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God has cared for these trees, saved them from drought, disease,
avalanches, and a thousand tempests and floods.
But he cannot save them from fools.
John Muir
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INTRODUCTION

Historical records are sometimes worth preserving although their value depends,
among other things, on their age and the inches of accumulated dust thereon. This slim
volume is an aged and dusty record of the Hall Memorial Lectures in Economics delivered at
the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, in the 1980s.
The Hall Endowment
Sherwood James Hall (1897-1968) was a woodsman, timberman. Raised in upstate
New York, he served a stint as a doughboy in World War I, and then studied forestry at
Syracuse University earning his degree in 1920. His initial employment was with James D.
Lacy and Company as a timber cruiser and project manager in the Jacksonville, Florida, area.
While there, he did a land use plan for a tract in Clay County owned by J. C. Penney; the
land is now the site of Penny Farms, a village and retirement center. He was also
instrumental in developing the pulp and paper industry in the region. And he bought timber
land in the area at Great Depression prices.
In 1948 Hall, along with two partners, S. E. Fogelberg and J. Ollie Edmunds,
bought a 30,000 acre tract of partly cut over redwood and douglas fir land on the coast of
California in southern Mendocino and northern Sonoma Counties. Here, Hall and his
partners, in collaboration with Emanuel Fritz, Dean of the College of Forestry at the
-5-

University of California, Berkeley, developed and practiced sustained yield redwood
forestry. The successful business, the Gualala Redwoods Inc., remains today but under
different ownership, perhaps enterprising Chinese.
Health considerations forced Hall to take up residence in a dry climate. So he
moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. Here, he acquired more – not forest – land. In his final years
Hall turned his attention to philanthropy. He endowed educational programs in the College
of Forestry at UC, Berkeley. The annual S. J. Hall Lecture in industrial forestry is still
presented on Homecoming Weekends at the Berkeley Campus. Then in 1965 he donated two
parcels of Las Vegas land to the Department of Economics at the University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. Proceeds from the sale of this land were to be used to finance educational efforts to
enhance community understanding of the principles of economics. These parcels of land
were sold in 1978 creating the S. J. Hall Endowment. And in 1982 Hall’s widow, Dessie,
donated two additional parcels of land to UNLV. Proceeds from the sale of these lands
supplemented the original Hall Endowment and the holdings of Lied Library.
The S. J. Hall Professorships in Economics
A portion of the Hall Endowment was used to support the S. J. Hall Professorships
in Economics at UNLV in the 1980s. There were three such Professorships. In addition to
teaching classes and pursuing research, the appointments gave the S. J. Hall Memorial
Lectures.
Wallace C. Peterson (1921-2012) was the Hall Visiting Professor in the 1983-84
academic year. Peterson held B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from the University of
Nebraska, Lincoln, and was the George Holmes Professor of Economics at the same
institution. Professor Peterson was Keynesian in that he considered The General Theory of
-6-

Employment, Interest, and Money the foundation of macroeconomic analysis; he was PostKeynesian in that he found much of the Neoclassical apparatus discordant with the
Keynesian framework; and he was an Institutionalist in that he regarded historical
developments, and social and political institutions as important elements in the analysis of
economic behavior and processes. Peterson published numerous articles, and his volume,
Income, Employment, and Economic Growth, was a widely used text in macroeconomics in
American colleges and universities. Professor Peterson gave two lectures: Lecture 1,
“Contemporary Macroeconomics: A House Divided,” was delivered on December 1, 1983;
and Lecture 2, “Economic Stabilization and Inflation,” was presented on May 8, 1984.
Murray N. Rothbard (1926-1995) was Hall Visiting Professor in the 1984-85
academic year. Rothbard held B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees from Columbia University. He
was Professor of Economics at the Polytechnic Institute of New York prior to his visitorship
at UNLV. Professor Rothbard was a founding member of the Cato Institute and was
therefore in the Libertarian fold; he was a disciple of the Ludwig von Mises branch of the
Austrian School of Economics; and he was a proponent of stateless Anarcho-Capitalism.
Rothbard was a prolific writer; his signature work is Man, Economy, and State: A Treatise on
Economic Principles (1962). During his visitorship Rothbard gave two lectures: Lecture 3,
“The Five Faces of Reaganomics,” was delivered on November 27, 1984; and Lecture 4,
“The Terrible Simplifiers: The Case Against the Flat Tax,” was presented on May 7, 1985.
Larry D. Singell (1937-

) was Hall Visiting Professor in the Spring Semester of

1986. Singell holds a B.A. degree from Eastern Nazarene College in Quincy, Massachusetts,
and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan. He was on
leave from the University of Colorado, Boulder, where he was Professor of Economics.
-7-

Professor Singell’s fields of specialization are Human Resource Economics and Urban
Economics. He has published numerous articles and monographs in his field, and he has
edited a number of volumes in The Collected Papers of Kenneth E. Boulding published by
the Colorado Associated University Press. Professor Singell gave one lecture: Lecture 5,
“Youth Unemployment: An American Crisis,” was delivered on May 14, 1986.
Professor Rothbard returned to UNLV as resident Hall Chair Professor in 1987. He
held this position until his death in 1995. In the resident professorship Rothbard gave two
lectures: Lecture 6, “Is There Life After Reaganomics?” was delivered on October 22, 1987;
and Lecture 7, “Deficits and Taxes: The Economics of the Next Four Years,” was presented
on c. January 11, 1989.
Taken as a series the lectures reveal some of the ragged edges of the dismal science.
In the first lecture Peterson, the Keynesian-Post Keynesian-Institutionalist, shows
macroeconomics in a crisis, a crisis of schools of thought; in the second lecture he examines
the American economy mired in another crisis, inflationary recession, stagflation. In the
third lecture Rothbard, the Libertarian-Austrian-Anarcho Capitalist, caricatures Reaganomics
as a polycephalic creature; in the fourth lecture he rants against all manner of flat, even
bumpy, taxes imposed by his always malicious government. In the fifth lecture Singell, the
Human Resource-Urban Economist, portrays an economy noticeably inclined toward youth
abuse. Then, in the sixth lecture Rothbard, the resident, returned to bury Reaganomics; and
in the seventh lecture he prepared a grave for the anticipated economic program of George H.
W. Bush. All-in-all the lectures are a jovial read, even at this late date!
Lewis Karstensson
May 10, 2017
-8-

If it is assumed that there exists for a market system an ideal
time-path for it to grow, then the fundamental issue is whether or not
forces natural to or inherent in markets will bring the economy to this path.
Wallace C. Peterson
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LECTURE 1
CONTEMPORARY MACROECONOMICS: A HOUSE DIVIDED
Wallace C. Peterson
(Delivered on December 1, 1983)
In the introduction to his provocative book, John Maynard Keynes, Washington
University Professor Hyman P. Minsky says, “There are times in the intellectual history of a
discipline when its theoretical house is in good order; at other times this house is in
disarray.”1 This accurately describes the state of contemporary macroeconomic theory.
Macroeconomics is a term economists use to designate the branch of economic theory which
explains the forces in a market economy which determine output and employment, the rate of
inflation, and the growth of production over time.
It was not always thus. In the 1960s, especially during the Kennedy presidency, a
broad consensus existed on the content and utility of macroeconomic theory. To use Thomas
Kuhn’s fashionable terminology, there was an accepted “paradigm” which was enshrined in
the textbooks and defined the boundaries of the discipline.2 No longer is this true. The unity
which once prevailed in the house of macroeconomics is now shattered; the theory is in
disarray. In the Kuhnian sense, there is a crisis, and the reigning paradigm is being
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challenged. My purpose this evening is to explore this crisis, showing how it came about and
offering speculation on its ultimate resolution.
1. The Central Issue in Macroeconomic Theory
The point of departure for my remarks is what I regard as the central, unresolved
issue in macroeconomic theory. This is the extent to which the modern market economy is a
self-regulating system, one which when left to its own devices will settle down and grow
steadily in a manner which utilizes all of its resources, especially labor. There is irony here,
because this is the issue that divided economics in the 1930s, and it is the issue dividing it
today. In a 1935 article in The New Republic, John Maynard Keynes said that the basic gulf
in economics was between those who believe that in the long-run the economic system is
self-adjusting and those who rejected this view.3 In this article, which predated publication
of The General Theory, Keynes aligned himself with the heretics (those who questioned the
self-adjusting character of the economic system), and dropped hints that he was developing
an alternative theory.
From an historical viewpoint, two fundamental and very broad “visions” have
emerged in macroeconomics in answer to this basic question. By “vision” I mean a rough
model of how the market economy works with respect to such fundamentals as output,
employment, the price level, and growth. A brief overview of these alternative “visions”
provides an appropriate frame of reference for later discussion of the theories now competing
with the reigning paradigm.
If it is assumed that there exists for a market system an ideal time-path for it to
grow, then the fundamental issue is whether or not forces natural to or inherent in markets
will bring the economy to this path. Historically, the oldest vision is that of the classical
- 11 -

economists, a term used roughly (and not wholly accurately) to describe the body of
economic ideas and theories which developed during the century and a half following the
publication of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations. Although classical economics has
many facets, its dominant thrust with respect to the issue posed here is that a system of
market capitalism, if unfettered by the state or groups with monopoly power, will of its own
accord seek out and follow the ideal time-path of growth. This time-path is ideal because it
involves the fullest possible use of all society’s resources and the maximum production of the
things which people want. The system is self-regulating not only in the sense that it will
gravitate toward this path, but also because if displaced from the path by external events –
say a war, or an oil embargo – forces are set in motion which will return it to the ideal path.
As one may readily surmise, the alternative “vision” of how market economies
work rejects the foregoing view. Not only is there no automatic tendency for the economy to
reach the ideal time-path, but there is no assurance that it will stay there if, by chance, it
reaches such a path. Furthermore, in this view of the economic universe, destabilizing
forces, whether from inside or outside the economic system, tend to be cumulative in their
effects. Consequently, instability, not self-regulation, is the norm for the market economy, a
point of view which implies that some external intervention into the market system is
necessary if we are to depend on something other than chance to put the economy on the
ideal time-path of growth. In advanced market economies in the modern world the
appropriate entity for such intervention is the central government.
2. The Legacy of Keynes
Historically, it is the latter vision which is the most recent, and which has
dominated macroeconomic thinking in the last half-century. It is a point of view born out of
- 12 -

the bitter experience of the Great Depression of the 1930s and which as an intellectual
discipline is primarily a legacy from Keynes. More than any other economist of the 20th
century, he is recognized as the father of modern macroeconomics. Thus, it is appropriate
that we turn first to Keynes and his ideas if we are to understand the current disarray in
macroeconomics and how it came about.
British economist and Nobel Laureate, Sir John Hicks, has said that future
historians will designate the quarter-century after World War II as the “Age of Keynes.”4 In
this he is undoubtedly correct. From 1945 until 1970 Keynesian ideas formed the theoretical
core for the reigning paradigm in macroeconomics. For a guide to appropriate policies for
managing their economies, most Western governments after World War II looked to
Keynesian economics. In the mixed economies in the West, the quarter century after World
War II represented an extraordinary success story. Growth was rapid, unemployment was
low, and inflation was not a serious problem. Most important, there was no indication that
the catastrophic collapse of the 1930s might repeat itself, even though the fear of another
major depression never entirely disappeared. Rightly or wrongly, Keynesian theory got the
credit for most of this success.
The book that changed the way we think about how the economic world works was
published early in 1936 under the title, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money. It is an abstruse work, not recommended for the general reader. Keynes said in the
Preface that it was directed chiefly to his fellow economists, although he hoped it would be
“intelligible to others.” The General Theory, John Kenneth Galbraith has said, is, like the
Bible and Marx’s Das Kapital, “deeply ambiguous,” a fact which helped to win converts.
Keynes explained the book’s abstruseness and ambiguities as the result of his “long struggle
- 13 -

to escape from habitual modes of thought and expression.”5 The latter were those of the
classical economics upon which Keynes was brought up at Cambridge.
To understand the full importance of The General Theory, one must realize that
Keynes’s objectives in the book were twofold. First, he sought to demonstrate that the
classical theory, which dominated British and American economies before the 1930s, was
wholly inadequate either to account for or deal with a major social and economic catastrophe
like the Great Depression. Keynes has been criticized for attacking a caricature rather than
the real substance of classical thinking, a viewpoint not without merit. Nevertheless, it is
primarily because of Keynes’s criticism that we have a better idea of the scope and shape of
classical economic thinking with respect to the aggregate performance of the economy.
Keynes may not have invented classical macroeconomic theory, but he certainly forced the
economic profession to explicitly identify the variables and relationships which governed the
performance of the aggregate economy. Before Keynes they were only implicit in the
economics taught at Cambridge.
Keynes’s other and more important objective was to develop a better theory, one
which truly would explain how output, employment, and the price level are determined under
all circumstances. As Keynes said in a letter to George Bernard Shaw shortly before The
General Theory was published, his new book would “largely revolutionise . . . the way the
world thinks about economic problems.”6 The book did exactly that. Keynesian theory as it
developed after 1936 – and especially as it unfolded in the post-World War II years – largely
displaced classical economics as the reigning macroeconomic paradigm. Keynesian
economics became the new orthodoxy, an orthodoxy now under attack from several
directions. Parenthetically, it is appropriate to note that it was a particular version or
- 14 -

interpretation of Keynes’s thought which assumed this role. Technically among economists
this interpretation is known as the “income-expenditure” approach to macroeconomic
analysis, the reason being that it focuses primarily upon total, or aggregate, spending as the
primary explanatory variable with respect to the overall performance of the economy.
For a full appreciation of the “Revolution” in economic thought caused by The
General Theory, it is necessary to know something of the system of classical economics
which Keynesian economics attacked and displaced. There are two reasons for this. First,
understanding in a broad way how the classical economists viewed the world not only helps
make Keynesian economics intelligible, but also enables us to put the latter in the appropriate
historical perspective. Second – and perhaps more important – the contemporary theoretical
challenges to the Keynesian paradigm look back to the classical schema for ideas and
inspiration. Consequently, comments on the nature of classical economics are in order.
3. The Nature of Classical Economics
In The General Theory Keynes used the term “classical economics” to characterize
the whole body of economic theorizing which preceded his own work and which stretches
back at least to Adam Smith.7

Technically this is not correct; historians of economic

thought distinguish classical economics from neoclassical economics. Roughly speaking, the
former embraces economic thought from David Ricardo to John Stuart Mill, while the latter
refers to the theories of economists who came after John Stuart Mill. For our purposes,
however, this distinction is not of major importance, the reason being that contemporary
macroeconomics generally uses the term “classical” as Keynes used it, namely to describe
pre-Keynesian theorizing about the determinants of output, employment, and the price level.8
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In this broad sense, “classical economics” refers to the body of theoretical concepts
and ideas which explain how an economy organized on the basis of free, competitive markets
and the private ownership of land and man-made capital (i.e., structures and machines) is
supposed to work. In the classical lexicon, a “competitive” market is one in which neither
buyers nor sellers can by their own actions determine or in any way influence the prices
which the market establishes through the interaction of the buyers and sellers. To explain
how the system works means to explain how through markets the system establishes prices
for everything that is produced and prices for the resources required so that production can
take place (land, labor, and capital); how efficiency in the use of resources is obtained; and
how the material welfare or well-being of all participants in the system is maximized. In a
sense, the classical economics as developed and refined throughout the 19th century was
really concerned with explaining in a formal way how Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”
working through markets harnessed personal greed – the pursuit of self-interest – to the
social good, the maximum production of the things people want.
What Keynes was interested in with respect to classical economics was how the
system was supposed to bring about the full and continued use of all resources in production,
especially the employment of labor. As he pointed out in The General Theory, classical
economics, while explaining in elegant detail how a market system allocates its resources
between different uses and how prices are established for the goods and services produced
and for the resources used in their production, it seldom examined in detail the theory of
what determines the actual employment of the resources available to a society.9 There is
such a theory, Keynes maintained, even though it is rarely mentioned. This being the case,

- 16 -

Keynes proceeded to set forth what he regarded as the essentials of the classical theory of
employment.
Classical employment theory, as outlined by Keynes and as it is now found in most
textbooks, consists of three basic propositions. First, the level of employment is determined
by the total demand for and supply of labor. A corollary to this is that once employment is
determined, output is also determined since the two obviously go together. In classical
macroeconomic theory the overall labor market is essentially the labor market for the
individual business firm writ large and applied to the whole economy. What is unique about
the classical theory is that the supply of labor is defined in a way to preclude any
unemployment except unemployment which is voluntary. Practically speaking, the classical
school regarded the full employment of labor as a normal state for the economy, a
proposition mocked by the mass unemployment confronting the economy in the 1930s. The
second classical proposition is the rather curious doctrine known as Say’s Law of Markets,
after Jean Baptiste Say, an early 19th century French economist. Even though the level of
employment is determined by the total demand for and supply of labor, and this level utilizes
all workers seeking work, the possibility exists that the output produced with this labor might
not be sold. Isn’t overproduction or a glut of unsold goods possible? Common sense and
experience suggest that the obvious answer is yes. But not according to Say’s Law. In its
simplest form, Say’s Law asserts that “supply creates its own demand,” which means that
every act of production creates income and therefore demand equal to the value of that
production. No general overproduction is possible. In a crude form, Say’s Law is valid in a
barter economy, since no person would bring goods to market except to exchange them for
other goods. In an economy which uses money, matters are not so simple. Production
- 17 -

generates money income for the producers, but one of the virtues of money is that one
doesn’t have to spend it immediately. Thus, in a money-using economy the possibility exists
that some income arising from production may not be spent immediately – it might, in other
words, be saved. Classical economics got around this problem by adding a corollary theory
to Say’s Law, namely a theory which links the supply of savings to the rate of interest and
the latter to borrowing by the businessman to purchase new capital goods, i.e., structures and
equipment. Therefore, if more is saved, interest rates will fall, and more borrowing and
spending for real capital will take place. If less is saved, the reverse will happen. The
essential point is that in the classical theory, saving cannot cause a decline in spending and
thus be responsible for more being produced than could be sold. Say’s Law works in a
money-using economy as well as in a barter economy. At least this was the classical view,
echoes of which are heard today in the argument that the economy is suffering from a
shortage of saving. This brings us to the third classical proposition, namely the role of
avoiding the clumsiness of barter. Money serves, primarily, as a medium of exchange, which
is to say it is generalized purchasing power readily convertible into almost anything. This
being the case, any change in the amount of money will lead to more or less spending, but
since resources are normally fully employed, more or less spending primarily affects the
price level. The idea that prices are linked directly to the money supply is known as the
quantity theory of money. It is an old idea, dating back to the 18th century or earlier, but one
which has been reconstituted in modern dress by former University of Chicago economist,
Milton Friedman. We shall examine his ideas shortly.
Combining the foregoing propositions with competitive markets and the free play of
self-interest by businessmen, workers, and consumers gives us all the necessary ingredients
- 18 -

for a self-regulating economic system, one which employs all resources fully and in the most
efficient way possible. The logical – or “natural” – policy conclusion derived from this view
is that of laissez faire, or non-interference by government in the running of the economy.
Classical economics thus did what any good theory should do: it explained (how
employment, output, and prices were determined); it predicted (full employment would be
the norm); and prescribed (governments should keep their hands off the economy).
4. The Keynesian Revolution
In Thomas Kuhn’s classic study of how scientific progress proceeds through
“revolutions” he argues that an accepted body of theoretical ideas – a paradigm in his words
– is in trouble when, increasingly, anomalies appear. Anomalies are events or happenings
which cannot be explained adequately by the prevailing paradigm. The stage is then set for a
crisis and the emergence of a new paradigm – in short, for a scientific revolution.
If we view the classical ideas just discussed as the ruling economic paradigm prior
to 1929, then the anomaly which set the stage for the Keynesian Revolution was the Great
Depression and the mass unemployment therein. Here was something that simply could not
be explained by the ruling paradigm. Events made a mockery of the classical belief that the
economy was inherently stabilizing, that market forces on their own would bring about full
employment. Economic theory confronted a scientific crisis as described by Kuhn.
Ultimately, and also in accord with the Kuhnian scenario, a new paradigm emerged to
displace the classical system. This was the Keynesian “revolution,” the essence of which is
quickly described.
Instead of asserting, as classical theory did, that employment (and output) depended
upon the interaction between the total demand for and supply of labor, Keynes took a
- 19 -

different tack altogether. In a sense, he stood the classical analysis on its head. The
economy’s level of employment, he said, depends upon the interaction between total
spending – which he called aggregate demand – and the economy’s capacity to produce. In a
system of market capitalism, decisions to produce goods and services are the province of the
businessman, but production, which is also the source of employment, will take place only if
business experiences or foresees a market in which the goods produced can be sold at prices
which will cover their production costs. Lacking demand – either actual or expected –
productive capacity will stand idle and people will go without jobs.
The foregoing idea, simple as it seems, is the essential core of the Keynesian
“revolution.” It is aggregate demand, by which Keynes means total spending for goods and
services by consumers, businesses, and governments which triggers action in a market
economy. Only when sufficient demand is present or expected will businessmen make the
decisions which lead simultaneously to production and jobs. Nothing in the way that the
system works guarantees that sufficient total spending – i.e., demand – will exist to insure
that enough is produced to provide jobs for every person wanting work.
Contrast this with the classical view. Through Say’s Law of Markets, the classical
paradigm assumes that markets always exist for whatever is produced. There may be from
time to time a mismatch between the supply of and demand for particular goods, but overall
(or in total) such a mismatch is impossible. If this is the way the world works, then it makes
sense to explain the actual level of output by explaining, first, how labor markets in the
aggregate determine employment, and then how the amount of employment determines
output. Since there is always a demand for labor in the classical world if its price (i.e., wage)
is not too high, then any unemployment is the result of either wages being too high, a
- 20 -

condition workers could correct by agreeing to work for less, or simply because workers
choose not to work at the prevailing wage. In either case, unemployment is voluntary, and
consequently of no concern to society. Keynes saw it differently, arguing that it is
production which determines how much labor will be used, and that no production will take
place unless there are markets for what is being produced. If markets don’t exist, or are
weak, production doesn’t take place, or is low, and workers find themselves without jobs.
The fault is not theirs; it lies elsewhere. Unemployment is involuntary and society does have
an interest in the matter.
There is, of course, much more to Keynes’s General Theory than this. In market
capitalism, spending by consumers (households) and businessmen (firms) make up most of
the spending taking place. Keynes, we should remember, wrote The General Theory at a
time when spending by governments was a much smaller share of total spending than is now
the case. Much of The General Theory is devoted to explaining how the spending by
consumers and business firms is determined, and how and why this spending changes. If
these spending aggregates can be explained satisfactorily, then the level of total spending –
aggregate demand – can be explained. As far as spending by consumers is concerned,
Keynes believed that it was relatively stable, being dependent upon the income that is
generated when production takes place. But spending by business firms is a different story.
The business spending which concerned Keynes was capital spending, that is, the purchase of
equipment and structures so that a business firm may produce more goods and services in the
future. This spending is highly volatile, subject to sudden and unforeseen changes. The
reason is that in a market economy, capital spending is undertaken only in the expectation
that it will be profitable. Profitability depends upon the ability to sell in the future goods and
- 21 -

services to be produced using capital goods purchased in the present. Since the future is
unknown, spending decisions for capital equipment rest upon an uncertain and flimsy
foundation. Keynes said there was no scientific basis whatsoever for determining future
profitability. It is the volatility of capital spending which accounts for the inherent instability
of market capitalism, those alternating periods of boom and bust which have plagued
capitalism since the industrial revolution.
Two broad conclusions can be drawn from this brief sketch of the Keynesian
paradigm. First – and as already mentioned – there is nothing in Keynes’s vision of how a
market system works to insure continuously that total spending (or aggregate demand) will
be at a level sufficient to provide jobs for every person able and wanting to work. Full
employment, in other words, is not automatically attained. On the contrary, Keynes believed
that “full, or even approximately, full employment is a rare and short-lived occurrence.”10
Keynesian theory thus stands 180 degrees at variance from the classical theory on the crucial
issue of whether full employment is the norm for a market system.
The second conclusion, which follows logically from the first, is more far-reaching
in its implication. If private spending by consumers and businesses is not sufficient to push
the economy to full employment levels of production, then government should make good on
the deficiency. This is the straight-forward policy message from The General Theory. What
Keynes did was to provide the necessary intellectual justification – that is, the needed theory
– for intervention by government into the workings of the market economy in order to
achieve full employment. The triumph of Keynesian theory meant the end of laissez faire as
policy, an event codified in this country by the Employment Act of 1946. This act explicitly
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recognizes the federal government’s responsibility for maintaining “maximum employment,
production, and purchasing power.”11
5. Keynesian Economics in Practice
So much for the basic theory of Keynesian economics. Of more critical importance
is its validity and effectiveness. Economic theorizing is an attractive activity for many
people, especially for the mathematically inclined, but it is also a pointless activity unless it
is aimed ultimately at doing something about the economy’s real problems. Experience over
the long era of Keynesian ascendancy suggests three conclusions. First, World War II
provided an unplanned, undesirable, but effective “laboratory” test for Keynes’s basic
proposition. As is generally recognized, it was the war, not Roosevelt’s New Deal which
ended the Great Depression. Once war came, public spending mounted rapidly and by 1944,
the unemployment rate dropped to a record low of 1.2 percent. The injection of massive
amounts of new public spending into the economy did the trick. There is little doubt that a
depressed economy can be stimulated by Keynesian measures. An unfortunate byproduct of
this experience was the emergency of “military Keynesianism.” Joan Robinson argues, for
example, that a major slump was avoided during the “Age of Keynes” primarily because of
large scale government spending, made possible only because of a willingness of
governments and the public to spend money on armaments.12
Second, the evidence is clear that the economy in the post-World War II era
enjoyed greater stability and prosperity than in the earlier decades of this century. During the
quarter century after the war – the “Age of Keynes” – real growth was higher than prewar,
and variations in the rate of growth were smaller. The latter means that the business cycle,
though not eliminated, was much tamer when compared to prewar. The late Arthur Okun
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found, for example, that between 1945 and 1975 the typical expansion period lasted nearly
twice as long (48 months) as did an upswing in the years between 1854 and 1937 (26
months). Postwar contractions were only about half as long (11 months) when compared to
downswings in the same prewar time-span (21 months).13 “This quantum jump in stability –
this taming of the business cycle,” Okun said, “Must, in my judgment, be credited to public
policy. It was made in Washington.”14 Whether or not this postwar success is a direct result
of Keynesian policies is a question scholars will debate for a long while.
Finally – and unfortunately – experience taught that Keynesian theory was
asymmetrical.15 By means of fiscal and monetary policy spending could be stimulated to
bring the unemployment rate down, but when the policy machinery was thrown into reverse
to combat inflation, the economy did not respond as expected. Rather than leading to an
immediate fall in the inflation rate, a policy reversal caused output and employment to fall,
thereby putting the economy into a recession but not ending inflation. Such has been the
pattern since the end of the 1960s. Four times since 1969 administrations have attempted to
slow the growth of money demand – i.e., spending – in the hope of slowing inflation, and
each time the result was the same: recession and rising unemployment.
The earlier success of Keynesian economics in conjunction with its alleged failure
to cope with inflation made economics ripe once again for a paradigm crisis. Keynesianism
was now the established orthodoxy, and like classical economics, it was vulnerable to attack
once anomalies appeared which it could not explain. In the contemporary scene, the major
anomaly is, of course, inflation, which the critics say is not only a social and economic
problem of major importance, but also one that Keynesian theory will exacerbate rather than
cure. To this point, a Kuhnian scenario has been followed. But now there is a difference. In
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Kuhn’s scheme, the crisis is resolved when a new paradigm emerges to displace the older
paradigm. But this is not happening in macroeconomics. Instead of revolution, we have
counter-revolutions, attempting not only to displace the Keynesian paradigm, but contending
with each other. They are “counter-revolutions,” because, rather than take macroeconomic
theory into new and unexplored territory, they look back to classical economics for ideas and
inspiration. It is to these I now turn.
6. The Counter-Revolutions
Since 1945 three “counter-revolutions” have emerged to challenge the Keynesian
orthodoxy, winning significant support among economists and some policy-makers. The
year, 1965, was a pivotal year for these developments because it marked the beginning of the
Vietnam escalation and the ensuing inflation which Keynesian-oriented policy-makers found
so intractable. The counter-revolutions are, respectively, Monetarism, the New Classical
Economics, and Supply-Side Economics. They are not the same, although they have
common roots in the classical theory displaced by the Keynesian Revolution. In the time
remaining, I shall sketch out, in a broad way, characteristics of each of these challenges.
a. Monetarism.
Monetarism – or the modern quantity theory as it is also called – is practically
synonymous with Milton Friedman, Nobel Laureate and long-time Professor of Economics at
the University of Chicago. Friedman, who never really accepted Keynesian theory, even
though working within a Keynesian framework, argued consistently during his long
professional career on the primacy of money in macroeconomic theory. When Keynesianism
after 1965 seemed unable to control inflation, monetarism came into its own, gaining
significant support within the economics profession.
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What is the basic issue between the Monetarists and the Keynesians? In the
income-expenditure version of Keynes – i.e., the post-World War II textbook model of
Keynesianism – fiscal policy which operates through the surpluses or deficits of the federal
budget is looked on as the primary means for controlling the level of aggregate demand (i.e.,
total spending). Friedman and the monetarists dispute this, asserting that the money supply
provides a better link, not only to the price level as in the older, classical quantity theory, but
also to output and employment – at least in the short run. To the extent this is the case, and
to the extent that any policy actions are necessary, policy-makers are better off by
manipulating the money supply rather than changing taxes or government spending in
managing the economy.
The rub in the foregoing is the phrase, “to the extent that any policy actions are
necessary.” Contrary to Keynes and the Keynesians, Friedman and his disciples believe that
a market economy is inherently stable, that the forces of the market are truly self-regulating.
This being the case, the obvious question is how do the Monetarists account for the observed
instability of the economy, for the presence of the business cycle since the Industrial
Revolution? This answer, like all aspects of their theory, centers on money. Money and its
management by governments is the real cause of instability. This is the basic conclusion
Friedman reached in his massive empirical study, A Monetary History of the U. S. 18671960.
From the foregoing theoretical tenets, Monetarism derives its primary policy
recommendation. To prevent instability, discretionary monetary changes by the monetary
authority (the Federal Reserve in the U. S.) must be avoided. In place of discretion there
should be a “monetary rule,” one which would establish a fixed annual rate of growth for the
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money supply. The rate selected would depend upon the growth rate for key long-term
determinants of output, such as the labor force and technological change. Since Monetarists
also believe that there is a long lag between changes in the money supply and prices,
establishing a fixed rate of growth for money and sticking with it would insure the long run
stability of prices. From October 1979 through mid-1982, the Federal Reserve opted for a
quasi-Monetarist position, not in the sense of abandoning discretion in policy, but in focusing
on the money supply rather than interest rates as a policy target. Inflation has come down,
but at a cost in terms of unemployment and lost output which many economists consider too
high.
b. The New Classical Economics.
Far more sweeping in its implications for macroeconomic theory and policy is the
radical counter-revolutionary challenge to Keynesianism which Professor James Tobin of
Yale University calls the “New Classical Economics.”16 Intellectually it is the most
powerful of the challenges to the Keynesian orthodoxy, a fact which makes it highly
attractive to many economic scholars. It was the late Harry Johnson who pointed out that a
necessary characteristic for a new economic theory seeking to displace an older economic
theory is a sufficient degree of difficulty.17 It must be difficult enough to discourage senior
colleagues from attempting to understand it, but not so difficult as to prevent younger
scholars from mastering it with a reasonable intellectual investment. Johnson saw this as one
of the reasons for the success of Keynes’s theory, but the New Classical Economics also
meets this requirement.
Basically, the New Classical Economics is a marriage of two ideas, one essentially
new and the other older and drawn directly from classical economics. These ideas are the
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theory of rational expectations and the theory of continuous market-clearing. Both are
subtle theories, not easily reduced to a few sentences. The rational expectations hypothesis
(REH) starts with the common sense proposition that our expectations about the future affect
the decisions we make today. The crucial question for economics is how people form their
expectations. The answer of the rational expectations school is that economic agents (there
are no flesh and blood people in the REH literature, only “agents”) form their expectations
using all available information and they use this information efficiently. There is nothing
particularly novel in this, except that it is assumed that the knowledge includes an
understanding of how any governmental policy measure will affect the economy. In the
jargon of economics, it is assumed that agents have knowledge of the relevant economic
model used by policy-makers. The significance of their argument is that any policy actions
by government will be ineffective, the reason being that policy results are anticipated by
being incorporated into the information used in forming expectations. In short, governmental
policy won’t work, unless people don’t have accurate information. This is interpreted by
proponents of the rational expectations school to mean that the only way a government can
make policy work is to fool people systematically, not a pleasing idea for a democracy.
Expectations don’t exist in a vacuum. They are acted on in the real world economy
through market decisions. This is the point at which the other part of the New Classical
Economics enters the picture, the theory of continuous market-clearing. The idea behind this
is that markets are efficient, which is to say that prices established will not lead to either a
surplus or shortage of whatever is being traded in a particular market. In a market which is
efficient in this sense, all relevant information known to buyers and sellers is reflected in
price which clears the market. The efficient market theory was applied initially to financial
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markets – stocks and bonds – but the New Classical Economics has taken it over and applied
it to all markets, including the market for labor. Essentially, this is a restatement of the
classical view that all markets are competitive and all prices are flexible. When this is
combined with rational expectations, the result is a view which holds that the economy is
self-regulating, that full employment is the norm, and that any governmental intervention into
the economy will be counter-productive. Fluctuations in real variables – output and
employment – when not caused by governmental mismanagement, result solely from
insufficient or inaccurate information. Basically, the New Classical Economics abolishes
macroeconomic theory.
c. Supply-Side Economics.
The third counter-revolutionary challenge to the Keynesian paradigm, Supply-Side
Economics, is the one best known to the public, primarily because it provided the rationale
for the Reagan administration’s massive tax cut in 1981. It also has the least substance of the
three challenges discussed, being primarily a creation of the news media, rather than a
product of serious economic scholarship. Simply put, Supply-Side Economics combines a
belief that all productive effort is inversely related to taxation with a faith in Say’s Law of
Markets.
The first proposition is the message provided by Arthur Laffer’s now-famous curve,
originally sketched out on a napkin in a Washington, D. C. restaurant. Laffer, a University of
Southern California economist, argues that a cut in taxes will result in a near miraculous
burst of production and growth. The supply response to a tax cut will be so great that
government revenues would actually increase. Also there is no need ever to worry about
selling the added output, for, as George Gilder says in his book, Wealth and Poverty, the
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definitive statement of the supply-side philosophy, “the essential thesis of Say’s Law remains
true: Supply creates demand. There can be no such thing as a general glut of goods.”18 The
tax cuts of 1981-83 provided as near a “laboratory” test for an economic theory as we are
likely to get. Supply-side economics failed the “test” miserably; instead of growth and rising
revenues, we got near-depression conditions in 1981-82 and staggering deficits for the
foreseeable future.
7. Concluding Comments
In concluding my comments I wish to make a few broad observations on the
ultimate resolution of the crisis in macroeconomics. That there is such a crisis I do not deny.
But I don’t believe any of the three counter-revolutions just discussed will succeed in
becoming the new world view for macroeconomics. There are several reasons for this. The
ultimate test of the validity of any economic paradigm is not its theoretical elegance, but its
success or failure in the policy realm. It must address itself to and offer solutions for crucial
economic problems. Harry Johnson has said that The General Theory was successful
because it had something sensible to say about a major problem, mass unemployment.19
Monetarism promises in the long-run to solve the inflation problem, but its short-term costs
of high unemployment and lost output are a price society is unwilling to pay. Supply-Side
Economics simply can’t deliver what it promises. As to the New Classical Economics, it
denies the historic reality of a system of market capitalism constantly in flux, never in
equilibrium, always moving between boom and bust. There is nothing in this paradigm to
explain the observed existence of rising prices and wages alongside high unemployment and
excess capacity. As James Tobin suggests, the New Classicals seek to bend the real world to
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fit their paradigm, rather than construct a model which explains the economic world in which
we really live.20
I believe that ultimately a new and more satisfactory macroeconomic paradigm will
come from an entirely different direction, a direction now being charted by a small and still
heterogeneous group of economists known as the “Post Keynesians.” Currently, neither their
names nor their ideas are well known to the public, or even within the economics profession
for that matter.21 But this will change. Their goal is to develop a macroeconomics suitable
for the world as it really exists, not as it might exist if the assumptions of classical economics
were really true. They carry the label “Post Keynesian” because in part they look to
neglected elements in The General Theory for an understanding of how the economy really
works. They contend that the standard post World War II interpretation of Keynes – the
income-expenditure approach described earlier – overlooks many of Keynes’s keener
insights into the actual workings of market capitalism. Those include, for example, seeing
capitalism as an economic system operating in real, historic time, not as a timeless
equilibrium system; understanding the crucial role that expectations rooted in uncertainty
play in capitalistic behavior; and paying attention to how money and financial institutions are
a major factor in the endemic instability of the system. In the real world economy many key
prices and wages are set administratively rather than in competitive markets, a fact largely
ignored in the classical analysis, but not by the Post Keynesians. Perhaps the major and most
important way in which the Post Keynesians differ from classical economics is in their time
perspective. Classical macroeconomics is essentially long-term analysis, but as Keynes said
in a famous passage, the “. . . long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long
run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous
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seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again.”22 This
is sound advice which we should heed today.
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In the modern economy there are two sets
of basic forces contending with one another and through
which the economy works. There are those which center on competition
and market relationships, and those which center on power and power relationships.
Wallace C. Peterson

- 35 -

LECTURE 2
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AND INFLATION
Wallace C. Peterson
(Delivered on May 8, 1984)

For nearly two decades the United States and other major industrial democracies
have struggled to reach full employment without inflation. None have succeeded, a failure
that has caused both laypersons and professional economists to question the wisdom of much
contemporary economic theory as well as the policy measures based upon this theory. Since
the failures of the 1970s followed a quarter century (1945-1970) in which Western nations
successfully managed their economies on the basis of Keynesian principles, it was inevitable
that the failure in the 1970s to contain inflation while striving for full employment be laid at
Keynes’s doorstep. More recently, however, contemporary monetarism and supply-side
economics, theories which reach back to pre-Keynesian classical ideas for their inspiration
and substance, have been brought to bear on the problem. They, too, have been found
wanting. Recently, the inflation rate has been brought down sharply from the double digit
levels which prevailed as the 1970s ended, but the cost of this was a severe recession and the
highest unemployment since the Great Depression of the 1930s. So the question remains: is
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it possible for systems of market capitalism to enjoy simultaneously full employment and
stable prices?
This is the problem discussed in this lecture. My procedure is relatively straightforward. First, I shall discuss our recent experience with inflation and its causes. After that,
I shall examine some policy proposals appropriate to the 1980s, policies which will lead to
full employment without inflation, a goal which to date has eluded our grasp. I will conclude
with a few observations on some basic economic changes we will have to make to put the
house of our mixed economic system in order.
1. The Legacy of the 1970s
It is well recognized by now that the roots of the inflation which plagued the
economy in the 1970s had its origins in the Vietnam War. The impact of military spending
for Vietnam in 1966 and subsequent years provides a near perfect “textbook” case of how not
to manage the economy. Consider the following: in 1966 when the Vietnam build-up began,
the unemployment rate was 3.8 percent, slightly below the targeted Kennedy-Johnson full
employment figure of 4 percent; the Federal Reserve capacity utilization rate in
manufacturing was 91.7 percent, a figure not equaled before or since in the post-World War
II period; and there was practically no inflation, the annual percentage change in the CPI for
the prior six years being 1.3 percent.1 The picture is one of the economy being as near to a
full utilization of all its resources as is possible other than in the circumstances of an all-out
World War II style mobilization.
Whether or not the Johnson administration deliberately underplayed or
underestimated the size of the military build-up – 1966 was an election year – is a matter to
be left to the historians. What we do know ex post is that federal defense spending jumped
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$10.9 billion during the year, a sizable increase under full employment conditions. The
proper policy response should have been an immediate tax increase of equal or greater
magnitude, a course of action urged upon the administration by the nation’s leading
economists.2 The administration chose to ignore this advice, hoping, perhaps, that the war
would be resolved quickly and it would be spared the painful task of asking for a tax
increase.
No one knows, of course, if economic events in the 1970s would have been
significantly different had the Johnson administration chosen to act decisively during 1966
and requested the tax increase called for by the circumstances. By 1966, primarily because
of the success of the 1964 Kennedy-Johnson tax cut, there was widespread public acceptance
for the macroeconomic theories and policies which were taught after World War II in a
majority of the nation’s colleges and universities. The failure of the administration to reverse
course in 1966 and apply the remedy of a tax increase, painful as this would have been
politically, turned out to be extremely costly, not only for the economy, but also for the
economics profession. Given the fact that there is evidence that when a tax increase finally
did come in 1968, it worked as the theory predicted.3 It is not unreasonable to conclude that
prompt enactment of a tax increase during 1966 might have kept inflationary pressures in
check, and even, perhaps, prevented the collapse of the administration’s wage-price
“Guideposts” policy.4 For the economy the price for this policy failure was the inflation of
the 1970s; for the economics profession the price was lost credibility, a blow from which it
has not yet recovered.
All the foregoing is speculation. What actually happened is also well known.
Although mild in comparison with recent experience (1979-81), prices jumped significantly
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under the stimulus of excess demand. Between 1966 and 1969 the economy experienced a
classic “demand-pull” inflation, one which saw prices rising at a 6.1 percent annual rate by
the end of the period. Thus, the stage was set for the dismal “stop and go” performance of
the 1970s.
By 1969, the stimulus to expansion from the war in Vietnam was over, but the
inflation continued. Why the inflation continued once the Vietnam war build-up ended is a
question I shall address shortly. As a consequence, however, ending inflation became a
prime policy objective of every administration from Nixon through Reagan, with each
administration following essentially the same pattern. Whenever the inflation rate
accelerated (as it did in 1969, in 1973, and in 1980), the standard response was to apply the
monetary and fiscal brakes with the results always the same. Fiscal and monetary restraint
plunged the economy into a recession, as happened in 1970, 1974-75, 1980 and again in
1981-82. Unemployment rose and the inflation rate came down, although usually the latter
lagged a year or so behind the recession and rising unemployment. “Stagflation” is the
unlovely term coined to describe this situation. The Reagan economic experiment fit this
pattern. A restrictive monetary stance was a key element in the Reagan program, and as
happened three times previously, the result was recession.
What is not clear as the economy moves into a new expansion following the fourth
measurable recession since 1969 is whether this pattern will continue into the future. The
restrictive policies of the Reagan administration led to the same results prior administrations
experienced, but with an important exception. And this is that the inflation rate came down
more rapidly and sharply than in any of the three prior recessions, a development which has
led some economists to believe that the inflation’s upward momentum has finally been
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broken. Whether or not this is true, still remains to be seen, but it is not difficult to pinpoint
the reasons for the sharp decline in the inflation rate. First, the 1981-82 recession was the
most severe since the Great Depression of the 1930s, at least as concerns the unemployment
rate. The latter reached 10.7 percent in December, 1982, the trough of the recession.5
Second, the economy for all practical purposes had been in a stagnant condition for four
years, industrial production having been either flat or declining since 1979. Since President
Reagan’s restrictive policies were applied to an economy suffering from what Keynes would
have described as an “underemployment equilibrium,” it should not come as any surprise that
there was a weakening of prices, even given the strong oligopolistic structure and
administered price behavior in the strategically important sectors of the economic system.
Finally, the disarray in OPEC and plentiful food supplies kept the rate of increase in energy
and food prices – two key elements in the CPI – far below what it had been in the prior three
recessions.6
What general conclusions can we draw from the 1970s experience? First, it should
be obvious by now that neither monetarism nor supply-side economics has the answer to the
economy’s systemic excess of both inflation and unemployment. It is clear that restrictive
monetary policies will slow down the inflation rate, but the price is recession and excessive
unemployment. Monetarism’s implied promise is that by strict adherence to the monetary
rule inflationary expectations can be reduced quickly, thereby obviating the necessity for any
lengthy period of high unemployment. This has not happened. The unannounced shift of the
Federal Reserve in mid-1982 from targeting the money supply to targeting interest rates
represented tacit admission of monetarism’s failure. As for supply-side economics, it is
obvious that the expected burst of productive activity and growth which was supposed to
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flow from the 1981 tax cuts never materialized. Instead, the tight money policy pursued
during the first 10 months of 1981 pushed the economy into a deep recession long before the
effect of any tax cuts were felt.7
What is surprising in view of the record of the 1970s is that any serious economic
observer would expect anything different to happen. What is also discouraging, though not
necessarily unexpected, given the contemporary conservative orientation of the economic
profession, is the failure of mainstream economists to point out what ought to be obvious: the
recent recession, like all post-war recessions, did not turn into a major depression primarily
because of: (1) the sheer size of government and the stabilizing role such size imparts to the
economy, and (2) the magnitude of social spending by the federal government, spending
which sustains personal incomes and spending power in the face of an economic downturn.
There is irony in this because the Reagan administration, which has not hesitated to claim full
credit for the recovery, although disdaining any responsibility for the recession, has made
“big” government and “excessive” social spending prime targets for reduction. Furthermore,
as the recovery proceeded through 1983, it acquired a distinctly Keynesian flavor. Little was
heard during the spring and summer about supply-side incentives being at work, but the tax
cut was praised for its favorable impact on consumer spending, particularly for houses and
automobiles.
A second point concerns unemployment. The secular upward drift in the
unemployment rate since the late 1960s confirms that something more is involved than
cyclical fluctuations in the jobless rate. What we are seeing is a growing inability of the
economy, even under the best conditions, to provide jobs for all persons able and seeking
work. Conservatives have to a considerable degree chosen to sidestep the issue, primarily by
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redefining upward the acceptable rate of unemployment that can be achieved through
macroeconomic policies without causing a resurgence in inflation. The Reagan
administration’s Council of Economic Advisers puts what it terms the inflation threshold –
the point at which inflation increases with further reductions in unemployment – in the range
of 6 to 7 percent.8 What the 1970s experience confirms is that if the economy is stimulated
by conventional means, namely an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, prices respond
more quickly than does the unemployment rate. The problem is to discover both reasons and
remedies for this, a central objective of this lecture.
Our final observation at this point is related directly to the foregoing, taking us to
the heart of the problem. By the end of the 1960s the character of the inflation underwent a
basic change, from a “demand-pull” inflation to one of the “cost-push” variety. The
evidence? Simply put, an inflation which persists and even accelerates at times in the face of
continued (and even growing) slack in the economic system can only be accounted for in
“cost-push” terms. For evidence on the slack state of the economy during the 1970s, we need
only point to the fact that capacity utilization was below the average of the prior two decades,
unemployment was on average significantly higher than in either the 1950s or 1960s, and the
“gap” between potential and actual output was greater on average than it was in the 1950s.9
The crucial question, the issue to which I now turn, is how can we account for the persistence
of inflation in the face of such tendencies toward chronic stagnation?
2. The Roots of Inflation
If we leave aside the clear case of an inflation caused by excess demand under full
employment conditions (the situation from 1966 to 1969), we are left with two contending
explanations. The one is the modern quantity theory, fathered by Milton Friedman, and the
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other is the explanation offered by Keynes in The General Theory, an explanation which,
inexplicably, has been seriously neglected.10 Of the two, it is my contention that Keynes’s
approach provides the best explanation for the events of the 1970s.
As is well-known, the modern quantity theory maintains that the money supply is
the primary determinant in the short-run of not only the price level, but also output and
employment. Numerous statistical studies have shown that there is a close correlation
between money (however defined) and the general level of economic activity, a result not
unexpected since in a money-using society little can be done without the use of money. But
what such studies do not – and probably cannot – resolve is the causation problem. Is the
direction of causation from money to action to output and prices, or the other way around,
from action to money, and then to prices and output? A literal interpretation of monetarist
theory holds the first to be true, namely that it is the availability of money which necessarily
precedes and triggers the decision to act. Such a viewpoint, however, stretches credulity,
especially in view of the fact that the overwhelming bulk of whatever passes for money in
contemporary society comes into existence because some entity – consumers, business firms,
or governments – has decided to do something, the doing of which requires the spending of
money. If the money is not available from current income flows, borrowing will take place;
consequently, the money supply will expand. In even the most elementary textbook
treatment of the expansion and contraction of demand deposit money, it is clear that the only
thing that the central bank can ultimately control is the monetary base, namely the reserves of
the banking system. Whether or not there is an actual expansion of money in circulation
always depends upon the willingness of the public (and the government) to borrow.
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Observation and common sense tells us that “willingness to borrow” must of necessity be
preceded by the decision to act, to do something tangible.
In her now famous Ely Lecture to the American Economics Association in New
Orleans in 1972, the late Joan Robinson pointed out that in The General Theory Keynes not
only explained how the level of output is determined by investment and consumption
spending, but that his analysis also made it clear that “if continuous nearfull employment
was maintained without any change in traditional institutions and attitudes in industrial
relations, there would be an irrestible pressure to inflation.”11 It was this element in Keynes
which, she said, was swept under the rug. Continuing she went on to say:12
It seems that the extraordinary vogue in recent years of an argument so
implausible as the Quantity Theory of Money was due to a refusal to accept
the fact that the main influence on the general price level in money terms is
the level of money wage rates and the level of wage rates at any moment is
more or less an historical accident, depending upon conditions in the labor
market over a long past. This was such a serious blow to notions of
equilibrium and the rationality of a market economy that any theory was
better, even a theory that consisted of a set of incantations.
Not only do her biting remarks represent an outright rejection of monetarism as a
satisfactory theory of the price level, they succinctly state the essence of Keynes’s own
explanation for aggregate pricing behavior. In Chapter 21 (“The Theory of Prices”) in The
General Theory Keynes argued that there was a false dichotomy in the classical economics,
the dichotomy being that at the level of the individual firm and industry – the microeconomic
level, in other words – economists resorted to one kind of theory to explain prices, but when
they passed to the economy as a whole, they looked to an entirely different theory. In the
first instance, Keynes said, prices in a single industry depend partly upon the rate of
remuneration of the factors of production which enter into marginal cost and partly on the
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scale of output. In the second instance, however, it is argued that prices in general depend
upon the quantity of money. What was necessary, he argued, was an escape from this
“double life,” one which would show that the same forces which determine prices at the
microeconomic level also account for the overall behavior of prices.
The details of the argument Keynes developed need not detain us. His broad
conclusions are, however, crucial. As economists have long taught, individual prices are
determined by conditions of supply and demand in competitive markets, a point of view
which Keynes did not challenge, and a point of view representative of current
microeconomic thinking. What is crucial are marginal costs. Their general level is
determined primarily by money wages whereas their behavior as output changes depends
upon the scale of output in the short-run and upon productivity changes in the long-run.
Here we have the gist of Keynes’s thinking on the determination of prices at both the micro
level and for the economy as a whole. For the long-term his basic conclusion was:13
The long run stability or instability of prices will depend primarily on the
strength of the upward trend of the wage-unit (or, more precisely, of the unit
cost) compared with the rate of increase in the efficiency of the productive
system.
Restated, the essence of the argument is that in the absence of a situation which
clearly can be defined as one of demand-pull, the primary determinant of the economy’s
basic inflation rate is the relationship between the rate of growth of money wages and the rate
of growth of productivity. The first is what Keynes meant by the “upward trend of the wageunit” and the second is what he meant by “increase in the efficiency of the productive
system.” The basic inflation rate refers to general changes in prices which grow out of the
interaction of demand and supply forces at the level of the firm and industry. It is termed
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basic because in the absence of random shocks, such as the four-fold increase in energy
prices engineered by OPEC in 1973 or large increases in aggregate demand, the overall price
level must be explained by the same forces which determine prices at the firm and industry
levels.
3. The Theory and the Evidence
The foregoing gives us the bare bones of Keynes’s basic explanation for inflation,
an explanation which he believed provided the necessary linkages between the determination
of prices at the level of the firm and industry and the determination of prices in general.
Restated simply as possible, the theory holds that the economy’s basic inflation rate depends
upon unit labor costs, which in turn depend upon the relationship between changes in money
wages and changes in productivity. At this point, I wish to examine briefly the available
statistical evidence from the past 22 years to determine how well the theory fits the facts of
experience. This will set the stage for some policy recommendations.
In Table 1 at the end of the lecture we find data for five year intervals for the
period, 1960-1982, which shows annual average rates of change in the strategic variables
which enter into this approach. The variables include productivity, compensation per hour,
unit labor costs, and two inflation rates, the GNP deflator and the consumer piece index.
The story told by these data is direct. First, they show clearly the pronounced
deterioration in the rate of growth of productivity in the American economy, a phenomenon
noted by economists of every persuasion, but for which there is no agreed-upon explanation.
Second, money wages (including fringes) grew at an accelerating pace during the period,
even though the 1970s were marred by three recessions. Third, the combination of
deteriorating productivity growth and escalating money wages had its inevitable effect, an
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acceleration in the rate of growth of unit labor costs. Finally, and not unexpected, given the
widespread practice of mark-up pricing in industry and commerce, prices as measured by
either the GNP deflator or the CPI rose almost in direct proportion to the rise in unit labor
costs. In the absence of significant shifts in the distribution of factor income as between
labor and property sources, there is no alternative but for prices to rise in approximately the
same proportion as unit labor costs.
We should also note that these data reflect the basic relationships which were
embodied in the “Guideposts” for noninflationary wage and price behavior initially
developed by the Kennedy administration in 1962. In the 1962 Economic Report of the
President, Kennedy’s economic advisers said that:14
If all prices remain stable, all hourly labor costs may increase as fast as
economy-wide productivity without, for that reason alone, changing the
relative share of labor and nonlabor incomes in total output. . . . If hourly
labor costs increase at a faster rate than productivity, the share of labor
income in the total product will increase or prices will rise, or both.
The latter, of course, is what actually happened in the period covered by the data in Table 1.
Before turning to some questions which the data raise but do not answer, one point of
clarification is in order about the relationships contained in Table 1. They do not imply that
workers, because they push for higher wages, are the basic cause of inflation. Money wages
may lag significantly behind changes in the price level, as actually has been the case over the
last decade, leaving workers in the position of trying to play “catch-up” with respect to their
real wages.15 Yet the relationship between wages, productivity, and the inflation rate is
fundamental. This is a matter of arithmetic, not an issue of causation.
The foregoing discussion offers solid support for the view of Keynes, Joan
Robinson, and others that the level of money wages is the prime determinant of the
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economy’s basic inflation rate. In contrast, let us note that there is practically no statistical
correlation between the rate of growth of money (M1) and the inflation rate for the period
covered by the data in the Table. If there is any validity to the modern quantity theory there
should be some relationship.
What is left unanswered by the data, however, is what determines the level of
money wages at a particular time. Joan Robinson said that this level at any particular time is
more or less an historical accident. True enough, but we still need to be more specific,
particularly with respect to the rate of increase. The question of why money wages were able
to rise almost continuously given the depressed state of the economy during much of the
period must be answered. This is crucial both for understanding the inflationary process and
ultimately for policy actions.
Until the economy encountered the chaotic conditions of the 1970s, the most widely
accepted view of how the rate of increase for nominal or money wages is established was
embodied in the concept of the Phillips curve. As is well-known among economists this
curve shows that traditionally the growth in money wage rates was inversely related to the
unemployment rate. A low unemployment rate was associated with a rapid rate of increase
in money wages, and the reverse prevailed when the unemployment rate was high. The
Phillips curve is a device for describing the state of demand in the economy’s labor markets.
It says simply that when the demand for labor is high (unemployment low), there will be
strong upward pressure on wage rates as workers take advantage of favorable economic
conditions to improve their economic status. When demand is slack (unemployment high)
the pressure on wages will recede. The Phillips curve analysis has always recognized that
this relationship was asymmetrical, since workers strongly resist wage cuts, a condition
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which Keynes also stressed in The General Theory. Consequently, a rise in unemployment
may not lower the rate of increase in money wages as much as a reduction in unemployment
increases it.
The problem is that this standard version of the relationship between changes in
money wage rates and the unemployment rate does not adequately explain what happened in
the 1970s, nor can it explain what had happened more recently as a result of the policies of
the Reagan administration. To complete this theoretical framework and relate it to the facts
of experience, we must take into account two additional variables. These are: (1) the
expected inflation rate, and (2) the bargaining strength of workers. Essentially, the level of
money wages in the economy is determined first by the wage bargains of workers with their
employers. Such wage bargains are, of course, tempered by the general state of the
economy, by whether labor markets are tight or loose (the Phillips curve analysis). But they
also depend upon the foregoing additional factors, namely expected inflation and bargaining
power. Once the economy has moved from a state of price stability (1960-65) to a period of
rising inflation (1966-69), it is logical to expect that expectations about future inflation rates
would enter into the wage bargaining process. The extent to which workers can translate
their nominal wage demands, including a premium for expected inflation, into contract
agreements will depend obviously upon their bargaining power, given the overall state of
demand for labor. Thus, we can say that at any given time, and given too, the background of
the historical level of wages, the actual rate of increase in money wages depend upon an
interaction between the foregoing three factors: (1) the state of labor markets; (2) the
expected inflation rate; and (3) bargaining strength. These are the forces which were at work
all through the 1970s.
- 49 -

This analysis means that the economy confronts a troublesome dilemma. To bring
inflation down in the face of a strong bargaining position on the part of workers requires that
the expected inflation rate be lowered since the latter is a crucial variable which enters into
the wage bargain. But this can be done only by lowering the inflation rate itself. Thus, is the
dilemma, the vicious circle in which the economy is caught. To date the only way we have
found to break out of this vicious circle is to create a recession of sufficient length and
severity that weak labor markets and their ensuing downward pressure on wages will
overcome the upward pressure on wages generated by past inflation and bargaining power.
Recessions eventually work their will on labor markets, hourly rates of change in worker
compensation, unit labor costs, and eventually prices, but the price is high – millions without
work and billions of dollars in lost output.
4. Some Policy Suggestions
This brings us to the fundamental question of what is to be done? What policy
options are viable for the American economy? A careful analysis of and reflection upon the
economy’s behavior and the alleged policy failures in the recent past suggest two practical
approaches to the economic management of our society which ought to be vigorously
pursued. First, we must develop a new policy tool, and second – and more important – we
must change in a fundamental way our conception of how Keynesian ideas should be applied
to managing the macroeconomy.
One of the major post-World War II failures of “mainstream” economics –
including “Keynesian” economics as taught in the textbooks – was the failure to recognize
that a serious inflationary problem would arise out of the combination of sustained full
employment and the concentration of economic power in strategically important areas of the
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economy. As Thomas Balogh, a leading British economist, points out, market power lodged
in the giant corporation enables it to shift readily onto prices the burden of increased wages,
the latter being determined in many instances by powerful trade unions.16 What is called for
is a workable incomes policy.
An incomes policy is easy to define but difficult to implement. In its essentials an
incomes policy involves finding the means to keep increases in money incomes within the
bounds set by productivity gains. Ideally, an incomes policy should encompass all forms of
money income, including profits, but as a practical matter a workable incomes policy will
probably be limited to changes in money wages. But since wages make up nearly threefourths of the national income and thus are the major element in production costs, an incomes
policy built around wage income alone has the potential to control inflation.
By now the need for an incomes policy should be obvious, although it is by no
means clear that even a majority of economists are willing to endorse the concept. Within
the present institutional framework, modern governments have only two major tools to call
upon for managing the economy, namely fiscal policy and monetary policy. The experience
of the 1970s makes it apparent, however, that an incomes policy has become a badly-needed
complement for the standard monetary and fiscal measures, at least if any attempt is to be
made to pursue an aggressive full employment policy. Given the brute fact of market power,
and as the experience of the 1970s demonstrates, it is impossible to use conventional
monetary and fiscal means in pursuit of full employment without having in place an incomes
policy to contain the pressures on the price level any expansion may set loose. And as the
1970s also demonstrated, this pressure becomes manifest and well-nigh irresistible long
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before the economy reaches full employment, even by the lax standards conservative
economists accept these days.
At the moment there is no agreement among economists as to how an incomes
policy should be constructed. Basically, there are two approaches, one involving using the
tax system and the pricing mechanism to get the desired results, and the other involving
direct control over price and wage decisions in the strategic sectors of the economy where
oligopolistic firms dominate and wage settlements are reached under conditions resembling
bilateral monopoly. TIP, standing for “tax-based incomes policy,” is the acronym used to
describe the first approach. This may involve a “carrot” version in which corporations and
wage-earners get tax refunds if they adhere to a designated set of wage and price guidelines,
or a “stick” approach in which they are subject to tax surcharges if they fail to adhere to the
guidelines. The appeal of TIP stems from its indirect approach, one of using the market to
obtain the desired results. On the other hand, direct control over wages and prices in sectors
with a high degree of concentration substitutes the judgment of public officials for private
judgments, the reason being that most prices (and wages) in these sectors are established
administratively, rather than by the impersonal forces of the market.
While an incomes policy is the missing element in the Keynesian policy triad, and,
without it we cannot make headway toward the desired goals of full employment and price
stability, something more is required. We need to rethink in a fundamental way the meaning
of Keynesian theory and its application to the management of the economy. Only if this is
done will it be possible to attain greater economic success than heretofore, even within the
constraints of existing institutions.
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The conventional wisdom with respect to the uses of Keynesianism in the postWorld War II era – a view accepted pretty much by liberal and conservative economists –
runs somewhat as follows. As suggested in the opening paragraph of this essay, the quarter
century after the end of World War II is seen as an era of economic success, much of which
is attributed to the successful application of Keynesian ideas for managing the economy. Sir
John Hicks has called this period the “Age of Keynes,” but also noting that while many judge
the era as having been one long boom, it is an open question as to how far this economic
success was due to Keynesian policies.17 In the United States, in any event, Keynesianism
came into its own in the 1960s with the advent of the Kennedy administration and its
commitment to an active policy of demand management. The high point came with the
success of the 1964 tax cut. Even President Nixon was moved to proclaim early in his first
term, “I am a Keynesian.” And then came the 1970s and the twin disasters of excessive
unemployment and excessive inflation. Consequently, and just as Keynesianism was given
credit for earlier successes, now it was accorded the blame for rising unemployment and the
failure to curb inflation. “Federal economic policies bear the major responsibility for the
legacy of stagflation,” President Reagan’s Economic Advisors said in their 1982 Report.18
The difficulty with the widely-accepted conventional view that Keynesianism has
failed is that it is wrong. It is wrong because Keynesianism in the best sense of the word has
never been fully tried in the American economy. When the Full Employment Bill (which
later became the Employment Act of 1946) was introduced into the wartime Congress in
1944, the bill as the title suggests, embodied a strong commitment to full employment and
conscious economic planning. Using the powers of the government to guarantee jobs for all
was seen by the bill’s supporters as the essential, bedrock element in Keynesianism. What
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happened, however, was that the commitment to a full employment economy was too much
for conservatives, who saw such a commitment as socialistic and a threat to the free
enterprise system. As a result, the bill which finally emerged from the Congress – the
Employment Act of 1946 – contained little more than a symbolic commitment to full
employment. As a matter of fact, the phrase “full employment” does not appear in the Act.
The change in language between the original Full Employment Bill and the
Employment Act is more than a matter of semantics. The essential difference is between the
belief of Keynes and his supporters that government should be used to ensure full
employment which in turn would produce economic growth, and what is basically the
conservative viewpoint that economic growth in the private sector is what will ensure full
employment.
The logical outcome of this was that economic growth in the private sector became
the primary means by which full employment was to be generated in the postwar era. Once
Keynesian economists had yielded through changes in the language of the Employment Act
on the fundamental promise that the full power of the state would be used to attain full
employment, the only way left to secure the jobs for all was by generating expansion in the
private sector. The basic thrust of policies in the postwar era became “counter-Keynesian.”
Instead of economic planning and government intervention on the supply-side to insure full
employment, policy became oriented primarily to the expansion of the private sector, using
demand management techniques as the major means to this end. The “politics of growth”
replaced, in a sense, the “politics of Keynes,” even though the policies pursued were
developed by well-known Keynesian economists and carried out under the Keynesian label.19
Growth would not only provide full employment, but avoid the necessity of having to make
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difficult and controversial decisions affecting income and its distribution. As long as growth
continued, all was well, but once growth ceased as it did in the 1970s, the economy was in
deep trouble.
How did all this come out in terms of policy specifics? It was not until John F.
Kennedy became president that there was an administration which committed itself
ostensibly to using Keynesian theory as a guide for economic management. The two crucial
policy actions taken by this administration (including the successor Johnson administration)
were the 1964 tax cut aimed at consumers and the introduction of the investment tax credit
for business. These policies were important for two reasons. First, their primary objective
was to encourage economic growth by applying a stimulus to the private sector. When faced
with the various alternatives for “getting the economy moving again,” President Kennedy
opted for measures which would enhance the private sector, not the public sector.20 Second,
the pattern was set for the rest of the postwar era as to what it meant to use Keynesian theory
for economic management: the emphasis was to be on the private sector with special efforts
being made to stimulate investment through the device of investment tax credits. This is the
essence of what is meant by the “counter-Keynesian” thrust of post-World War II policy.
If we grant this premise that post-World War II policy has in effect stood Keynes on
his head (counter-Keynesianism), the logical question which follows is what policy mix
within the framework of existing institutions would be truly Keynesian? Assuming that a
workable incomes policy has been developed and put in place, the application of Keynesian
theory to the overall management of the economy involves, at minimum, the following three
propositions. First, full employment must become the bedrock policy objective. Without
jobs for all who want them, little else in Keynesianism makes sense.
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As a second proposition, the high-investment and high-profit strategy adopted
during the Kennedy-Johnson years and pursued by every successive administration must be
abandoned. Because the end objective of this strategy was to promote a high rate of
economic growth, the abandonment of the strategy also means abandonment of “the politics
of growth” which has dominated the postwar era. In its place, we should adopt a high
consumption strategy, one designed to ensure minimal standards of well-being for all
citizens, as well as enriched standards of community consumption. Such a view runs counter
to the contemporary conventional wisdom to the effect that a major need of the American
economy in view of its productivity crisis is to increase the rate of investment. Aside from
the fact that the share of the GNP going into equipment investment did not decline as
productivity was falling, there are two other weaknesses in this argument. First, the high
investment strategy pursued through investment tax credits and other tax breaks for corporate
enterprise did not succeed in increasing investment appreciably in the American economy.
Second, it overlooks a fundamental point of emphasis in The General Theory, to wit, that the
raison d´être for investment spending is the expectation of profit, which in turn depends
upon the existence of a future demand for consumption goods. The best way to stimulate
investment spending in a market economy is to stimulate consumption, not the other way
around.
The final proposition concerns interest rates. If there is any single idea which
Keynes propounded in The General Theory and adhered to throughout his life, it is the
absolute necessity for interest rates to be (and remain) low if market capitalism is to function
effectively. Keynes’s belief that we might look forward to the “euthanasia of the rentier”
may be, perhaps, too extreme a view, but there cannot be any quarrel with his steadfast belief
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that interest rates should be kept low. Unfortunately, interest rates, both nominal and real,
have moved in just the opposite direction since 1950; both short-term and long-term rates are
now at levels never before reached in this century, a trend which runs 180 degrees counter to
what Keynes believed necessary. Instead of moving in any sense toward the “euthanasia of
the rentier,” we have moved drastically in the opposite direction. In 1950, for example,
interest income accounted for but 1.3 percent of national income; by 1982, this percentage
had jumped to 10.9, a more than eight-fold increase in the share of income going to the
rentier class. Since, as Keynes says, “Interest to-day rewards no genuine sacrifice, anymore
than does the rent of land,” we have an intolerable situation. Only the economically naïve
still believe that the level of interest rates is governed by the interplay of supply and demand
forces in competitive markets. Interest rates can – and should – be brought down, but not in
isolation. The drive to lower interest rates must be a part of an overall effort to apply
Keynesian theory to managing the economy in a manner not yet seriously attempted in the
post-World War II era. It is not claimed that the propositions just discussed are the last word
on “what Keynes really meant,” but it is claimed that they are more nearly in harmony with
the basic thrust and spirit of The General Theory than many of the actions taken in the
postwar era described as “Keynesian.”
5. Looking Toward the Long-Term
I shall bring these remarks to a close with a few comments on the long-term. The
propositions discussed above are offered as basically a Keynesian-based program designed to
make the economy perform better within the existing institutional framework. The
demonstrated failures of monetarism, supply-side economics, and growth-oriented “counterKeynesianism” of the 1960s and 1970s make a new approach essential.
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It is important, however, that we don’t overestimate the results that can be expected
from attempting to make Keynesianism work in ways not yet attempted. The successes we
can expect from implementing the propositions discussed in the prior section will be
relatively modest, although clearly superior to the “stop and go” cycle of rising
unemployment and rising inflation characteristic of the economy since the mid-1960s.
What we cannot realistically expect is that implementing the Keynesian ideas we
have been discussing will provide a total solution to the fundamental dilemma confronting all
market economies – how to get full employment without inflation.
This is the point at which more fundamental changes of an institutional and longerterm character enter the picture. If we are to improve and perfect the short-term management
of the economy using standard Keynesian techniques, then we must direct our attention to
basic change and reform in three areas. First, there is the question of jobs. Experience since
the mid-1960s shows that we confront a rising level of joblessness which cannot be explained
by the ups and downs of the business cycle. As presently structured, the economy is not able
to provide jobs for all persons able to work and wanting employment. Keynesian measures
such as discussed above do not provide the whole answer. In part this problem will be solved
by recognition of the necessity for public employment as a permanent fixture of the
economy.
Second, there is the matter of the distribution of income and wealth. We cannot
continue indefinitely to sweep this basic issue under the rug, because it is one which goes
directly to the nub of the problem of getting sustained full employment without inflation. As
has been argued in this lecture, we must have an incomes policy, some set of arrangements
whereby increases in money incomes are kept within the boundaries established by
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productivity changes. However, for an incomes policy to be successful, there must be a
rough consensus that the division between wage income and non-wage income is fair. In the
absence of such consensus, the incomes policy will collapse, as labor and management pit
their bargaining strengths against each other in a struggle to increase the relative share of
each in the income total. This is what brought about the collapse of the Guideposts after
1966. To prevent an endless and fruitless “war” between labor and management over
relative shares and the inflation which will follow in the train of such a “war,” we need a new
consensus on the distribution of the social product between wage and non-wage income – a
“social contract.” Without such a consensus, no incomes policy will be workable and the
goal of full employment without inflation will continue to elude us.
Finally, the issue of the necessity for the attainment of a new “social contract”
necessarily forces us to confront the fact of market power in economic relationships. In a
narrow sense this involves the power of trade unions to bargain for money wages and the
power of the corporations to set prices. In a broader sense we shall have to look at the entire
institutional structure through which economic power manifests itself. In the modern
economy there are two sets of basic forces contending with one another and through which
the economy works. There are those which center on competition and market relationships,
and those which center on power and power relationships. Conventional theory has taught us
much about the way in which competitive forces working through markets affect economic
activity, but we have only begun to scratch the surface in exploring the realm of power and
power relationships and how they affect the economy. This is the task which awaits us.
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Table 1
Productivity, Unit Labor Costs, and Inflation: 1960-82
(In percent, annual average rates of change)

Compensation
Per Hour*

Unit
Labor
Costs

Inflation Rates
GNP
Deflator
CPI

Period

Productivity

1960-64

2.9%

3.9%

1.0%

1.2%

1.2%

1965-69

1.9

5.8

3.6

3.3

3.4

1970-74

1.4

7.5

6.0

5.3

6.1

1975-79

1.3

8.6

7.2

7.4

8.1

1980-83**
1.1
8.4
7.3
7.2
8.3
_________________________________________________________________________
*Wages and salaries plus all fringe benefits, including employer contributions.
**Four year period.
Source: Economic Report of the President, 1984.
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Footnotes
1. All figures are from the Economic Report of the President (Washington, D. C.:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1984).
2. A petition signed by over 1,000 economists urged this course of action on the
administration.
3. Arthur M. Okun, “The Personal Tax Surcharge and Consumer Demand, 196870,” The Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 1, 1971.
4. For details on the “Guideposts” policy, see Economic Report of the President,
1962, pp. 185-190.
5. Current Economic Indicators, May 1983, p. 12.
6. In 1974 energy prices rose by 29 percent and again by 23 percent in 1979, but in
1982 they rose by only 1.4 percent. For food, the price increases were 14.4 percent in 1974,
10.9 percent in 1979, and 4.0 percent in 1982. These data are from the Economic Report of
the President, 1983.
7. From January to October, 1981, there was a steady decline in the rate of growth
in the money supply. During this period the rate of growth for M1 fell from 10.3 percent in
January to -0.2 percent in October.
8. Economic Report of the President, 1983, p. 37.
9. Data on unemployment and capacity utilization are from the 1983 Economic
Report of the President. For a discussion of the “gap” analysis see the author’s text, Income,
Employment, and Economic Growth (5th Edition; New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
1984).
10. John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1964), pp. 292-309.
11. Joan Robinson, “The Second Crisis in Economic Theory,” The American
Economic Review, May 1972, pp. 1-10. (Italics added).
12. Ibid., p. 5.
13. John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory, p. 309.
14. Economic Report of the President, 1962, p. 186.
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15. Between 1970 and 1982 hourly earnings in current dollars grew by 142 percent,
but hourly wages in constant dollars fell by 2.5 percent. See Economic Report of the
President, 1983, p. 206.
16. Thomas Balogh, “Is Keynes Dead?” The New Republic, June 7, 1980, p. 16.
17. Sir John Hicks, The Crisis in Keynesian Economics (New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1974), p. 3.
18. Economic Report of the President, 1982, p. 23.
19. Seymour Harris, Leon Keyserling, George Soule, and Alvin Hansen are among
the Keynesian economists who pushed in the late 1940s for a program of full employment
and economic planning as a means to implement Keynesian ideas in the United States.
20. This was a victory for Leon Keyserling who, as a member of the Democratic
Advisory Council during the 1950s, argued that the most realistic way to implement
Keynesian ideas was to cut taxes. John Kenneth Galbraith, also a member of the Council,
favored an expansion of public spending. Galbraith lost the argument and President
Kennedy, after being elected, followed Keyserling’s advice.
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Reaganomics is not a single monolithic entity. It is
a label attached to the pronouncements and policies of a diverse,
shifting coalition of groups of economists and writers. Each group has a
very different set of values, theories, and programs, and each group regards all
the other groups with a thinly-concealed mixture of distaste, suspicion, and even hatred.
Murray N. Rothbard
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LECTURE 3
THE FIVE FACES OF REAGANOMICS
Murray N. Rothbard
(Delivered on November 27, 1984)
“Reaganomics” is one of the most talked about phenomena of our times. Most
people regard it as a monolithic entity, and vest it with the magical properties of King Canute
trying to command the tides. But generally the tides proceed on their own, and so in most
cases does the economy. To attribute everything that happened in the economy in the last
four years, or that will happen in the next four, to “Reaganomics” is to grant it far too much
power for good or for ill.
But, more than that, Reaganomics is not an “it” at all. Reaganomics is not a single
monolithic entity. It is a label attached to the pronouncements and policies of a diverse,
shifting coalition of groups of economists and writers. Each group has a very different set of
values, theories, and programs, and each group regards all the other groups with a thinlyconcealed mixture of distaste, suspicion, and even hatred. Usually, these antagonisms are
papered over in the interests of influencing the policies of the Reagan Administration, but
sometimes, as in the war between the monetarists and supply-siders, or, as in the open
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brawling over the former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, Martin Feldstein,
the quarrel bursts into public view.
Trying to analyze what is going on becomes more complicated when we realize that
some highly placed leaders will shift their position toward the likely winners. Even more
problems are created by the fact that each group tries to take full credit for the perceived
successes of Reaganomics, while at the same time passing the blame for its failures on the
shoulders of the other groups. Since the President is necessarily the ultimate decision-maker
– at least officially – in the executive branch, each of the groups is careful never to criticize,
much less denounce, the President personally even if their counsel is no longer heeded, the
President like the kings of old, remains always a great and good man, temporarily and
unaccountably surrounded by false and even evil advisers. With enough enlightenment and
education, the President will surely come to agree, get rid of the false prophets, and replace
them with the true ones (that is, the out-group in question). For each of these groups
proclaims its loss of power to be only temporary. Soon they will be restored to the
President’s favor. And sometimes, this restoration may, even occur, or, as in the case of the
lately resurgent supply-siders, may be seen to have happened, which may be at least as
important in politics as what is actually going on.
In this murky and sometimes bizarre atmosphere of court intrigue, and shifting
power blocs masked by public agreement, it is difficult for the analyst to try to figure out
what is actually going on. But still we will plunge fearlessly into the task.
I contend that under the monolithic surface of Reaganomics we can discern at least
four very different policy groups. But first we will be dealing here only with MacroReaganomics – that is, the popular areas of spending, taxes, deficits, and money. On Micro- 65 -

Reaganomics we need only say that all the groups agree that the economy should be
thoroughly deregulated, and also that almost no such deregulation has taken place. But on to
our four Macro-Reaganomics groups, our Four Faces of Reaganomics. (I hasten to point out
that these groups aren’t monolithic either, but they can still be strongly distinguished from
each other.) perhaps the most
1. The Old-Fashioned Conservatives
The first group is lovable, but perhaps not coincidentally, the least influential of the
four. I don’t know exactly what to call them; there is no one label that has been attached to
them. So I will call them “Old-Fashioned Republicans” or “Old-Fashioned Conservatives.”
Unfortunately for them, they have been a lot stronger in the ranks of politicians and among
voters, than they have been among economists, intellectuals, or opinion-molders. Before the
advent of the Reagan Administration, they were strong in the House of Representatives, and
they also included Ronald Reagan before the Republican Convention of 1980. These were
the Congressmen who stood up on the floor of the House, shortly after the beginning of the
Reagan Administration, some of them literally with tears in their eyes, as they explained that
for the first time in their political lives they were voting for an increase in the national debt
limit, they who had always been strongly committed to a balanced budget. But they were
voting now for an increase in the debt limit because they were totally convinced that Ronald
Reagan was dedicated with every fiber of his being to a balanced budget. Therefore, they
knew with certainty that he would keep his pledge to balance the budget by 1984. The rest is
history. The balanced budget is long gone and forgotten, and I doubt whether many of these
Congressmen cry any longer as they vote routinely and periodically for yet another increase
in the debt limit.
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What then have been the cherished policies of the Old-Fashioned Conservatives? A
balanced budget; a large massive cut in taxes; and to achieve a balanced budget, an even
more drastic cut in government expenditures. How “Massive,” how “Drastic”? These are
matters of considerable difference among this group, but the basic thrust is clear enough. So
much for fiscal policy. In monetary policy, these Old-Fashioned Conservatives favor ultrahard money, marked by a return to, or an advance toward, a gold-coin standard for the dollar.
The historic function of this group, it is clear, was to provide the rhetoric, but in no
sense the reality, of the Reagan Administration, and particularly the campaign rhetoric of
Ronald Reagan in his campaigns of 1972, 1976, and 1980, and for his numerous speeches in
between. For their pains, this group has been virtually destroyed politically, as can be seen in
the fate of the balanced-budget conservatives in the House of Representatives.
I can only think of four of this group who achieved any sort of influence in the
Reagan Administration. The leading one was Martin Anderson, an Economist at the Hoover
Institution at Stanford, who was Reagan’s Chief Adviser in Domestic Policy during his 1976,
1980, and 1984 Presidential Campaigns. Anderson became Head of Domestic Policy at the
White House at the beginning of the Reagan Administration. In leaked stories to the press,
Anderson was repeatedly ridiculed by leading White House aides as the “Keeper of the
Scrolls”, a man who kept inconveniently reminding the President of his campaign promises
and supposed principles. By the end of the first year of the administration, 1981, Anderson
was out and back at Stanford, part of the general “purge” of “extremist” economists that
occurred at the end of 1981. Doug Bandow, aide to Anderson, left the White House shortly
thereafter. Steve Hanke, of the Council of Economic Advisers staff, left about the same time,
after his plan, initially adopted by the White House, to sell part of the public land to private
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enterprise ran into the powerful environmentalist steamroller. Hanke returned to Johns
Hopkins. Martin Anderson’s wife, Annelise, lasted considerably longer as Deputy Head of
the Office of Management and the Budget. Her appointment to what has now become the
female spot on the Federal Reserve Board was announced by the White House, but was then
reversed when vetoed by Chairman Paul Volker, a Keynesian. Annelise then returned to the
Hoover Institution, and the position was filled by an obscure disciple of the Keynesian, Paul
McCracken. Of the four, only Hanke and Bandow have gone public with their criticisms of
what they regard as the betrayal of its founding principles by the Reagan Administration.
Old-Fashioned Conservatives were the principal losers in the ideological power
struggle in the sense of what happened to their personnel. Reaganomic policies were also the
reverse of Old-Fashioned Conservative policies down the line. When President Carter left
office he was denounced by conservatives as a big spender. In his last full fiscal year, 1980,
Federal Government spending totaled $577 billion. In President Reagan’s last fiscal year,
1984, total Federal spending has been estimated at $854 billion, and projected total spending
for next year is $968 billion. Now, whatever this is, it is not a massive cut in government
spending; it is not even a moderate or slight cut. It is a huge increase, an increase of 48
percent in four years. President Reagan, with every new year, becomes that year by far the
biggest spender in American History.
Even if we try to mitigate the record by looking at the percentage of federal
spending to the national product, the Reagan budget still looks more statist and less
libertarian than President Carter’s. In Carter’s last fiscal year in office, government
expenditures totaled 21.9 percent of Gross National Product; in fiscal 1984, Reagan’s
expenditures amounted to 23.1 percent of GNP.
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On deficits, Reagan’s record is all too well known. President Carter left office with
a deficit of $60 billion. In the last two years, the annual deficit has at least tripled, in the
neighborhood of $180 to $200 billion. More important, the deficit seems now to have struck
permanently at that level, and the administration holds out little hope of lowering it
significantly for many years. Far from balancing the budget by 1983 and 1984, the President
brought, in those years, the biggest deficits in American History. Even if we again try to
mitigate the problem by taking the deficit as a percentage of GNP, the percentage deficit has
more than doubled, from 2.3 percent of GNP to over 5.0 percent, and it seems to have been
made permanent at near that level.
We will deal with taxes when we get to our next group of economic thinkers, the
supply-siders. In the field of money, President Reagan clearly felt he had discharged his
obligation to the pro-gold standard forces by employing the time-honored governmental
method of burying a possibly embarrassing conflict: appointing a commission. The
President appointed a U. S. Gold Commission in the fall of 1981 to study and make
recommendations about a possible return to the Gold Standard. In the usual method of
government, however, the supposedly impartial researchers were heavily stacked in advance
– against gold. The overwhelming majority – indeed, all but two or three – consisted of
dedicated monetarists and Keynesians united in their long-standing hostility to gold. The
staff director, Anna Jacobson Schwartz, was a veteran monetarist and anti-gold partisan. The
result was inevitable. After holding a few largely unattended hearings, the staff and the
commission overwhelmingly recommended against a gold standard, and that – except for the
minority report of two – was that.
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2. The Supply-Siders
We turn now to the second of our faces of Reaganomics, the supply-siders. Along
with the Old-Fashioned Conservatives, the supply-siders also supplied a good deal of the
Reagan rhetoric before the election of 1980. Supply-siding began as a conscious movement
quite late, in 1975. But while remarkably few in number, and lacking any sort of general
treatise expounding their views, the supply-siders have been blessed with an enormous talent
for self-promotion, for adroit manipulation of the media, and for organizing intellectually and
politically as a self-conscious cadre. Their major intellectual and media center has been their
control of the editorial page of The Wall Street Journal, from which has emerged its major
philosopher and agitator, Jude Wanniski, author of the best-selling book, The Way the World
Works (1978). The supply-side ranks also include columnists, Evans & Novak, and George
Gilder, Ripon Society Republican leader and author of several best-selling works. The
supply-side’s major political figure is New York Congressman, Jack Kemp, and its most
important organizer and fund-raiser is ex-Trotskyist intellectual, Irving Kristol.
The supply-siders philosophy of politics was best expressed in Wanniski’s The Way
the World Works designed to provide a world historical framework for Ronald Reagan’s
forthcoming 1980 campaign and projected tenure as President. The theme of Wanniski is
that, throughout history, the masses, the general public, is always right. The public needs no
education from intellectuals or political leaders. There is no need for that, since the general
public is always correct. If the wishes of the public appear inconsistent, then it must be a
seeming inconsistency. It is up to intellectuals and political leaders to articulate the will of
the masses and to embody that will in political institutions. The leaders are also to find the
underlying consistency in any seeming contradictions in the desires of the public.
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In short, the heart and the consistent motif of supply-side programs is a very simple
one. It is clearly a philosophy of demagogy. That is, a philosophy of finding out what the
public wants and then rushing to give it to them. I suppose this program can be called
“expanding American democracy,” especially if we adopt H. L. Mencken’s definition of
“Democracy,” which is: “The people know what they want, and deserve to get it, good and
hard.”
Armed with this doctrine, the supply-siders set about to formulate their economic
program. What does the public want, they asked? In the fiscal sphere, three things: first,
they want to keep up the supply of goodies they receive from the modern welfare-warfare
state, so they want government expenditures to stay high and go higher; second, the public
wants a big income tax cut; and, third, the public wants a balanced budget. Considering that
the deficit was already $60 billion at the end of the Carter Era, this was a tall order indeed.
Common sense asked: If you are going to increase expenditures, and also cut taxes, how in
blazes are you going to give us a balanced budget?
The public seemingly wanted three terribly contradictory things. But Wanniski had
already informed us that the public is always right. How to save the theory? The answer
came with the famous bit of legerdemain, known in song and story as the Laffer Curve, the
product of supply-side economist Arthur Laffer. Not only was the Laffer Curve the answer,
it was so simple that it could be drawn on a cocktail napkin to explain the theory to busy
bureaucrats and congressmen on the run.
We will cut tax rates sharply, said the Lafferites, and those cuts, especially the
marginal income tax rates, will stimulate productivity, effort, and investment. As a result,
total production will increase so much that the lower tax rates will generate enormously more
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tax revenue. Presto changeo! And the lower tax rates and consequent higher tax revenues
will balance the budget. The public is correct, you see, after all. The instincts of the masses
have proved to be sounder than the ditherings of effete intellectuals.
The Laffer Curve proved to be catnip for the Republican politicians of 1980, all
struggling to maintain these three contradictory policies. Thus, a moment of truth came
when columnist Mary McGrory in effect asked the televised Republican Presidential
candidates debating in 1980: “Gentlemen, you say you favor keeping up spending, cutting
income taxes, and balancing the budget. How can you do all these things?” Even George
Bush, whose horrified Keynesian economics advisers had led him to call the Laffer Curve
“Voodoo Economics,” gave what was in effect the Laffer answer to this crucial conundrum.
Nineteen-hundred-and-eighty-one was a banner year for the supply-siders, who
have been on a virtual roller-coaster during the four years of Reagan. The President initially
gave to each of the conflicting groups power over the particular Macro-Area that most
interested them: the supply-siders got control over taxation, the Keynesians over spending,
and the monetarists over the Federal Reserve and the money supply. The supply-siders got
the two top tax posts at the Treasury: Paul Craig Roberts and Norman Ture, with Secretary
of Treasury Regan, a man of no firm views, at least friendly to them. And they thought they
had their own David Stockman in the powerful post of head of the Office of Management
and the Budget. The supply-siders gleefully took full credit for the Reagan tax bill victory of
1981, trumpeting the tax cuts centering around the famous Kemp-Roth three-year income tax
cut.
But then, in the last half of 1981, everything began to sour. Two cataclysmic events
temporarily discredited Reaganomics, and with it discredited the supply-siders who had
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seized full credit for the good days in the early part of the year. Those two events were (1)
the plunge into the biggest recession (actually, “Depression”) since the 1930s, and (2) the
obvious fact that, instead of the supply-side tax cut quickly balancing the budget, the country
was plunging into an enduring deficit of unprecedented proportions. The supply-siders were
quickly tossed overboard by the end of 1981, with Roberts and Ture returning to private life.
During the dark days of 1982, the supply-side cadre decided to adopt three fallback
positions. In the first place, they pointed out that the Reagan Administration had not really
tried supply-sideism in the first place. So that the failure of Reaganomics was in no sense
their failure. They pointed, quite properly, to the fact that the first year’s initial 10 percent
cut had been whittled down to zero, and that the moderate income tax cut remaining was
more than offset by two factors: the Social Security Tax, which kept increasing, and
“bracket creep,” by which inflation wafted everyone into higher income tax brackets. As a
result, the average person paid higher income taxes after the Reagan “tax cut” than he had
paid before. The Reagan tax “cut” was really a tax increase. Thus, the public paid $517
billion in taxes in the last Carter fiscal year, 1980. During the first Reagan year, taxes rose to
$618 billion. The last Carter year revenue amounted to 19.6 percent of GNP; the first
Reagan year revenue equaled 20.3 percent of GNP.
The supply-siders were quite right, but the forces of their criticism would have been
stronger had they not taken previously full credit for the alleged tax cut. They were on firmer
ground when they pointed in anguish to the secret betrayal by their old ally, Stockman, who,
in the private counsels of the administration, had defected to Keynesianism in early 1981 and
persistently argued, then and since, for tax increases to offset what turned out to be the
virtually non-existent tax cut. Not only that: Stockman broke the rules of politics by leaking
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his anti-supply-side criticisms to the Atlantic Monthly, which published his views without his
approval in late 1981. While Stockman was then “taken to the woodshed” by the President,
he is still on the job, while the supply-siders have long since gone.
If the supply-siders were not responsible for the grave 1981-82 Depression, who
was? In the second part of their fallback critique, the supply-siders pinned the blame on their
enemies, the monetarists, who had been put in charge of the Fed and of the monetary arm of
the Treasury. The monetarist-dominated Fed, the supply-siders charged, tightened up the
money supply too much, as did the Keynesians after them during 1983 and 1984. Money
should be cheap and loose, and because the supply-siders were not in charge of money, the
result was tight money and depression.
It is not sufficiently known that the supply-siders are not just income-tax cutters.
The supply-siders have two arrows to their macroeconomics bow. One is income tax cuts.
The other is cheap and inflating money. Why? Once again, because that is clearly what the
masses want. In their philosophy of demagogy, the supply-siders stood against the
monetarists and Old-Fashioned Conservatives who claimed tanstaafl, “there ain’t no such
thing as a free lunch.” The supply-siders charged tanstaafl to be a counsel of pessimism, of
doom-and-gloom, of scrooge-like attitudes properly repudiated by the optimistic masses.
The entire supply-side doctrine was based on the counter-claim, tistaafl, or, there is too a free
lunch, part of the magic free-lunch was the Laffer Curve: the other was loose money, which
also allegedly stimulated productivity and supply. But won’t there be a problem of inflation?
Not after a while, replied the supply-siders soothingly, because supply will increase so much
as to offset monetary inflation. Just as we will naturally grow out of a deficit, so we will also
grow out of inflation. The supply-siders do not consider that, no matter how greatly the
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productive growth of the American Economy, it can never grow as fast as the printing of new
money, which is virtually costless and under the unlimited power of the Federal Reserve.
The supply-siders have a new twist on inflation; however, they are nothing if not
bold and creative. For while their soundings of public opinion have informed them that the
public likes cheap and easy money, they also like the idea of a gold-backed dollar. The
supply-siders have therefore come up with an ingenious gimmick: we will go back to the
gold standard, thereby inspiring confidence in the dollar, and bringing down interest rates
and stimulating saving and investment. But at the same time, the Fed will be instructed to
expand the money supply at a rapid rate, thereby keeping everyone happy with cheap and
abundant money and credit. Here is another seeming supply-side contradiction, resolved by
the alleged growing out of inflation, and by the fact that their gold standard is in no sense a
genuine one. Instead, it would be a sham gold standard, designed to lull the public and the
market into an ungrounded sense of confidence in the dollar. No one would be able to
redeem dollars in gold coin, and the Fed would be able to change the price of gold at will, in
order to fine tune the macro-economy. Essentially, the supply-siders are calling for a return
to the unlamented Bretton Woods System, which collapsed of its own inner flaws in 1971.
Basically, the supply-side attitude is one of “after us, the deluge.” They care not at
all about the consequences, and make Keynes’s famous, “in the long run we are all dead,” a
model of sober long-run foresight. If inflation came headlong as a result of their cheap
money policies, they would find some way to cross that bridge when they came to it.
The third plank in the supply-side fallback position was to jettison Arthur Laffer
and his famous curve. History was busily rewritten as the supply-siders such as Paul Craig
Roberts assured us that Laffer was an extremist never followed by the rest of the group, who
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never promised or expected revenues to rise so much as to assure a balanced budget. The
dumping of Arthur Laffer was made easier by the fact that Ronald Reagan had gotten rid of
Laffer as one of his main advisers after the 1980 Republican Convention, presumably as one
price to be paid for the influx of George Bush’s and Jerry Ford’s Keynesian economic
advisers. Laffer had already proved to be expendable.
And so the supply-siders moved to phase two of their position on deficits. Whereas
before they had assured us that tax cuts would lead to a balanced budget, now their tack
changed completely. Now the line was: who cares about deficits anyway? And so the
supply siders adopted the extreme Keynesian line that “deficits don’t matter.” One almost
saw the ghosts of Abba Lerner and the left-wing Keynesians of the 1930s saying: “Who
cares about the debt? We only owe it to ourselves.” The problem, of course, is that now that
the Federal debt is not $50 billion but moving rapidly toward $2 trillion, and now that
interest rates are very high instead of close to zero, it makes an enormous difference whether
any of us is a member of the “we” or of the “ourselves.”
With the economic recovery and the lowered inflation of 1983 and 1984, the
supply-siders reversed course once again, as they rushed to embrace a Reaganomics that now
seemed successful. They loudly took credit for the “success” of the very same policies they
had, the previous year, claimed to be a failure because their policies had not been followed.
Their personnel have in no sense been restored to power, but now, as Jack Kemp positions
himself to be the heir-apparent in 1988, the once bitter criticisms of the administration having
been long forgotten. The Reagan Administration is no more supply-side in reality than it was
in 1982, but it is now as fervently embraced by the supply-siders as it was at the very
beginning.
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3. The Keynesians
We come now to the group who, characteristically, has supplied virtually none of
the rhetoric but virtually all of the policies of the Reagan Administration: The Keynesians.
This might come as a surprise to many who think that all Keynesians are liberal Democrats.
But that is not true. Keynesians come in a wide spectrum of ideological shapes and sizes.
There are Democratic Keynesians. But not too conservative, of course. Republican
Keynesians are what is often called “enlightened” or “responsible” conservatives, which
means that their cherished policies are 180-drgrees from the Old-Fashioned Conservatives.
The Republican Keynesians are the folks who brought us Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford
Administrations, and who are, when all is said and done, bringing us the Reagan
Administration. Their ranks are legion: some of the most prominent are George Shultz, now
Secretary of State; Arthur Burns, now Ambassador to West Germany; Paul McCracken,
already mentioned; Martin Feldstein, the last Head of the Council of Economic Advisers; and
Alan Greenspan, who presided over the Bipartisan Reagan Commission that at least
temporarily, salvaged the Social Security Program.
In fact, until the crisis years of 1972-74, Keynesians comprised virtually all the
economists in the country. Beneath all the equations and charts, the Keynesian creed was a
simple one: recessions and depressions, marked by bankruptcies, falling prices, and heavy
unemployment, are caused by under-spending on the part of the public; inflationary booms,
marked by full employment and rising prices, are caused by over-spending on the part of the
public. While free markets might work well in the micro-sphere, the Keynesians asserted,
they are subject to fatal instability in the larger macro-sphere. But fortunately, salvation is at
hand. There exists government, not subject to the irrationalities and instabilities of
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individuals in the free market. Government can step in, see the problem on its control dials,
and then correct the failing capitalism by pumping in more spending in recessions and taking
out spending in booms. In that way, permanent full employment without inflation will be
achieved. So confident were the Keynesians in their ability to fine-tune the system, so
convinced were they that the business cycle was no more, that graduate schools stopped
teaching courses in business cycles. Why teach courses that could only be of antiquarian
interest, a lot of fuss about a dead issue?
There were many nuanced differences among Keynesians about how the spending
levers were to be pushed. Government could either spend more itself or else cut taxes so as
to stimulate private spending, and while technically either could be done, the natural bias of
government meant that increases in government spending were massive, while tax cuts were
few, minimal, and far between. Similarly, in booms the government could either cut its own
spending, or else raise taxes and thereby “sop up excess purchasing power” – our purchasing
power. Naturally, government almost never cuts its spending, and so that option got
discarded very early in the game. Even more quick to be lost down the Orwellian Memory
Hole was the original Keynesian commitment to what they called a “cyclically balanced
budget.” Sure, they told the skeptical Old-Fashioned Conservatives of the 1930s, we too are
committed to a balanced budget. But we’re simply not tied, like you are, to the narrow
accounting unit of a year. We’ll balance the budget too, but over the cycle; we’ll incur
deficits over the years of recession, but then we’ll have surpluses over the years of boom, so
that over the years of the full cycle, the budget will be balanced.
Well that promise was, of course, soon forgotten, as it became all too clear that the
idea of a substantial budget surplus had joined the dodo bird on the list of extinct species.
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Soon, the Keynesian doctrine underwent a subtle shift: we should have big deficits in a
depression, they declared, and smaller deficits in boom times. Taxes, on the other hand,
might be cut slightly in recessions, only to be increased a great deal in booms. The general
trend, of course, was for ever-greater increases of the burden of government, both in taxation
and spending, upon the American economy.
The Keynesians have been running the economic policies of government for the last
40 or 50 years. But something dramatic happened in the deep recession of 1973-75,
something which had been threatening to happen in previous post-World War II recessions.
There was a steep recession, with bankruptcies, unemployment, and cuts in production; and
yet at the same time, prices went up a great deal, in fact at a steeper rate than in any previous
peace-time year in American History. If we suffer from inflationary recessions, what can
Keynesians do, since their whole doctrine is geared to pressing the accelerator in recessions
and stepping on the brake during booms? How can government step on the accelerator and
the brake at the same time?
Keynesianism was thrown into permanent confusion by the 1973-75 experience and
by the fact that all subsequent recessions have been marked by price inflation rather than
deflation. After Arthur Burns resigned as Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in
the late 1950s, he gave a lecture in which he outlined his Keynesian prescriptions. When
asked about the 1958 recession, which was already beginning to show signs of prices rising
slightly instead of falling, he predicted correctly that that recession was almost over. When
pressed about what he would do if inflationary recession should ever recur on a much greater
scale, he answered: “Then we’d all have to resign.”
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But, of course, one law of politics is that no one ever resigns. Keynesians haven’t
resigned, but they are certainly punchy, going through the motions, lacking the old assurance
and swagger. It is typical, by the way, of the bad luck of Richard Nixon that he announced,
“we are all Keynesians now,” at just about the time when Keynesianism was losing its grip.
Essentially, Keynesians remain champions of the status quo, calling for more of the same:
higher spending, higher taxes, moderately cheap money, etc. Worried about the huge deficits
that have grown and persist even during booms, they have during the Reagan Administration
been clamoring consistently for higher income taxes to close the deficit at least partly. And
they did succeed to some extent, in raising taxes ever since the picayune 1981 tax cut.
Certainly they have succeeded in keeping spending high and rising. On the monetary front,
as I will note shortly, Paul Volker was allowed to return to his Keynesian instincts by late
1982. And, despite making the requisite tight money noises, the Fed has succeeded, over all,
in increasing the money supply at a rate slightly higher than even the substantial rate of
monetary inflation under Jimmy Carter.
But still: the continuing crisis of Keynesianism since 1973 has broken up the once
overwhelming Keynesian consensus in economics, and has opened the door to newer and
fresher, if not necessarily sounder, approaches: especially fresher to the supply-siders and
particularly to the monetarists, who have managed to corral a large chunk of the economics
profession in the past decade.
4. The Monetarists
And so we turn to our last Reaganomic group, the monetarists. Here we have to
distinguish between Milton Friedman, the founding father of monetarism, and his numerous
disciples. Friedman is not only a monetarist but a man devoted, except in the area of money,
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his specialty, to classical liberal values and programs. Hence, he joined the Old-Fashioned
Conservatives in pressing for substantial cuts in government spending. He even linked up
with the hated supply-siders in calling for tax cuts, but for very different reasons: not
because he believed in the Laffer Curve, but because he felt that politically, if Congress sees
a loss in revenue, it will cut spending proportionally in order to avoid a huge increase in the
deficit. Friedman has, of course, turned out to be wrong in this conjecture, since nothing
seems to induce either Congress or the Executive Branch to cut spending – by which I mean
a cut-cut as in an actual reduction, not cuts in the rate of increase, or similar bits of semantic
trickery we have endured in recent years.
But the other monetarists are not Friedman. The monetarists give not a hang for
taxes or spending or deficits. To the monetarists none of this matters. The only thing that
matters is the famous “money rule”: the idea that we should retain fiat money controlled by
the Fed, but that the Fed should be ordered to expand the supply of money at a fixed,
constant rate. What that rate should be has curiously varied among monetarists, but it is
usually somewhere between three and five percent. The whole trouble with
macroeconomics, say the monetarists, is a Fed that insists on increasing the money supply in
a volatile and erratic manner. And so they called for the Fed to abandon the Keynesian
doctrine of trying to fix interest rates, and instead concentrate on fixing the total money
supply, increasing at the constant money rule rate.
At the beginning, as I have mentioned, Reagan settled the war among his
economists by giving to each group control over their major interest and so the monetarists
got control of the money supply. In particular, Beryl W. Sprinkel was put in as Under
Secretary of Treasury in Charge of Monetary Policy. After a bit of public bludgeoning of
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Paul Volker by Sprinkel, the Fed Chairman swung into line and faithfully pursued monetarist
policies from early 1981 until October 1982. During this period, no Fed Chairman could
have stuck more closely to the monetarist prescription.
The monetarists, we must add, did not only counsel the money rule. They realized
that a rapid drop in money growth to the three or four percent from the existing seven or
eight percent would precipitate a recession. The monetarists were just as anxious as
Keynesians to avoid recessions, since neither group believed that recession performed any
necessary or important economic function, such as liquidation of the unsound investments
undertaken during the preceding inflationary boom. And so the monetarists counselled that
the Fed slowly and steadily reduce the rate of money growth each year by a small amount. In
that way inflation would be gradually brought down without incurring a recession. We
would have a “soft landing.”
And so this was done. Unfortunately for the monetarists, however, even a moderate
drop in the rate of money growth to 5.5 percent was enough to precipitate not only a
recession, but by far the steepest and most severe recession since the 1930s. Not only that:
Friedman and the monetarists had promised the Reagan Administration that, as inflation
came down, interest rates would decline to the same extent. The specter of high interest rates
would be lifted. For it was an article of faith among the monetarists that “real” interest rates,
that is, the interest rate minus the inflation rate, would always and forever be at three percent.
Lower inflation by reducing the rate of money growth, they assured everyone, and interest
rates would come down to preserve the magic three percent real rate. But while inflation
came down greatly, from approximately 13 to three percent, interest rates scarcely fell at all,
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and we were plunged into unprecedentedly high and seemingly permanent high real interest
rates.
These two failures discredited the monetarists totally within the Administration,
apparently beyond hope of redemption. Jerry Jordan, the top monetarist on the Council of
Economic Advisers, was sent back to academia, and while Sprinkel is still there, he has been
uncharacteristically quiet ever since October 1982, when Paul Volker shifted back toward
making interest rates a preferred target, and pumped in money at a frantic rate of 13 percent
per year in order to inflate our way out of the recession. Exit monetarism, leaving some form
of Keynesianism in complete control, leavened by continuing supply-side rhetoric.
The monetarists’ fallback position proved not to be nearly as effective as that of the
supply-siders. They claimed that the Volker of 1981-82 had not been totally and completely
monetarist. His heart had not been in it. But he had come so close that such an excuse cut
very little ice. The desperation of the monetarists was revealed by their major excuse:
namely that reserve requirements were not imposed on the banks instantaneously, as they had
been before 1968. Instead, since 1968 the Fed had allowed a two-week lag for the banks to
meet reserve requirements, and thereby Fed control over the money supply had been fatally
weakened. Two weeks! Never had so picayune an explanation been offered for so
catastrophic an economic failure. And, indeed, in February 1984 the Fed finally reinstalled
instantaneous reserve requirements (known as contemporaneous reserve accounting), and it
didn’t make a dime’s worth of difference. But, of course, by that time monetarism had been
abandoned.
As for the enormous rise in real interest rates, the monetarists had really no answer,
and at one point, Milton Friedman actually threw up his hands and conceded that he couldn’t
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understand what had happened. Admirably honest no doubt, but decidedly not the way to
win out in the great game of politics.
5. Ronald Reagan
We have now dealt with Four Faces of Reaganomics. What about the fifth? The
fifth, of course, is Ronald Reagan himself. What are his preferred economic policies? Well,
who knows? None of us is equipped with a crystal ball to see into the heart and mind of the
President. One thing we do know: the cherished conservative analysis, held both by OldFashioned Conservatives and by supply-siders, doesn’t work. This explanation is summed
up in the famous conservative cry: “Let Reagan be Reagan!”, first raised when the President
argued with equal fervor for the $100 billion tax increase of 1982 as he had for the tax cut
only a year before. The theory goes that the good and wise Reagan, who really agrees with
us, is surrounded by wicked pragmatist and Keynesian advisers preventing him from
following his true instincts. Hence: “Let Reagan be Reagan!” The problem with this
scenario is that it conveniently overlooks the key question: Who appointed these wicked
advisers, and who keeps them in power? The answer, of course, is Reagan himself.
We can only assess the President on the record of his words and especially his
deeds. We do know that he employs the rhetoric of the Old-Fashioned Conservatives and the
supply-siders, while largely following the policies of establishment Keynesians. All this was
explained patiently to the anguished conservatives of 1982 by Representative Barber Conable
of New York, a shrewd veteran Republican politician. The President, he explained
admiringly, has the remarkable ability to separate his mind into two air tight compartments:
the realm of rhetoric, where he employs the doctrines of conservatism, and the realm of
policy, where he continues Keynesian programs. And, pointed out Conable, there is no
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relation whatever between the two realms. Conservatives, therefore, should wise up to the
realities of this situation and quit complaining. All well and good, and sound, as far as it
goes. But what Conable neglected to explain was, if rhetoric has no relation to policy, why
does the President bother to employ rhetoric at all? Once this question is posed, the answer
should be obvious. President Reagan has forged a mighty coalition, a coalition of fervent
conservatives harnessed to the shrewd “pragmatic” beneficiaries of the big government status
quo. In this coalition, each group, the ideologues and the pragmatists, get what they are most
interested in. The pragmatists get to keep the status quo Keynesian big government welfare
state, and the ideologues get the libertarian, free-market, get-government-off-our-backs
rhetoric. Thus, both sides are kept happy, as was shown in the landslide victory of Ronald
Reagan in November. Politically, at least, many-faced Reaganomics has proven to be a
smashing success.
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I am sure that all of us . . . could live fairly
comfortably with the idea of each of us kicking in, say,
a grand total of ten dollars a year to the federal government.
Murray N. Rothbard
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LECTURE 4
THE TERRIBLE SIMPLIFIERS: THE CASE AGAINST THE FLAT TAX
Murray N. Rothbard
(Delivered on May 7, 1985)
All “right thinking” groups in our society, all across the political spectrum,
republicans and democrats, conservatives and liberals, left and right, warmly support the flat
tax. By “right thinking” I mean all people who have managed successfully to identify their
own views, whatever they may be, with the common good or the public interest or the
general welfare. Mainly, such people are found in the ranks of intellectuals, including
academics, writers, and media pundits. The latest scheme to draw virtually unanimous
support from all these people is the flat tax. A few weeks ago, I had the dubious pleasure of
watching no less than three TV programs in one night devoted to praising the virtues of the
flat tax. By this time, however, the cautious and the wary should be on the alert: namely,
any policy that draws unanimous support from academics, writers, and media broadcasters
can’t be all good. There must be a catch somewhere.
The flat tax has been cleverly labelled a tax “reform,” the very word “reform” being
heavy with the implication that no man or woman of good will, be they liberal or
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conservative, democrat or republican, can possibly stand opposed to such a plan. My
favorite writer, H. L. Mencken, once pungently wrote that he had learned at his father’s knee
in Baltimore what “reform” in politics really meant: “mainly a conspiracy of prehensile
charlatans to mulct the taxpayer.” In fact, we can set it down as an intelligent working rule
of politics that when some plan comes at us either as a “reform” and/or as the unanimous
proposal of all right-thinking intellectuals, we had best keep a careful eye on our wallets and
our pocketbooks.
1. “Special Interests”: Good or Bad?
So convinced are the flat-taxers that only they have a pipeline to interpret the
common good or the general welfare, that they invariably charge that any and all critics of
their scheme are simply spokesmen for a sinister and shadowy group they commonly refer to
as “the special interests.” “Special interests” seems to be an effective way to write off
substantial opposition to the flat-tax, especially since the convenient tendency of intellectuals
is to dismiss all other interests but their own as “special” and hence somehow narrow and
sinister. I would like to suggest instead that special interests aren’t all bad, and to propose a
criterion for distinguishing between beneficial and unfortunate effects of special interest. I
would like to distinguish between “aggressive” and “defensive” actions of special interest
groups. Take, for example, the sugar program to which all of us have been subjected for a
half-century. In order to maintain and expand the inefficient U. S. sugar industry, the sugar
interests have for decades propped up sugar prices by use of government, and lobbied for
severe quotas on the import of sugar. As a result, American consumers (to say nothing of
foreign sugar producers) have been hurt severely, the supply of sugar sharply restricted and
the price artificially raised – so that the support price of sugar in the U. S. is now no less than
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seven times higher than the world market price. Here is a clear-cut example of aggressive
action by special interests.
But there are also cases of special interests acting defensively, rather than
aggressively. Several years ago, for example, the movie theatres circulated petitions against
a new tax on movie admissions and urged that it be repealed. Here were special interests
acting, not aggressively but defensively, trying to remove a millstone from their operations,
battling for their right to keep more of their own money. I was happy to sign that petition
both because I believed that the cause of the movies was just and also that my own and other
movie consumers’ rights and interests were being invaded by the government. But wasn’t
this special pleading on the part of the movie theatres? Yes, and so what? There is no reason
to expect that movie companies will be in the forefront of action to protect rights and
incomes of, say, liquor stores, as they will be in protecting their own. In all cases where
special interests are acting defensively, the front fighters for the rights of consumers will
naturally be the particular firms or industries that happen to be under attack. Who else would
we expect to sound the alarm than the special interests most deeply under fire?
To return to the flat tax: the seductive rhetoric of invoking the “special interests”
has led most people to believe that everyone will benefit from the flat tax except a few
wicked corporations or multi-millionaires. Nothing could be further from the truth. If the
flat tax is enacted, millions of us will find out, too late and to our chagrin, that, to paraphrase
the immortal words of the philosopher Pogo: “We have met the ‘special interests’ and they
are us.” Or as Senator Dole (Republican, Kansas) put it recently on the issue of the flat tax
as an allegedly “fair” tax: “everybody believes in fairness unless they’re involved.”
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Before we go down the list of so-called “special interests” who will be hurt by the
enactment of a flat tax, I want to stress that I’ll be talking about the pure flat tax concept,
rather than about the current approach to it submitted last fall by Secretary of the Treasury
Regan, and supported by the administration. The Regan plan, which for example proposes
three income tax brackets instead of one flat one has been called a “flat tax with bumps.” It
presents as much of the flat tax that the Treasury Department thought they could get away
with politically, and presumably this will soon be modified further in the final Reagan
Budget proposal. But the important point is that the arguments for the Regan plan are solely
that it approaches the ideal of the flat tax, and so it is that ideal that should be examined.
The flat tax, quite simply, proposes that every individual and every organization be
subjected to the same, uniform proportionate income tax. To achieve that uniformity, the flat
taxers propose the ruthless suppression of all credits, deductions, exemptions, and shelters,
all of which are sneered at as “loopholes” in the tax system. In the flat taxers’ pure theory,
the proportional income tax would apply to everyone regardless of income. But early in the
development of the flat-tax movement they decided that, politically, the poor would have to
be exempt from the tax. As a result, all flat tax schemes are now “degressive,” that is, they
are proportional above an arbitrary minimum income floor, below which line the income
receiver pays no taxes. The “degressivity” leaves an important element of progressivity in
what has been touted as a strictly proportional plan.
2. What Is a “Loophole”?
It is instructive to pause for a moment to examine the pejorative term “loophole.”
What is a “loophole,” anyway? It is never defined, but the flat-taxers seem to make the
implicit assumption that the government really owns, or should own, all of what everyone
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makes, at least up to some arbitrary percentage decided by the government. Hence, any
failure of government to confiscate everyone’s property up to that amount is somehow a
moral blot that needs to be rectified. But to me it is far from self-evident that the
government, rather than we ourselves, should have the primary right to our own earnings.
And we must realize that what the “closing of loopholes” will mean under a flat tax is a
merciless and continuing search-and-destroy mission by which the government will root out
and obliterate every little cherished nook and cranny, every little hidey-hole, in which many
of us have been able to squirrel away a bit of our own earnings and our own property, and
keep them safe from the ever-expanding, all-encompassing maw of the federal government.
Wrapped up in the confusion over the role of “special interests” is a muddle over
the concept of “subsidy.” Flat-taxers call these exemptions, deductions, and loopholes
“subsidies,” and being staunchly opposed to subsidies, flat-taxers propose to eliminate them.
But is it really a “subsidy” to be allowed to keep more of your own money? Only if we agree
with the curious implicit assumption of the flat-taxers that the government, not us, really
owns our earnings and our property, and that therefore being allowed to keep some of them is
an arbitrary indulgence on its part. I submit, to the contrary, that there is a big and crucial
difference between the government’s taxing Peter to pay Paul, which is a “subsidy” to Paul,
and the government’s allowing Paul to keep more of his own funds. That can only be called
a “subsidy” on the grotesque assumption that the government really owns all of our property
to begin with.
Before examining the “special interests” who will lose, and often lose heavily, from
the imposition of a flat tax, let me say that, strictly for the sake of argument I will begin by
granting the flat taxers their insistent point that the shift to their tax will be strictly “revenue- 91 -

neutral,” that is, that total tax revenue will remain exactly the same from the shift, and will
not increase. I will grant that point for the time being, but I also remind you of the perceptive
and sardonic motto of the typical, street-wise New Yorker: “If you believe that, buddy,
there’s a bridge in Brooklyn I’d like to sell you.”
Let us now go down the list of heavy losers from the imposition of the Flat Tax:
a. Receivers of “Imputed” Income.
The flat taxers are nothing if not sophisticated economic theorists, and they realize
that we receive our incomes, not only in money but also in other ways, by goods or services
“in kind,” or in various psychic ways. They also realize that much of the flowering of nonmoney incomes, to which they “impute” monetary value, has come about precisely in order
to avoid some of the confiscations of the taxing system. Since income taxes are levied on
money income, people tend to shift as much income as possible from monetary to nonmonetary forms.
And so, people pay and receive income in non-monetary ways: If a carpenter goes
to a physician for treatment, he may meet his bill by fixing the doctor’s house rather than by
money payment. Employees receive much of their income in non-monetary “fringe
benefits,” which may accrue in money only in the future. Salesmen and executives take
some of their salary, not in money income, but in blissfully tax-free “perks” such as expense
accounts, and the much-cherished three-martini lunch.
But the flat-taxers, in their puritanical frenzy at seeing anyone escape their allotted
payment of taxes, are out to get rid of all that. It is good-bye to the tax-free fringe benefit,
the expense account, the three-martini lunch. And what will happen to the restaurant
business, the hotel business? What indeed will happen to Las Vegas? I shudder to
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contemplate it. But the flat-taxers, like all puritans, like all fanatics, care not; they are ready
to wreak unlimited havoc in the name of attaining their ideal.
Labor groups are already complaining about the taxing of their health care, life
insurance, and retirement fringe-benefits in the Reagan Plan. But to quote a popular
Reaganism: “They ain’t seen nothin’ yet!” For one thing, there is the American
homeowner. Every homeowner is going to get it, but good, under the flat-tax regime. The
flat-taxers, for example, have figured out that homeowners benefit, in a real though nonmonetary way, by not having to pay rent. And so the flat-taxers propose to tax every
homeowner on the “imputed rent” they are earning by not having to pay rent to a landlord.
If, for example, you own your own home, and some officials figure out that you would have
been paying $1,200 a month if you had been renting the home, then you will have to pay a
proportional tax on this imputed total.
I applaud the sophistication by which the flat-taxers realize that we earn income in
imputed or non-monetary forms. There is just one big hitch in their scheme: that no one has
yet figured out a way to pay “imputed” taxes. Unfortunately, the IRS insists on cold hard
cash. And so it is going to be very painful for many people to have to pay taxes in money on
income which is only psychic. As we will see shortly, the flat-taxers are out to tax capital
gains fully as much as if they were earned income, as indeed they are. But if they had their
druthers, they would tax these gains, not when we realize them in money form, but every
year, as they accrue. It is going to be very difficult for many people to pay through the nose
on capital gains from increases in the value of their stocks or their homes, gains which they
can only reap when they come to sell their asset. In the regime of the flat-taxers, there will
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be a great deal of painful forced-selling of homes and other assets. And to think, all this in
the sacred name of the twin watchwords of the flat-taxers: “Simplicity” and “Fairness!”
It’s a good thing that the flat-taxers haven’t yet figured out how to tax us on our
leisure, although as good puritans I’m sure they’re working on it.
b. Payers of Interest.
Interest payments are expenses that the government allows us to deduct from
taxable income. They will be brought under the heel by the flat-taxers. But if interest
payments are no longer deductible, this means that one of the great economic advantages of
owning a home, being able to deduct mortgage interest payments from taxes, will disappear.
Notice that all of America’s homeowners are going to be clobbered four ways by the ruthless
ideologues of the flat-tax movement. One, as we have seen, homeowners will lose by being
forced to pay taxes on their “imputed rent;” two, they will no longer be able to deduct interest
payments on mortgages; and three and four, the value of their homes, on which they count
when they wish to move, will be forced down because the after-tax return on the house will
decline from the two increased tax levies.
I fail to follow the logic on this one: I can see why those who earn interest have to
pay taxes on this income; but I fail to see why those who pay interest have to shell out more
as well. In fact, this looks to me like double taxation on the same income, and if the flattaxers were not the self-proclaimed experts on “fairness,” I would even go so far as to say
that double taxes on the same income are unfair.
c. Receivers of Capital Gains.
The flat-taxers are also astute enough to realize that capital gains constitute income.
But, on the other hand, profits add to capital gains, and since they propose to tax profits too,
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they are once again, double-taxing the same income. At the very least, then, profits should
no longer be taxed if capital gains are as well. Relentless in pursuing any bit of untaxed
income, the flat-taxers note that capital gains have been taxed much less in recent years than
other income, and so they propose to pile on higher taxes so as to bring about the desired
uniformity.
But higher capital gains taxation will strike hardest and foremost at the new, young,
venture capitalists going into high-risk, progressive industries. Heavy capital gains taxation
will strike a deadly blow precisely at new, high-risk venture capital. Do we really want to
cripple these firms and ventures?
We have already pointed to the extra difficulties if flat-taxers pursue their prey to
the last ounce and insist on taxation of accrued, and not just realized, capital gains.
It is common knowledge that great Britain’s economy, since World War II, has
suffered grievously from very high levels of income tax. One of the reasons that the British
economy has not gone completely down the drain is that, fortunately, its government has
levied no tax on capital gains, thus allowing many capital ventures to flourish. Our
implacable flat-tax Jacobins would make sure to close that loophole.
d. Accelerated Depreciators and Investors.
But let it not be thought that our flat-taxers are only out to make life difficult for
new venture capitalists. The old-line smokestack industries, already in decline, will get theirs
too. One of the great problems of the older, heavily capitalized smokestack industries is that
their profits have not been high enough to permit them to maintain and particularly to
modernize their capital and allow them to compete with newer firms at home and abroad.
Two highly beneficial tax reforms of the first year of the Reagan Administration were (1)
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allowing investment credit on corporate and personal income tax for investing in capital; and
(2) permitting business firms to accelerate the depreciation of their capital at virtually any
speed. The investment credit allowed heavily capitalized firms to keep more of their profits,
and invest in maintaining, modernizing, and expanding their capital. Accelerated
depreciation has permitted firms to keep more of their current profits out of the hands of the
IRS and to plow them back into badly-needed replacement and modernization of equipment.
Now, under the thrall of the flat-tax ideologues, the Reagan Administration in an
about-face, proposes to get rid of its own salutary reforms. Both of them are now derided as
“subsidies.” But, once again, the investment credit allows people to keep more of their
money if used for investment. Neither can we call accelerated depreciation a subsidy. There
is no reason why a business should not be able to depreciate its capital at any pace it wants.
Its total, long-run tax bill does not even decline; what a business is permitted to do is, instead
of extending a depreciation allowance over, say, the 10-year life of the machine, to choose
instead to take the entire allowance off now, so as to be able to buy a new machine and pay
the same total tax bill out of the returns of the new machine over the next nine years.
Accelerated depreciation simply allows every firm to arrange the time-schedule of its
payments in ways that are most convenient and efficient.
e. Owners of Natural Resources.
Let it not be thought that owners of natural resources, such as oil, natural gas, and
metallic mines, will get off scot free. On the contrary, they will be among the worst losers
from the tyranny of the flat-taxers. Economists in general, let alone flat-taxers, have long
denounced depletion allowances of natural resource owners as an outrageous subsidy. Since
oil and natural gas companies, in the public’s folk mythology, are considered especially
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wicked, this part of the flat-tax creed enjoys particularly wide popularity. Yet, in actuality,
apart from the fact that the right to keep one’s own money can hardly be called a subsidy,
there is another important fallacy in calling depletion allowances a subsidy. An income tax,
by its very name, is designed as a tax on annual income, not on accumulated wealth. A tax
on wealth directly confiscates property and brings about a decline in the structure of capital
and hence of everyone’s standard of living. But then we must realize that if we make the
grave mistake of treating a using up of capital as a firm’s income, and tax it accordingly, we
will precipitate a decline in its capital structure and impose severe losses upon the firm.
Suppose, for example, that a crude oil company produces and sells oil, and makes a net
income from the sale of $100 million. But the oil in its reserves has now been diminished; if
we can determine, say, that the value of its underground oil has gone down by $70 million,
then the net income of the company has only been $30 million. To tax it as if its income has
been $100 million will unwittingly impose crippling losses upon the company. And yet, our
flat-taxers, true to form, propose to do precisely that. And the value of stock investments in
oil and mineral resource companies will, of course, decline as well.
f. Corporations.
Lest we think that only the new venture firms and the older smokestack industries
will get the axe from our flat-taxers, we should know that all corporations will suffer, for the
corporate income tax will increase substantially, to make the tax on a par and uniform with
the tax on the income of individuals. Everything, again, looks neat and “fair,” with all
individuals and organizations paying a uniform rate.
But hold; for in this instance, the flat-taxers are cutting against what I consider to be
a correct trend in modern economics. That is, if, in the famous Milton Friedman formula,
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tanstaafl (there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch), then we can also add the term tanstaac
(there ain’t no such thing as a “corporation”). There is no existing entity called a
“corporation” that feels, works, thinks, earns income, and then enjoys that income. A
“corporation” is only a label for individuals who organize themselves, and hopefully earn
income, in certain ways. There is no income-earning thing called a “corporation” that exists
and earns income above and beyond the people, that is, the stockholder-owners, who
constitute that corporation. Therefore, a tax on corporate income is an unjust and “unfair” (if
I may use that term) double tax on the same income, as well as a tax hitting at savings and
investment. Instead of raising income tax rates on corporations, as the Reagan Plan and the
flat-taxers would do, we should move in the other direction, end double taxation, and cut the
corporate tax to zero. Stockholders should be taxed just once, on the income they
individually earn from the corporate firm. And oddly enough, before he succumbed to flattaxism, Ronald Reagan himself has been known to voice such sentiments.
g. State and Local Taxpayers.
And now we come to a category of losers from the flat tax that I, as a New Yorker,
find particularly outrageous. I speak here in this glorious land of Nevada, where all of you
are blessed with no state income tax, no city income tax, and what we consider a small sales
tax. But I and millions of other hapless and exploited citizens live in New York City, where
we are mulcted and coerced into paying the highest state income tax in the nation, the highest
city income tax in the country, and the highest sales tax. Why, you may ask, are the
unfortunate residents of New York groaning under such an unprecedented and massive tax
burden? You all know why. Our remarkably low crime rate is celebrated in song and story
throughout the length and breadth of America, our public schools are a schoolhouse of crime
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rather than the three Rs, our glorious streets and sidewalks are celebrated for their cleanliness
and sparkle, our roads have even fewer potholes than Tijuana, and our fire department has
managed to limit the massive destruction of buildings by arson to only one-half of the Bronx,
and even lesser fractions of Manhattan and Brooklyn. For this glorious roster of “urban
services” we have been forced to pay through the nose.
And now the cup of New Yorkers runneth over. After having been chastised for so
many years with whips, the flat-taxers now arrive on the scene to chastise us with scorpions.
It seems that being able to deduct our massive state and local taxes from our federal taxable
income has only been a wicked “subsidy,” and so now even that small consolation will be
snatched from us. Why? Why in the name of “fairness” and “simplicity” are the unfortunate
serfs of New York City who have already suffered the trials of Job, to be clobbered yet
again?
It goes without saying that flat-taxers are zealots in favor of taxing the interest from
municipal bonds – a long-standing goal of liberals in order to aggrandize the power of the
federal government as against the states. If municipal bonds are taxed, their value will of
course plummet, as will the credit and the power of state and local governments to float
bonds. More and more spending will then be centralized in the hands of a super-powerful
federal government. Is that what we all really want? I suppose there is no reason to raise the
point that federal taxing of municipal bonds is clearly unconstitutional, as would be state
taxation of Treasury bonds; for since when has anyone worried about the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States?
h. The Charitable and the Non-Profitable.
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One important tax deduction to be swept away would be gifts to charities or other
non-profit organizations. Since much charity is now done under the gun of the IRS, the
result of the flat-tax would be a drastic crippling of private charitable and educational
organizations. Why should giving to charities, the arts, and educational institutions be
hobbled and penalized, in the name of “simplicity” and “fairness”? The severe losses of
many of these organizations, would lead them to turn to the federal government to bail them
out, in effect nationalizing private charity and expanding and aggrandizing the federal
welfare state. All universities and non-profit institutions that depend on voluntary giving
would be victims of the zeal of our single-minded flat-taxers.
i. Victims of Fire, Sickness, and Accident.
There are even more helpless victims who will fall under the heel of the flat-taxers.
Every man or woman who falls sick and whose medical payments are not insured, will, in
flat-taxland, be unable to deduct these payments from his taxable income. No victim of fire,
uncovered by insurance, will any longer be able to deduct his losses. And so the flat-taxers
will have found another set of helpless sitting ducks for them to mow down: life’s
unfortunates, run over by accident or disease, will be run over a second time, this time in the
name of “equality” and “fairness.” How many victims of such “fairness” are we going to
permit?
j. Entrepreneurial Losers.
Some entrepreneurs make profits; others suffer losses. That is the essence of
entrepreneurship. While I don’t believe that losers should be bailed out or subsidized by
government, it seems like excessive punishment for government to kick them, once again,
while they’re down. But, this is precisely what our flat-taxers are planning to do. While it is
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difficult to claim that losses, like profits, somehow constitute net income, this is precisely
how flat-taxers regard them: as hidden income to be ferreted out and taxed. We have heard
for years about those evil “tax shelters” which “they,” the wicked rich, like to indulge in. But
mainly these “shelters” are losing propositions, the losses of which partially offset net
income in other areas. How can we call such shelters “income”?
I, for example, in addition to being a salaried professor, am a self-employed author
and lecturer. Some years, I make a net income from this business, other years I suffer losses.
Who are the flat-taxers to come swooping down, they or the IRS try to pry into my soul, and
announce either that I am a genuine but sometimes losing entrepreneur, or that in my secret
heart of hearts I rejoice in my losses because it lowers my taxable income? Are the flattaxers or the IRS truly qualified to examine everyone’s heart and soul and decide on
everyone’s inner motives? And, in the last analysis, how dare they anyhow?
Let everyone, then, realize that the “they,” the “special interests” who will be hurt,
and perhaps hurt badly, from the flat tax, are not just a few shadowy and malevolent
millionaires. If you are a homeowner, or a stockholder, a venture capitalist, an owner of
natural resources, a holder of a municipal bond, a payer of state and local taxes, a contributor
to charity or non-profit activities, or a sufferer from uninsured sickness, accident, or
entrepreneurial loss, you will be a loser from the flat tax. While it is not really possible to
average out pain or loss among individuals and make it disappear, there is every reason to
believe that, on the average, upper income groups will probably benefit on net from the fall
in tax rates under the flat tax, whereas the middle class, as usual, will be hit and hit hard. So
what else is new?
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3. What Price “Pareto Optimality”?
Thus, the flat tax is a drastic and radical scheme that, at the very least, will impose
pain and heavy losses upon large numbers of people. And for what? As the English would
say, what’s it all in aid of? In the discipline known as welfare economics, economists like to
pay lip-service to the so-called criterion of Pareto-optimality: that is, that no government
action, no matter how beneficial, shall injure even one person. It is not surprising that
economists honor this criterion more in the breach than in the observance, for it is hard to
know how any action of government could ever fulfill it. But still, there is a point we can
learn from the Pareto criterion. For it seems to me that if we are to consider any radical and
drastic change, we should at least have a good reason for doing it. A radical change for the
sake of abolishing slavery? Fine. To achieve freedom? To roll back Leviathan government?
Also fine. But, on the flat tax, surely we should stop, look, and listen! For are we to impose
severe losses on so many people, merely for the sake of symmetry?
The burden of proof, then, should be on the shoulders of the flat-taxers. For the
sake of what are they proposing to put so many of us through the wringer? Their arguments
may be boiled down to three: fairness, neutrality to the market, and simplicity.
4. The Argument From Fairness
The major argument for the flat tax is not economic but moral, namely that this is
the only fair way to distribute taxation. The assumption is that, given an arbitrarily
determined total revenue to the government, that revenue should be distributed in a uniform,
flat tax manner.
But the flat taxers do not really argue their point; they simply assume it as selfevident to all people of good will. Well, sorry, but I don’t see it. I don’t see why it is
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particularly “fair” to clobber the sick, the sufferers from accidents, or the homeowners, or
why it is fair to impose monetary taxes on earners of non-monetary income. More
specifically, I don’t see why proportional taxation is any “fairer” than many other possible
patterns of distribution. Take, for example, Mr. A and Mr. B, each of whom earns a net
income of, say, $50,000 a year. But Mr. A is a young man, just starting in life, with virtually
zero assets. He depends on personal savings to build up his wealth and to finance a future
business.
Mr. B, on the other hand, is an older man who has already built up or inherited
millions of dollars in assets. Why is it manifestly fair for him to pay the same tax as Mr. A?
Neither is it obvious to me that a sick person with heavy medical bills should pay the same
tax as a healthy man with the same income. Note that I am not saying the opposite: I am not
advocating a tax on health or on wealth. I’m simply saying that there seems to be no
convincing argument for the fairness of one pattern of taxation over another.
In fact, I will go even further, and say that fairness has little or nothing to do with
the matter, that, in fact, tanstaaft (“there ain’t no such thing as a fair tax”). Conservative flattaxers like to analogize to the free market, and maintain that they are trying to achieve
neutrality to the market. But consider: What in the world is a “fair” price on the market?
Many medieval economists came to grief on this issue. What is the “fair price,” for example,
of Wonder Bread? Who knows? For my part, as a Wonder Bread consumer, I’d love to see
the price down to about a penny a loaf, and the Wonder Bread Company would undoubtedly
love to be able to charge one-hundred dollars a loaf. As it is, after the higgling and haggling
of the market, we all settle for about one dollar a loaf. There seems to be no sense to the
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concept of fairness in price except what is arrived at, from day to day, as the result of
voluntary transactions on the market.
But what of taxation? Unfortunately, we can’t even apply the voluntary transaction
criterion here, because by its very nature taxation is coercive, and is not arrived at by the
voluntary bargaining of individuals on the market. So what then is a “fair” tax? I submit that
the concept simply doesn’t apply. All I know is that, as a taxpayer, I would like my taxes to
be as low as possible. I suggest, then, that we cease the impossible quest for fairness in
taxation, and try to arrive at taxes as low as possible. For whom? For everyone.
Let us note, for example, the analysis of taxation by one of my favorite economists,
the nineteenth century Frenchman, J. B. Say. After pointing out that taxation is a coercive
transfer from individuals and groups to the government, crippling their ability to produce and
consume, Say’s concluding recommendation on the tax question was trenchant and clear-cut.
“The best scheme of finance,” Say wrote, “is to spend as little as possible; and the best tax is
always the lightest.” In short, to paraphrase Jefferson, “That government is best which
spends and taxes least.”
I submit that instead of worrying about distributing taxes “fairly,” or what is
supposed to amount to the same thing, allocating tax suffering equally, we should set about
trying to minimize tax suffering as much as we can down the line. And if we approach the
problem that way, we should find it easier to gain broad agreement. Rather than trying to
figure out whether a proportional, digressive, regressive, or progressive income tax structure
is “fairest,” we may find we can agree on reducing the tax burden of everyone.
Thus, let us compare two hypothetical tax systems. In system A, there is a steeply
progressive income tax, ranging from zero to ten percent in the highest income brackets. In
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system B, in contrast, everyone pays a flat, strictly proportional income tax, of forty percent.
I have a hunch that, in choosing between these systems, even the upper income groups would
plump for the far more progressive, but much lower tax burden. The central point is the
lowness of each tax, rather than the distribution of the burden.
I submit that what people are, or should be, interested in is lowering their own tax
burden rather than zealously and enviously trying to aggravate the burdens of other people;
in short, defensive rather than aggressive pursuit of their special interests. And here is a
genuine basis for solidarity among taxpayers of all groups and sizes. The point, then, is not
that “they” – whoever “they” are – are paying too little taxes and should be brought to heel.
The point is that all of us are paying too much. The flat tax movement is part of a process by
which the government and its allies have been able to split and deflect the tax protest
movement from trying to lower the taxes of everyone, into trying to force everyone into
paying some arbitrarily defined “fair share.”
5. The Argument From Neutrality to the Market
An important argument of the flat-taxers, especially those who claim devotion to
the free market, is that their plan is needed to restore the allocation of resources to what
would have been the pattern on the market: in short, that the flat tax is uniquely neutral to
the market. The argument runs as follows: credits, deductions, and loopholes distort
resources relative to the free market because more resources go into the loopholes than would
otherwise. Thus, an investment tax credit means that more resources will go into investment
than would on a free market. Let us take a simple case to highlight the argument: suppose
that there are only two industries in the economy, machine tools and wheat. If machine tools
receive an investment tax credit, more resources will be poured into machine tools relative to
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wheat than on the purely free market. Therefore, the tax credit distorts resources, and a flat
tax, by eliminating that credit, will correct the distortion and restore genuine market
conditions.
But this argument overlooks a crucial point: namely, that even in our simple model,
much less in the real world, there is still another channel for the allocation of resources,
namely government. In our example, if resources did not go into machine tools because of
the special credit, they would have gone not into wheat but into government, and government
is far less neutral to the market than any other allocation. In other words, from the point of
view of the free market, any allocation of economic resources in the private sector, whether
machine tools, wheat, or whatever, is better, that is, closer to the free market, than those
resources going into the maw of government. If neutrality to the free market is really the
consideration, then free-marketeers should rejoice with the creation of one more loophole,
one more nook and cranny safe from the tax-man. The key point to focus on is private
resources vis a vis government.
Oddly enough, it has been completely overlooked that the Reagan Administration,
while submitting the Reagan flat-tax plan, has at the same time called for further tax credits:
for private school tuition and for enterprise zones. Both are laudable, but both are
completely opposed to the flat tax concept.
There is another important point about neutrality to the market, one which also
speaks to the fairness issue. The flat-taxers have strongly implied that, in contrast to the
progressive tax, the uniform proportionate tax is neutral to the market – for the market would
pay in this way for the services of government. But would it really? Where on the market is
the price of anything proportionate to the income of the customer? I pay approximately one
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dollar a loaf for Wonder Bread; if and when David Rockefeller goes to the market to buy a
loaf of Wonder Bread, is he forced to pay one million dollars a loaf – or whatever the
proportion would be for our respective annual incomes? Certainly not! One of the great
things about the market is that every good or service tends to be at one price: regardless of
the race, creed, personality, or income of the customer. So if the flat-taxers really wish to
emulate the market and try to be neutral to that market, they would advocate, not a tax
proportionate to everyone’s income, but a genuine flat tax, that is, an annual tax paid equally
by everyone, in absolute terms; a tax that would be truly equal and truly flat, with no
exemptions or special burdens on income. But how, you might ask, could the poor person
pay a tax equal to a wealthy one? A good question, one that can be answered by pointing to
the price of Wonder Bread. That is, it wouldn’t be a problem, if the price, or the tax were
low enough. I am sure that all of us, for example, could live fairly comfortably with the idea
of each of us kicking in, say, a grand total of ten dollars a year to the federal government.
6. The Argument From Simplicity
Perhaps the most seductive argument of the flat-taxers is the argument from
simplicity: that, in contrast to the maddening complexity of today’s tax code, a code that
even the IRS itself cannot fully understand, the flat tax would be simplicity itself. Everyone,
they promise, would be able to make out their income tax “on a postcard.”
But in the first place, it wouldn’t be that simple. We would still need a complex
process to determine what our net, taxable income might be. Those of us who are selfemployed would still have to figure out our expenses and net incomes. But let us set that
aside. What the flat-taxers don’t seem to realize is that there are, after all, worse things in the
world than complexity. And one of them is paying higher taxes. In short, they don’t seem to
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understand some of the reasons for all the tax complexity. The reason is that many people
are willing to wade through a great deal of complexity in order to lower their tax burden. So
that, in a sense, given the tax system, much of the complexity that everyone denounces is
voluntary. In fact, if we desire simplicity, we can achieve it right now, and without the flat
tax. Two-thirds of Americans do so now by filling out the simple short form for their taxes.
The one-third of us who choose the wearying long-form route do it for one reason alone: to
lower our tax bills. Why in the name of simplicity, are the flat-taxers trying to take this
choice away from us? That is one reason I call them “the terrible simplifiers.” Let them
keep their gift of simplicity to themselves, thank you.
One variant of the simplicity argument proved so alluring to a friend of mine that he
was almost persuaded by the flat-taxers: the promise that the flat tax would get rid of what
are apparently one of the most disliked groups in our society: Tax Lawyers and Accountants.
Apart from the fact that the flat tax would still require a lot of cogitating over net income, let
me be one of the few Americans to put in a good word for this much vilified and beleaguered
group. Denouncing tax lawyers and accountants is like blaming doctors for the existence of
disease, or attacking expenditures on guards, locks, and fences for protecting oneself against
crime. Our complaint should not be with tax lawyers and accountants, but with the system
that makes them necessary. So long as that system exists, we must realize that they are our
shield and our buckler, our defense against the depredations of the tax system. Besides, if we
are truly interested in getting rid of tax lawyers and accountants, there is one surefire way to
do so. During the Joe McCarthy era, my friend the libertarian writer and theorist Frank
Chodorov sat down and wrote: “The way to get rid of communists in government jobs is to
abolish the jobs.” Similarly, we might say that the way to get rid, once and for all, of tax
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accountants and lawyers is to abolish the income tax. This suggestion would meet all the
cherished criteria offered by the flat-taxers: it would surely be simple, it would certainly be
neutral to the market; and it would be uniform, “fair,” and equal: a flat income tax of zero,
across the board, with no loopholes, credits, or exemptions.
7. Revenue-Neutral?
It is now time for us to relax the original assumption that I granted the flat-taxers:
that their plan would be, and remain, revenue-neutral. Even if the flat tax would not raise
total revenue immediately, who here is naïve enough to believe that the government will sit
still for long for revenue-neutrality? The government may be willing to lull us into a false
sense of security by promising no increase in total revenue. It doesn’t mind cutting tax rates
a bit temporarily, for the sake of bringing more revenue sources into its clutches. It is worth
a lot to bring previously sheltered hiding places into the grasp of the federal government. I
can make that point most dramatically by pointing to the fact that eminent left-liberal
economists like Walter Heller champion the flat-tax plan. We might almost point to a picture
of Professor Heller, and ask: why is this man smiling? He is smiling because, as he has
frankly written, the cut in present tax rates is worth the broadening of the tax base, that is, the
bringing of previously exempt income under the grip of the federal taxing power.
8. Conclusion: The Terrible Simplifiers and the “General Interest”
We end on the note with which we began: by remarking on the curious fact that
academics and media people, that is intellectuals, are almost to a man enthusiastic about the
flat tax, regardless of their position on the ideological spectrum. But if the flat tax is neither
evidently fair nor genuinely simple nor neutral to the market, if it is merely a snare, a
delusion, for more confiscatory taxation, it is easy to understand why politicians and
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bureaucrats may love the idea. But why the enthusiasm of the intellectuals – the alleged
spokesmen for the “general” or “public” interest? The answer is that the intellectuals may
well have a “special interest” of their own.
Here I come to the title of my talk. Jacob Burckhardt, the great nineteenth century
Swiss historian, referred to many of the intellectuals of his day as “terrible simplifiers.”
What he meant is that many intellectuals, right, left, or center, are opposed to the messy
individuality, the untidy diversity of real life. It is an occupational disease of intellectuals to
simplify the reality of people, of other people that is, in order to try to understand them. And
so intellectuals like to pigeonhole their subjects – other people – into neat, orderly, and
simple categories, and to classify and then deal with them in neat and orderly ways. From
that way of thinking it is an easy step to classify and then treat people as mere pawns to be
pushed around. And to do so, the intellectual turns to the secular arm – that is, the
enforcement power of government – to do the pushing. Intellectuals, in short, are all too
often terrible simplifiers, willing and eager to impose massive pain and losses upon other
people for the sake of symmetry, uniformity, flatness, or some other simple and abstract
ideal. The nature of the creed, the specific content of the ideal, is not nearly as important as
the eagerness to override and bulldoze out of existence the diverse and rumpled reality of
individual life. We have, alas, come to know in the twentieth century that totalitarianism can
have many faces.
When the Reagan plan toward a flat tax was announced last winter, an anonymous
White House aid attacked the proposal as one “that looks like a tax system designed by a lot
of academics.” And a leading New York broker charged that “those guys at Treasury are tax
lawyers, assistant professors or statisticians. They have no understanding of what makes an
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entrepreneur tick.” Indeed, the main designer of the Reagan plan, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Treasury, Charles E. McClure, Jr., a former academic, proudly proclaimed his lack of
realism. Admitting that the plan was written “in an ivory tower,” he declared that “one nice
thing you get from the ivory tower, is that you get opinions that tend to be unbiased, that are
not affected by special interests, that have the public interest in mind.” I hope that we will
now begin to treat such arrogant claims with the skepticism they so richly deserve.
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Forced idleness means not only that the individual is
denied an opportunity to earn income, but also society loses the goods
or services the individual could have produced. However, in the forty years since
the end of World War II, even in periods of recession, over 90 percent of adults
seeking employment have found acceptable jobs. Joblessness among young
people seems, therefore, to be temporary and “cured” by aging.
Larry D. Singell

- 112 -

LECTURE 5
YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT: AN AMERICAN CRISIS
Larry D. Singell
(Delivered on May 14, 1986)

The difficulties that young people experience in finding employment have
perplexed society from the very beginning of time. Indeed, the record reports that Adam and
Eve experienced some frustration in getting their offspring happily established in suitable
career paths. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that widespread concern is expressed over the
employment difficulties of this generation of young people. But there is evidence that young
people now face even greater difficulty entering the world of work than past generations.
Rates of unemployment for individuals between the ages of 16 and 24 are alarmingly high,
exceeding 50 percent for blacks and 25 percent for whites in a number of large American
cities. Prior to the 1970s, youth unemployment rates nationally averaged between 1 to 2
times the adult rate. However, since then they have increased to between 4 to 5 times the
adult rate. Currently, young people between the ages of 16 and 24 account for one half of the
nation’s unemployed although they comprise only one quarter of the nation’s labor force.
Economists have always been concerned with involuntary unemployment for any
member of society because it represents an unrecoverable waste of resources. Forced
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idleness means not only that the individual is denied an opportunity to earn income, but also
society loses the goods or services the individual could have produced. However, in the forty
years since the end of World War II, even in periods of recession, over 90 percent of adults
seeking employment have found acceptable jobs. Joblessness among young people seems,
therefore, to be temporary and “cured” by aging.
Nevertheless, social action to reduce youth unemployment is both necessary and
desirable, for several reasons. First, early work experience is critical to making the transition
from school to work and is central to learning job search techniques, effective work habits,
self-respect, confidence, and reasonable career expectations. Research, based on recently
available data which has followed a group of young people from childhood through their
adult years, demonstrates a significant connection between early labor market success and
earnings throughout adult life. For example, teenagers who are both out of school and
unemployed for extended periods are more likely to experience more lifetime unemployment
as well as lower lifetime earnings. Because of this, a year of unemployment for a typical
youth in the United States, on the average, results in a loss of $20,000 income over the
workers lifetime. In addition, there is evidence that opportunities for employment for young
people have fundamental effects on their motivation to seek education and training, and
therefore, impact on the growth potential of the country.
There is also a fear that youth unemployment is associated, perhaps in a causal way,
with other social problems such as youth crime, drug abuse, and so forth. Clearly, there is a
growing malaise among young people in America. In the 1950s, crime rates for young
people were below those of the adult population. But both violent crime and crimes against
property for young people have grown more rapidly and, currently, they exceed adult rates.
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Suicide rates for individuals 15 to 24 have increased almost three times since 1950.
Illegitimate births among teenagers have more than doubled since the mid-1950s. Violence
in schools along with drunkenness and narcotics offenses have increased at dramatic rates.
While this increase in youth crime, violence, illegitimacy, and suicide are brought about by a
complex set of social forces, an inadequate number of legitimate employment opportunities
clearly contributes to the anxiety that young people face in growing up. A healthy society
must provide adequate opportunities for its young to obtain training and work experience as
well as opportunities to earn income.
The purpose of this lecture is to analyze what can be done to increase the
employment opportunities for young people. A word of caution is in order. One of my
distinguished colleagues, Kenneth Boulding, has advanced what he calls the “law of political
irony” which says basically that what people do to help others usually hurts them, and what
they do to hurt them usually helps them. The contrary results are typically the outcome of
good intentions combined with inadequate understanding, or confusion, regarding both the
nature and causes of the problem, as well as the way humans respond to help efforts. Toward
such a purpose, I shall start with an analysis of the nature and causes of youth unemployment
and, out of this analysis, abstract some recommendations for policy.
1. The Size and Nature of the Problem
The magnitude of the youth unemployment problem is enormous. The number of
unemployed people between the ages of 16 and 24 is currently between three and four
million. These are individuals who are actively seeking work but are unable to find a job. In
addition there are: (1) an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 young people who say they would be
looking for work if they thought jobs were available; (2) an additional 700,000 minority
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youth who have disappeared out of the system, in the sense that they are out of school and
out of work, but as far as we know they are not seeking work. They are on the streets; and
(3) another one million youths who are employed part time who say they are looking for
more hours of work than they have. In all, there are somewhere between five and six million
young people who are unemployed or underemployed.
Table 1 at the end of the lecture provides data on the percent of the work force
employed and unemployed by age, race and sex for 1954, 1977, and 1983. The years 1954
and 1977 were selected because adult unemployment rates were comparable in these two
years, and 1983 was the latest year for which data could be obtained. Several important
observations should be made from these data. First, the fraction of young, white males who
were employed has remained steady, while the fraction of young, white females employed
have increased dramatically over this period. This constant or expanding percent of
employed white youth, together with their increasing unemployment rates suggest that for
this group much of the problem is brought about by increased labor force participation.
Second, unemployment rates for young blacks have increased dramatically while the fraction
who were employed has also declined sharply. Thus, while the unemployment problem for
all youth is significant, black teenagers face severe difficulties, with one half of those
actively seeking work unable to find employment.
Four alternative and sometimes competing explanations for the high and rising
levels of youth unemployment have been put forth by experts who have studied the problem.
Briefly, the explanations are that youth have been increasingly; (1) pushed out of jobs by
economic recession and a slowing in the rate of economic growth; (2) crowded out both by

- 116 -

growth in their own numbers and the expansion in female labor force participation; (3) priced
out by minimum wages or union pressure to raise wages; and (4) dropped out of employment
possibilities because of failure of the education system, the lack of job training possibilities
or structural changes in the economy along with numerous other conditions which result
from living in poverty amid affluence. While most scholars recognize that all four of these
forces may be operating simultaneously, there is little agreement on the relative importance
of each to the growing problems of youth joblessness. However, these differences in view
have an important impact on the policy mix that is recommended. Therefore, we turn to a
somewhat more detailed analysis of these four causes before proceeding to policy
recommendations.
a. The Pushed Out Hypothesis.
Growth rates in family income and gross national product per worker in the United
States from 1970 to 1985 were less than half those from 1955 to 1970. This sluggishness in
demand has increased unemployment rates for all workers. Some researchers have argued
that the higher youth unemployment rates are largely the result of these recessionary
conditions. The argument is essentially as follows: Because young people are exploring
alternative jobs, they change jobs more frequently than adults. In recession conditions, it
takes longer for the average worker to locate suitable employment. Hence, the higher youth
unemployment rates may simply be the product of the less favorable economic climate of the
recent period and the need for young people to try different jobs.
A great deal of effort by economists has gone into analyzing how youth
unemployment rates change when general economic conditions improve. From these efforts
we have learned that: (1) youth labor market activity is very responsive to general market
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conditions. For example, when adult unemployment rates go down by one percentage point,
the proportion of the youth population that are employed increases by between two and three
percent. However, youth unemployment rates fall by approximately one percent because a
number of young people, who were not in the labor force previously, begin looking for work.
(2) An important difference exists for youth enrolled in school. For youth enrolled in
school, almost all of the expansion in employment is from those who were not in the labor
force, suggesting that youth in school simply wait for job opportunities. If such offers are not
forthcoming, they do not enter the labor force. This means that the number of jobs that must
be made available to bring about full employment for young people is significantly greater
than the reported number of unemployed youth. Indeed, this suggests that policy decisions
for young people should focus on both employment and unemployment rates. In short, it is
possible to provide a number of jobs for young people without changing the youth
unemployment rate significantly. (3) Even if general economic conditions improved to the
point where adults were fully employed, the unemployment rate for teenagers would remain
unacceptably high. There are a number of researchers, including myself, who have tried to
estimate how much youth unemployment rates could be reduced if we could restore a strong
national economy. For example, Table 2 presents the most optimistic forecasts of youth
unemployment rates if full employment rates for prime age males were achieved. These are
most optimistic because they are based upon achieving unemployment rates for prime age
males that are the lowest achieved since World War II. Even under these most favorable
conditions, overall unemployment rates for white and non-white teenagers would be 10.8 and
24.5 percent, respectively. These results suggest that some important part of youth
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unemployment must be due to factors that go beyond the sluggish performance of the
national economy.
b. The Crowded Out Hypothesis.
The post war baby boom resulted in a very large increase in youth population in the
United States beginning in the 1960s. For example, in the United States the number of
persons aged 16 to 19 and 20 to 24 was virtually constant between 1929 and 1959. However,
between 1960 and 1970, the population of 16 to 19 year olds increased by 50 percent.
Correspondingly, the population of 20 to 24 year olds increased by a similar percentage
between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s. This large influx of young, relatively untrained
workers clearly imposed some problems of adjustment on the labor market.
Another factor which must also be considered in this context is the expansion in
female labor force participation. In the United States in 1940, 28.1 percent of all females
participated in the labor market. Since that time, changing social attitudes reduced
discrimination against females, and a host of other factors led to a steady expansion in female
labor force participation. Since 1978, more than half of the female population has been in the
labor force. A large percentage of these females were competing for entry level jobs. This
clearly put greater pressures of adjustment on the labor market which may have impacted on
youth opportunities.
It is reasonable to believe that such developments contributed to higher youth
unemployment rates at least in the short run. In fact, the Congressional Budget Office
estimated that the increased number of young people in the market raised the unemployment
rate of 16 to 19 and 20 to 24 year olds by four and one percentage points, respectively, in the
1970s. There is, however, no reason this expanded labor force should cause unemployment
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in the long run if market forces work freely. In short, an expansion in the supply of any
resource can be accommodated by appropriate price adjustments. Hence, debate exists as to
how much of this unemployment is caused by rigidities introduced by social policy
(exemplified by legislated minimum wages to which we shall turn momentarily) or possibly
some other inefficiencies in the process of market adjustment. There is evidence that the
market does adjust to even short run changes in supply if these changes are anticipated. For
example, each year between May and July, teenage employment in the United States
increases substantially as four to five million additional young people seek and find summer
employment. Employers clearly anticipate this seasonal increase in supply and organize
production to take advantage of the availability of these teenagers. Some economists argue
that if production can adjust so rapidly to a seasonal shift in demographic composition, it
seems reasonable that it could adjust significantly to a much slower change over several
decades. Of course, such changes must be anticipated.
c. The Priced Out Hypothesis.
A substantial amount of the work on youth unemployment in America has focused
on the impact of minimum wages on teenage employment. Economists long ago
demonstrated the critical role of flexible wages and prices in the economy’s adjustment to
changes in consumer demand, productivity, and factor supplies. Thus, minimum wages
represent a general barrier to labor market adjustment which could impact on all workers.
They may, however, disadvantage young workers in more significant ways because they
have lower levels of skill and experience, and therefore, lower productivity. Furthermore, if
some group is the victim of economic or social discrimination (e.g., blacks, females) or if
employers prefer one group of workers over others, minimum wage laws can result in a
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relative concentration of unemployment among these groups. Studies in the United States
show that 80 to 90 percent of employers preferred workers 22 years of age or older, even for
relatively unskilled jobs. In such cases, minimum wages contribute to unemployment
because, with the minimum wage set above the full employment equilibrium wage, the
excess supply of labor allows employers the freedom to consider factors that don’t relate to
worker performance without sacrificing profits. Thus, on theoretical grounds, minimum
wages could clearly account for some potentially important fraction of youth unemployment,
and for the concentration of unemployment within groups suffering from prejudice.
Unfortunately, policymakers who consult the research on the impact of minimum
wages on youth unemployment are likely to come away confused. It is easy to find some
experts arguing that the minimum wage is responsible for a considerable amount of teenage
unemployment, while others argue that the minimum wage has no impact on teenage
unemployment. A study by the United States Department of Labor concluded that, “. . .
while there are hints of adverse effects of minimum wages in available data, no firm
statements can be made about the magnitude of such effects.”
The reasons for the confusion are important for considering what impact minimum
wages have had on teenage unemployment. Basically, there are two difficulties. First, the
fraction of employment covered by minimum wage laws has changed over time. This is
important because if a significant fraction of employment opportunities are not covered by
the law, workers who might be unemployed in the covered sector may seek jobs in the
uncovered sector where wages are flexible. For example in 1950, 95 percent of all
manufacturing workers were covered, while only three percent of retail trade and 19 percent
of service industry employees were covered. Agricultural workers were completely exempt.
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Between 1950 and 1960, there was no extension in minimum wage coverage although the
minimum wage rates were increased.
It might also be noted that the significant increase in teenage population described
above resulted in wage adjustment. For example, 18 to 20 year old men who worked full
time earned 54 and 66 percent, respectively, of adult male earnings in 1967. By 1977 this
was down to 49 and 58 percent, respectively. As wages adjusted, the fraction of young
people who were employed also increased illustrating the market’s ability to adjust. These
relatively lower wages brought the average wage of young people closer to the minimum. In
1961 and 1966, however, Federal legislation extended coverage of minimum wages, and by
1970, 59 percent of all employees in retail trade, 99 percent of construction workers, and 71
percent of all service industry workers were covered. Coverage was also extended to
agricultural workers on large farms. Expanded coverage thus reduced the alternatives for
employment.
A second difficulty involves the long-run adjustment which further compounds the
difficulties described above. As the coverage of minimum wages expands, higher wages
might encourage labor-saving innovations. Thus, in addition to changes in the minimum
wage, changes in coverage and the effects this may have had on technology must be
considered.
When these developments are taken into consideration, it appears as if 10 to 15
percent of white teenage unemployment and perhaps as much as 25 to 30 percent of the
unemployment of black teenagers can be accounted for by minimum wages.
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d. The Dropped Out Hypothesis.
This hypothesis regarding youth unemployment includes a wide and diverse set of
explanations of youth unemployment, but there are two central threads. The first focuses on
the growth in formal education and the associated patterns for labor market entry that have
taken place over a long period. Because of these changes a redefinition of youth
unemployment seems necessary. The second focuses on structural changes in the economy
which make traditional policies to stimulate the economy ineffective. These structural
changes in the economy and changing educational requirements have changed the
employment needs of some youth, and left others with so little hope for a job that they have
quit searching. They have dropped out. As a result a more focused set of youth employment
policies must be developed to reach and deal with the problems faced by this group of young
people.
2. The Redefinition of Youth Unemployment
In the American economy the definition of unemployment and the methodology for
its measurement is based upon the labor market attachment of adult males. In general it is
deemed personally and socially desirable for adult males to be working full time. If they are
actively seeking work and cannot find a job, they are counted as unemployed. Hence, the
percent of adult males who are unemployed is an acceptable index of an “unsatisfactory
status” for these workers. On the other hand, increasingly young people need to be engaged
in education or a number of other activities. For example, in addition to school, they can be
in an apprenticeship program, the military, or beginning to raise their own families. Since a
large fraction of youth is not in the labor force at any one time, the unemployment rate is not
a good measure of unsatisfactory status for young workers. Indeed, because of recent efforts
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to keep people in school, more than 85 percent of those between the ages of 16 and 17 are in
school. Thus, having a job is not necessarily the preferred activity for many young people.
Attending school, training programs, or other similar activities may require that young people
take part time jobs and have more flexibility than other workers. Thus, “actively seeking
work” may not mean the same thing to the young who face a variety of options in
comparison to the adult who desires full time employment. In short, higher unemployment
rates for young people, as they are currently measured, may or may not indicate some real
social problem. Some economists have argued that improved measures of “unsatisfactory
status” should be developed and utilized. In my view, these arguments are clearly valid, but
caution is important. Unemployment, like so many intractable social problems, is most
easily solved by redefinition.
The unemployment rate is useful for adult males because it gives us the percentage
of that group (the labor force) who are unable to engage in socially desirable activity (that is
they are unemployed). If we use this concept for young people, we should compare the
number of youth who are unemployed with the number of youth engaged in activities
deemed desirable for young people. For example, we might use those who are in school, the
military, or working (but not in school). Using 1983 data for the United States, I have
calculated unemployment rates for young people using two different definitions. These data
are provided in Table 3. U1 is youth unemployment that the Labor Department collects,
which is based on the same definition used for adult males. The second measure, U2, is the
percent of youth who are in school, whether they are working or not, at work, or in the
military, and who are unemployed. I refer to the group of youth in school, the military, and
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working as the augmented labor force because these young people are working at activities
society deems desirable. An alternative measure, U3, is also provided which compares the
augmented labor force to the number of young people who are simultaneously out of school
and unemployed.
While the above are not perfect measures they do help us understand the problem.
For example, they show that unsatisfactory conditions exist for a small fraction of young
people. Approximately 90 percent of young white workers and 95 percent of all 16 to 17
year olds may be said to be in satisfactory situations. That is, they are either in the military,
at school, working, or both working and at school. For this group, unemployment results
because they cannot locate a job that accommodates their educational program. Young
people are not only staying in school longer, the ones who stay in school are also trying to
work. Between 1960 and 1980 labor force participation rates of teenagers in school
increased from 56 to 68 percent. The slower growth in family income and the rapid increase
in schooling costs may also have accelerated this need to work. Keeping young people in
school may require an expanding number of part time jobs.
On the other hand, these data highlight the difficult transition between school and
work reflected in the high rates of unemployment for older young people, and the persistently
high rates of unemployment for minority youth. Unemployment rates for minority youth
remain alarmingly high no matter what definition is used. Indeed, for blacks, unemployment
of out of school youth between the ages of 18 and 24 are at great depression levels, or
greater. The high rates of unemployment for young black females may be explained by their
increased involvement in raising their own families, but it is not clear why their
unemployment rates should be three to four times greater than those for white females.
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Perhaps the most important finding of researchers, who have examined the
transition from school to work, is that most teenage joblessness is accounted for by a small
part of the population who are out of work for extended periods of time. For example, a
major study, which followed a large group of teenagers as they moved from school to work,
and in and out of the labor force, found that almost half of all job changes among teenagers
occur without intervening unemployment, and close to two thirds of entrances into
employment occur without measured unemployment. In general, periods of unemployment
are very short for most young people. However, for teenagers who drop out of school, 54
percent of the measured unemployment and 76 percent of those who leave the labor force
because they think there is no hope of finding a job, are persons out of work for more than
six months. Thus, a small hard core of perhaps only five to 10 percent of the teenage
population account for most of the unemployment. The question is what accounts for the
persistence of this hard core?
3. Increased Labor Market Segmentation
For the past three or four decades, most economists characterized the labor market
as if individuals who wanted jobs were arranged in a single line. The people with the highest
level of skill and ability were at the head of the line and those with the lowest level of skill at
the end. As economic conditions improved employers made their way down the line, hiring
the most skilled people first. Full employment was thought of as a situation where all
workers who want to work at prevailing wage rates obtain a job regardless of their skill level.
This view seemed to explain the problems faced by youth in the labor market. Since, in
general, young people were among the least skilled, they would naturally be at the end of the
line. As such, they would be the “last hired and the first fired,” and predictably their
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unemployment rates would generally be higher than adults. The gap in adult and youth
unemployment rates would also widen in times of recession.
Recently, however, evidence has emerged which suggests that this old view of the
labor market might not be valid anymore. Indeed, the unemployment of the “hard core”
group described above does not seem to change very much when general economic
conditions improve. Based upon their experiences in a local labor market (Boston,
Massachusetts), Doeringer and Piore, for example, argued that the labor market works as if
people are organized in two lines. A group of people who are typically employed in high
wage, steady jobs which provide upward mobility are in one line, while those who tend to
work in low wage, unstable, and dead end jobs are in another. This second line has come
into existence because firms found it profitable to subcontract more unstable work, and
workers in this type of job have little or no reason to become attached to their jobs. Workers
who get stuck in this second line experience chronic unemployment.
There are a number of developments in the United States economy which
increasingly force young people into this second line. For example, older workers are
increasingly protected by job security legislation, collective bargaining agreements, and
conventional personnel practices. Growth in capital intensity has increased the risk of
employing young and inexperienced workers. Young people in school only want temporary
jobs. A further structural change, which has particularly disadvantaged young, black
workers, is that these primary jobs are moving out of the city to the suburban ring, and urban
transportation systems provide inadequate access to these jobs. Although these secondary
jobs are unstable, they may provide acceptable employment for youth who are in school.
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However, if young people cannot make the transition to primary jobs, they suffer chronic
unemployment.
4. Conclusions and Policy Considerations
Approximately 6 million young workers are currently unemployed or
underemployed in the United States. Unemployment rates for young people are clearly at
socially unacceptable levels indicating a substantial waste of resources and, perhaps more
important, a destruction of the incentives for young people to develop and use their talents
effectively. But what can be done? I have analyzed the causes of youth unemployment in
this lecture so that the policy options and constraints will be clearer.
Briefly, the problem stems from four basic sources: (1) Sluggish economic growth
and recession conditions have increased unemployment rates for all groups. If full
employment conditions could be restored for adult males, it is predicted that youth
unemployment rates would fall to approximately half their current levels. Thus, moving the
economy toward full employment must be given top priority. However, even if this could be
achieved, youth unemployment rates, particularly those for minorities, would still be
unacceptably high. Full employment will alleviate, but not eliminate the problem. However,
current fears of rekindling inflation are likely to forestall achievement of full employment.
In my view, the economic recovery under way cannot be expected to bring youth
unemployment rates for whites below 15 percent and for non-whites below 30 percent. (2)
Demographic factors, in the form of the “baby boom” and expanded female labor force
participation, have exacerbated the problem. These developments, combined with weak
demand, caused difficulties for market adjustment and clearly raised youth unemployment
rates. There is evidence that the economy can adjust to such changes, but more important the
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number of teenagers is now declining. This smaller number of teenagers will have to
compete with the relatively larger number of older workers who are unemployed. (3)
Minimum wages and other restrictions on wage flexibility have made labor market
adjustments more difficult, particularly for minority youth. Repealing minimum wage laws
would clearly help, although an important part of the problem would remain. Unfortunately,
the minimum wage law is deeply entrenched politically. Subminimum wages have been
considered for young people, but the possibility that youth would be substituted for adult
workers, thus raising adult unemployment rates, limits the attractiveness of this proposal.
However, the problem would likely be eased somewhat if minimum wage rates are held
constant or increased slowly. (4) Structural changes in the role of education and training for
young people, along with other social changes, have altered the labor market attachment of
young people. A small hard core of youth suffers from long term unemployment and some
have dropped out of the labor market completely.
This analysis argues for a policy emphasis on youth employment, and a major
redefinition of youth unemployment. This is so, first, because youth unemployment
substantially misstates the size of the problem. On the one hand, more jobs for young people
will expand substantially the number of youth who want one. The number who benefit may
be large even though unemployment rates do not change significantly. On the other hand, for
many youth, unemployment is the natural outgrowth of a necessary exploration in the market
which results in their eventually settling down after a few years in a stable career. In addition
to this exploration, young people need to be concerned with education, training, and other
activities so that the unemployment rate as it is currently defined does not provide a good
measure of unsatisfactory conditions for young people. Improved definitions illuminate two
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major problems regarding youth employment: providing jobs that facilitate attending school
or training, and obtaining steady career oriented jobs for a relatively small group of hard core
unemployed. An unacceptable number of minority youth and others who face multiple
socio-economic disadvantages seem to experience long term and chronic unemployment.
This group of hard core unemployed young workers includes an estimated 300,000 to
400,000 young people. In general, society must avoid the potential time bomb of large
numbers of young people with bad or poor work experiences being thrown into the labor
force.
It is important to stress at the outset that there are no easy solutions. To help the
hard core, significantly greater targeting of resources is necessary although admittedly
difficult. Indeed, to the extent that social policy is aimed at the problem of the hard core
unemployed youth, efforts will be directed at the group where the problem is most
intractable. Selective job creation and on-the-job training will clearly be important. The
frustrating experience of American efforts to assist the hard core unemployed in the “War on
Poverty” have produced numerous testimonials of how results should not be overpromised.
In general, however, what has been learned is that if these individuals can be placed in a real
world adequate wage job, particularly in the private sector, with the assurance that if they
master the job, it is theirs, the program works in the sense that social benefits significantly
exceed costs.
In the long term the problem of youth unemployment, in general, as well as hard
core unemployment will be reduced if the linkage between school and work can be
improved. The school system will have to play a greater and more effective role in preparing
youth for the job market. Many efforts at employing the hard core unemployed are
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handicapped because the level of basic education is inadequate. In addition, employment
counseling services could be much better developed in the schools. Expanded apprenticeship
programs need to be considered. Occupational training must also be supplemented with
labor market information. Schools, of course, must have the resources to do this.
In all of this, there is the difficult problem of allocating such resources to the young
when there are adult heads of households who are also unemployed. Policy makers are in a
particularly precarious position. The youth of today represent the prospects for the future,
and failure to provide adequate opportunities for them now may be very costly in the future.
But programs to assist youth must be provided by expansion, or young people will be
substituted for adult heads of households. The resource costs of existing programs are
already straining government budgets. No other issue looms larger than the setting of
priorities for allocating the limited funds available to the government sector.
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Table 1
Employment and Unemployment Rates
By Age, Race and Sex
1954, 1977, 1983
White
1954

1977

Blacks and Others
1983

1954

1977

1983

18.9
36.9
61.2
81.7

11.8
29.0
54.5
74.9

36.7
36.1
21.7
5.2

52.2
47.3
31.4
12.1

12.5
28.0
45.4
57.4

10.7
23.1
40.3
59.4

44.7
37.4
23.6
9.8

48.6
48.0
31.8
13.0

Men
Percent Employed
Age: 16-17
18-19
20-24
25-54

40.6
61.3
77.9
93.8

44.3
65.2
80.5
91.3

36.3
58.0
74.3
87.8

40.4
66.5
75.9
86.4

Percent Unemployed
Age: 16-17
18-19
20-24
25-54

14.0
13.0
9.8
3.9

11.6
13.0
9.3
3.9

22.6
18.7
13.8
7.0

13.4
14.7
16.9
9.5

Women
Percent Employed
Age: 16-17
18-19
20-24
25-54

25.8
47.2
41.6
40.1

37.5
54.3
61.4
54.1

34.5
53.6
67.4
63.1

19.8
29.9
43.1
49.0

Percent Unemployed
Age: 16-17
18-19
20-24
25-54

12.0
9.4
6.4
5.0

18.2
12.3
9.3
5.8

21.4
16.8
10.3
6.4

19.1
21.6
13.2
8.3
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Table 2
Predicted Unemployment Rates for Individuals 16-24
Years of Age by Sex and Race with Unemployment Rate for
White Males Aged 25-54 at 1.5 Percent*
Unemployment Rate
Population Group

White

Non-White

Males
Age: 16-17

13.1

29.1

18-19

9.3

22.7

20-24

5.6

10.6

Age: 16-17

14.2

35.2

18-19

11.5

31.7

Females

20-24
6.2
13.2
__________________________________________________________________________
*Estimated from linear specifications from M. Feldstein and B. Right, High
Unemployment Groups in Tight Labor Markets, Discussion Paper 488, Harvard Institute of
Economic Research, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1976.
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Table 3
Unemployment Rates Using Three
Alternative Definitions of Youth Unemployment
U1
Group in
the Population

Conventional
Measure

U2
Augmented
Labor Force

U3
Unemployment for out
of School Youth with
Augmented Labor Force

White
Male, age
16-17
18-19
20-24

22.6
18.7
13.8

19.1
16.9
12.8

2.6
10.6
9.1

Female, age
16-17
18-19
20-24

21.4
16.4
10.3

18.2
16.1
10.0

3.0
9.2
8.2

Non-White
Male, age
16-17
18-19
20-24

52.2
47.3
31.4

41.2
36.6
26.3

8.2
26.6
22.6

Female, age
16-17
18-19
20-24

48.6
48.0
31.8

43.8
46.3
30.3
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6.3
40.4
27.1

Wherever we look, then, on the budget, in the domestic economy, or
in foreign trade or international monetary relations, we see government even
more on our backs than ever. The burden and the scope of government intervention
under Reagan have increased, not decreased. Reagan’s rhetoric has been calling
for reductions of government; his actions have been precisely the reverse.
Murray N. Rothbard
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LECTURE 6
IS THERE LIFE AFTER REAGANOMICS?
Murray N. Rothbard
(Delivered on October 22, 1987)
I come to bury Reaganomics not to praise it – and there can be no more fitting
epitaph for Reaganomics than the October massacre, especially the Black Monday of
October 19th. The stock market crash brought an end to the so-called Reagan “miracle” not
with a whimper but a bang. The crash showed dramatically once again that every time, as in
the late 1920s, when the financial and political establishment begins to talk about a new era
of permanent prosperity and perpetual boom in the stock market, the time has come to head
for the hills. Before Monday, the largest stock collapse had occurred in October, 1929, when
stock prices fell 12.8 percent in one day; this Monday, stock prices fell almost twice as hard,
by 22.6 percent. That is a crash, not a “correction.”
As usual, the crisis was met by deception and soft soap. Day after day, as the crash
continued, our political, economic, and financial leaders continued to assure us that nothing
was wrong, that stock prices are bargains and we should all buy right now, that stocks could
not drop further, that 1929 could never happen again. At first, we were told that the market
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crash was unimportant because trading volume was small, only to be greeted a few days later
by unprecedented and enormous trading volume, setting records at over 600 million daily
shares.
Leading the parade was President Reagan. Delivering a bromide eerily reminiscent
of Herbert Hoover, the President assured us that the “economy is fundamentally sound,” a
dubious consolation for those who lost one-half trillion dollars in wealth on Black Monday,
and one trillion dollars since the stock market began its steep decline this August.
In his now traditional “press conferences” shouted over the roar of helicopter
motors, President Reagan followed up his assurance by yelling, “there is nothing wrong with
the economy,” and, besides, “Congress is responsible for the deficit.” However, it was
hardly reassuring for him to shout that if a recession does come, the fault will be the media’s
for alarming us, a classic case of the king reacting to bad news on the front by shooting the
messenger.
The crash came because several years of monetary expansion finally resulted this
year in the return of price inflation, which accelerated from about one percent last year to
about five percent in 1987. But during the years of the Reagan “miracle,” – heavy monetary
expansion, prosperity, but low price inflation – real interest rates still remained high, a sign
that the public still remembered the bad not so old days of double-digit inflation. As
inflation accelerated in 1987, interest rates rose inexorably in response to the return of
inflation, and in anticipation of more to come. High interest rates put a chronic damper on
the stock market during the inflationary boom of the 1970s, and only the fall in nominal
interest rates caused by the whopping recession of 1981-82 could generate the boom of the
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last few years in the stock market. Now that inflation and higher interest rates reappeared,
the stage was set for the stock market crash.
The timing of the crash was insured by the Federal Reserve. After pumping more
money into the economy at the rate of over 10 percent a year for several years, the Fed
became worried at the rising inflation and interest rates this April and stopped its policy of
monetary inflation. From April on, the money supply has been flat, an admirable policy, but
one that almost always triggers a recession. A recession is inevitable once a credit boom has
been launched. The stock market is often an indicator of the near future of the economy, and
so it is very likely that this crash presages an imminent recession, and one that is long
overdue.
It is the view of the Austrian School of Economics that a boom in bank credit will
lead inevitably to a corrective recession, and that the sooner the boom is stopped, and the
recession is allowed to liquidate the unsound investments of the boom, the better. Having
expanded credit and brought about a return of inflation, the Reagan administration quickly
reacted to the crash by promising to protect us by virtually unlimited doses of inflation in the
future. Thus, our monetary czar, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, assured the
banks and the financial markets of enough liquidity (that is, new money) to bail everyone
out. On Tuesday Greenspan declared that, “the Federal Reserve . . . affirmed today its
readiness to serve as a source of liquidity to support the economic and financial system.”
Hence, the “cure” for what ails us – monetary inflation – is to be a lot more of the same.
Consistent with this program, the Fed has already pressured the banks to lower their prime
interest rates, and has already driven down the federal funds rate by pumping in more bank
reserves. On the international front, Secretary of the Treasury James Baker, who had been
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having trouble with the West Germans trying to induce them to inflate and lower their
interest rates, announced success in the wake of U. S. pressure after the crash.
Unfortunately, the Fed and the administration are caught in a trap of their own
making – in what the British call a “cleft stick.” As the Fed expands credit and pushes
interest rates down, price inflation will accelerate, and this will inexorably raise interest rates
via an inflation premium – precisely what happened in the double-digit inflation of the late
1970s. By frantically trying to stave off an inevitable recession, the administration can only
make it worse – and also make it inflationary, as in the 1970s. The administration is busily
working to bring about its own worst fears; the so-called “nightmare scenario” of a
simultaneous inflation and recession, accompanied by a falling dollar and a collapsed stock
market – all neatly in time for the presidential election year of 1988.
Let us now turn from the stock market crash for the moment and assess how well
Reaganomics has done over the seven years of its reign.
The first question to ask is: How well has Reaganomics achieved its own goals?
Perhaps the best way of discovering those goals is to recall the heady days of Ronald
Reagan’s first campaign for the presidency, especially before his triumph at the Republican
National Convention in 1980. In general terms, Reagan pledged to return, or advance, to a
free market, and to “get government off our backs.” Specifically, Reagan called for a
massive cut in government spending, an even more drastic cut in taxation, particularly the
income tax, a balanced budget by 1984 (that wild-spender, Jimmy Carter, you see, had raised
the budget deficit to $74 billion a year, and this had to be eliminated), and a return to the gold
standard, where money is supplied by the market rather than by government. In addition to a
call for free markets domestically, Reagan affirmed his deep commitment to freedom of
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international trade. Not only did the upper echelons of the administration sport Adam Smith
ties, in honor of that moderate free-trader, but Reagan himself affirmed the depth of the
influence upon him of the mid nineteenth century laissez-faire economist, Frederic Bastiat,
whose devastating and satiric attacks on protectionism have been anthologized in economics
readings ever since.
The gold standard was the easiest pledge to dispose of. President Reagan appointed
an allegedly impartial gold commission to study the problem – a commission
overwhelmingly packed with lifelong opponents of gold. The commission presented its
predictable report, and gold was quickly interred.
1. Government Spending
Let’s run down the other important areas. First, government spending. How well
did Reagan succeed in cutting spending, surely a critical ingredient in any plan to reduce the
role of government in everyone’s life? In 1980, the last year of free-spending Jimmy Carter,
the federal government spent 591 billion dollars. In 1986, the last recorded year of the
Reagan administration, the federal government spent 990 billion dollars, an increase of 68
percent. Whatever this is, it is emphatically not reducing government expenditures.
Sophisticated economists say that these absolute numbers are an unfair comparison,
that we should compare federal spending in these two years as a percentage of gross national
product. But this strikes me as unfair in the opposite direction, because the greater the
amount of inflation generated by the federal government, the higher will be the GNP. We
might then be complementing the government on a lower percentage of spending achieved
by the government’s generating inflation by creating more money. But even taking these
percentages of GNP, we get federal spending as a percent of GNP in 1980 as 21.6 percent,
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and after six years of Reagan, 24.3 percent. A better comparison would be the percentage of
federal spending to net private product, that is, production of the private sector. That
percentage was 31.1 percent in 1980, and a whopping 34.3 percent in 1986. So even using
these percentages, the Reagan administration has brought us a substantial increase in
government spending.
Also, the excuse cannot be used that Congress massively increased Reagan’s budget
proposals. On the contrary, there was never much difference between Reagan’s and
Congress’s budgets, and despite propaganda to the contrary, Reagan never proposed a cut in
the total budget.
2. Deficits
The next, and admittedly the most embarrassing, failure of Reaganomic goals is the
deficit. Jimmy Carter habitually ran deficits of $40-$50 billion and by the end, up to $74
billion; but by 1984, when Reagan had promised to achieve a balanced budget, the deficit
had settled down comfortably to about $200 billion, a level that seems to be permanent,
despite desperate attempts to cook the figures in one-shot reductions.
This is by far the largest budget deficit in American history. It is true that the $50
billion deficits in World War II were a much higher percentage of the GNP, but that was a
temporary, one-shot, situation the product of war finance. But the war was over in a few
years; and the current federal deficits now seem to be a recent, but still permanent part of the
American heritage.
One of the most curious, and least edifying, sights in the Reagan era was to see the
Reaganites completely change their tune of a lifetime. At the very beginning of the Reagan
administration, the conservative Republicans in the House of Representatives, convinced that
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deficits would disappear immediately, received a terrific shock when they were asked by the
Reagan administration to vote for the usual annual increase in the statutory debt limit. These
Republicans, some with literal tears in their eyes, protested that never in their lives had they
voted for an increase in the national debt limit, but they were doing it just this one time
because they “trusted Ronald Reagan” to balance the budget from then on. The rest, alas, is
history, and the conservative Republicans never saw fit to cry again. Instead, they found
themselves adjusting rather easily to the new era of huge permanent deficits. The GrammRudman Law, allegedly designed to eradicate deficits in a few years, has now unsurprisingly
bogged down in enduring confusion.
Even less edifying is the specter of Reaganomists who had inveighed against
deficits – that legacy of Keynesianism – for decades. Soon Reaganite economists, especially
those staffing economic posts in the executive and legislative branches, began to find that
deficits really weren’t so bad after all. Ingenious models were devised claiming to prove that
there really isn’t any deficit, that it’s only a mirage. Bill Niskanen, of the Council of
Economic Advisors, came up with perhaps the most ingenious discovery; that there is no
reason to worry about government deficits, since they are balanced by the growth in value of
government assets. Well, hooray, but it is rather strange to see economists whose alleged
goal is a drastic reduction in the role of government, cheering for ever greater growth in
government assets. Moreover, the size of government assets is really beside the point. It
would only be of interest if the federal government were just another private business firm,
about to go into liquidation, and whose debtors could then be satisfied by a parceling out of
its hefty assets. The federal government is not about to be liquidated; there is no chance, for
example, of an institution ever going into bankruptcy or liquidation that has the legal right to
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print whatever money it needs to get itself – and anyone else it favors – out of any financial
hole.
There has also been a fervent revival of the old left-Keynesian idea that “deficits
don’t matter, anyway.” Deficits are stimulating, we can “grow ourselves out of deficits,” etc.
The most interesting, though predictable, twist was that of the supply-siders, who, led by
Professor Arthur Laffer and his famous “curve,” had promised that if income tax rates were
cut, investment and production would be so stimulated that a fall in tax rates would increase
tax revenue and balance the budget. When the budget was most emphatically not balanced,
and deficits instead got worse, the supply-siders threw Laffer overboard as the scapegoat,
claiming that he was an extremist, and the only proponent of his famous curve. The supplysiders then retreated to their current, fallback position, which is quite frankly Keynesian;
namely, deficits don’t matter anyway, so let’s have cheap money and deficits, relax and
enjoy them. About the only Keynesian phrase we have not heard yet from Reaganomists is
that the national debt “doesn’t matter because we owe it to ourselves,” and I am waiting for
some supply-sider to adopt this famous 1930s phrase of Abba Lerner without, of course,
bothering about attribution.
One way in which Ronald Reagan has tried to seize the moral high road on the
deficit question is to divorce his rhetoric from reality even more sharply than usual. Thus,
the proposer of the biggest deficits in American history has been calling vehemently for a
constitutional amendment to require a balanced budget. In that way, Reagan can lead the
way toward permanent $200 billion deficits, while basking in the virtue of proposing a
balanced budget amendment, and trying to make Congress the fall guy for our deficit
economy.
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Even in the unlikely event that the balanced budget amendment should ever pass, it
would be ludicrous in its lack of effect. In the first place, Congress can override an
amendment at any time by a 3/5 vote. Secondly, Congress is not required to actually balance
any budget, that is, its actual expenditures in any given year are not limited to the revenues
taken in. Instead, Congress is only required to prepare an estimate of a balanced budget for a
future year; and of course, government estimates, even of its own income or spending, are
notoriously unreliable. And third, there is no enforcement clause; suppose Congress did
violate even the requirement for an estimated balanced budget: What is going to happen to
the legislators? Is the Supreme Court going to summon marshals and put the entire U. S.
Congress in jail? And yet, not only has Reagan been pushing for such an absurd amendment,
but so too have many helpful Reaganomists.
3. Tax Cuts
One of the few areas where Reaganomists claim success without embarrassment is
taxation. Didn’t the Reagan administration, after all, slash income taxes in 1981, and provide
both tax cuts and “fairness” in its highly touted tax reform law of 1986? Hasn’t Ronald
Reagan, in the teeth of opposition, heroically held the line against all tax increases?
The answer, unfortunately, is no. In the first place, the famous “tax cut” of 1981
did not cut taxes at all. It’s true that tax rates for higher-income brackets were cut; but for the
average person, taxes rose, rather than declined. The reason is that, on the whole, the cut in
income tax rates was more than offset by two forms of tax increase. One was “bracket
creep,” a term for inflation quietly but effectively raising one into higher tax brackets, so that
you pay more and proportionately higher taxes even though the tax rate schedule has
officially remained the same. The second source of higher taxes was social security taxation,
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which kept increasing, and which helped taxes go up overall. Not only that, but soon
thereafter, when the Social Security System was generally perceived as on the brink of
bankruptcy, President Reagan brought in Alan Greenspan, a leading Reaganomist and now
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, to save Social Security as head of a bipartisan commission.
The “saving,” of course, meant still higher Social Security taxes then and forevermore.
Since the tax cut of 1981 that was not really a cut, furthermore, taxes have gone up
every single year since, with the approval of the Reagan administration. Except, to save the
President’s rhetorical sensibilities, they weren’t called tax increases. Instead, ingenious
labels were attached to them; raising of “fees,” “plugging loopholes” (and surely everyone
wants loopholes plugged), tightening IRS enforcement, and even “revenue enhancements.” I
am sure that all good Reaganomists slept soundly at night knowing that even though
government revenue was being “enhanced,” the President had held the line against tax
increases.
The highly ballyhooed Tax “Reform” Act of 1986 was supposed to be economically
healthy as well as “fair;” supposedly “revenue neutral,” it was to bring us (a) simplicity,
helping the public, while making the lives of tax accountants and lawyers miserable; and (b)
income tax cuts, especially in the higher income brackets and in everyone’s marginal tax
rates (that is, income tax rates on additional money you may earn); and offset only by
plugging those infamous loopholes. The reality, of course, was very different. In the first
place, the administration has succeeded in making the tax laws so complicated that even the
IRS admittedly doesn’t understand it, and tax accountants and lawyers will be kept puzzled
and happy for years to come.
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Secondly, while indeed income tax rates were cut in the higher brackets, many of
the loophole plugs meant huge tax increases for people in the upper as well as the middle
income brackets. The point of the income tax, and particularly the marginal rate cuts, was
the supply-sider objective of lowering taxes to stimulate savings and investment. But a
National Bureau study by Hausman and Poterba on the Tax Reform Act shows that over 40
percent of the nation’s taxpayers suffered a marginal tax increase (or, at best, the same rate
as before) and, of the majority that did enjoy marginal tax cuts, only 11 percent got
reductions of 10 percent or more. In short, most of the tax reductions were negligible. Not
only that; the Tax Reform Act, these authors reckoned, would lower savings and investment
overall because of the huge increases in taxes on business and on capital gains. Moreover,
savings were also hurt by the tax law’s removing tax deductibility on contributions to IRAs.
Not only were taxes increased, but business costs were greatly raised by making
business expense meals only 80 percent deductible, which means a great expenditure of
business time and energy keeping and shuffling records. And not only were taxes raised by
eliminating tax shelters in real estate, but the law’s claims to “fairness” were made grotesque
by the retroactive nature of many of the tax increases. Thus, the abolition of tax shelter
deductibility was made retroactive, imposing huge penalties after the fact. This is ex post
facto legislation outlawed by the Constitution, which prohibits making actions retroactively
criminal for a time period when they were perfectly legal. A friend of mine, for example,
sold his business about eight years ago; to avoid capital gains taxes, he incorporated his
business in the American Virgin Islands, which the federal government had made exempt
from capital gains taxes in order to stimulate Virgin Islands development. Now, eight years
later, this tax exemption for the Virgin Islands has been removed (A “loophole” plugged!)
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but the IRS now expects my friend to pay full retroactive capital gains taxes plus interest on
this eight-year-old sale. Let’s hear it for the “fairness” of the tax reform law!
But the bottom line on the tax question, is what happened in the Reagan era to
government tax revenues overall? Did the amount of taxes extracted from the American
people by the federal government go up or down during the Reagan years? The facts are that
federal tax receipts were 517 billion dollars in the last Carter year of 1980. In 1986 revenues
totaled 769 billion dollars, an increase of 49 percent. Whatever that is, that doesn’t look like
a tax cut. But how about taxes as a percentage of national product? There, we can concede
that on a percentage criterion, overall taxes fell very slightly, remaining about even with the
last year of Carter. Taxes fell from 18.9 percent of GNP to 18.3 percent, or for a better
gauge, taxes as a percentage of net private product fell from 27.2 percent to 26.6 percent. A
large absolute increase in taxes, coupled with keeping taxes as a percentage of national
product about even, is scarcely cause for tossing one’s hat in the air about a whopping
reduction in taxes during the Reagan years.
In recent months, moreover, the Reagan administration has been more receptive to
loophole plugging, fees, and revenues than ever before. To quote from the Tax Watch
column in the New York Times (October 13, 1987): “President Reagan has repeatedly
warned Congress of his opposition to any new taxes, but some White House aides have been
trying to figure out a way of endorsing a tax bill that could be called something else.” In
addition to closing loopholes, the White House is nudging Congress to expand the usual
definition of a “user fee,” not a tax because it is supposed to be a fee for those who use a
government service, say national parks or waterways. But apparently the Reagan
administration is now expanding the definition of “user fee” to include excise taxes, on the
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assumption, apparently, that every time we purchase a product or service we must pay
government for its permission. Thus, the Reagan administration has proposed not, of course,
as a tax increase, but as an alleged “user fee,” a higher excise tax on every international
airline or ship ticket, a tax on all coal producers, and a tax on gasoline and on highway
charges for buses. The administration is also willing to support, as an alleged user fee rather
than a tax, a requirement that employers, such as restaurants, start paying the social security
tax on tips received by waiters and other service personnel.
In the wake of the stock market crash, President Reagan is now willing to give us a
post-crash present: higher taxes that will openly be called higher taxes. On Tuesday
morning, the White House declared: “We’re going to hold to our guns. The President has
given us marching orders: no tax increase.” By Tuesday afternoon, however, the marching
orders had apparently evaporated, and the President said that he was “willing to look at” taxincrease proposals. To greet a looming recession with a tax increase is a wonderful way to
bring that recession into reality. Once again, President Reagan is following the path blazed
by Herbert Hoover in the Great Depression of raising taxes to try to combat a deficit.
4. Deregulation
Another crucial aspect of freeing the market and getting government off our backs
is deregulation, and the administration and its Reaganomists have been very proud of its
deregulation record. However, a look at the record reveals a very different picture. In the
first place, the most conspicuous examples of deregulation; the ending of oil and gasoline
price controls and rationing, the deregulation of trucking and airlines, were all launched by
the Carter Administration, and completed just in time for the Reagan Administration to claim
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the credit. Meanwhile, there were other, promised deregulations that never took place; for
example, abolition of natural gas controls of the Department of Energy.
Overall, in fact, there has probably been not deregulation, but an increase in
regulation. Thus, Christopher DeMuth, head of the American Enterprise Institute and a
former top official of Reagan’s Office of Management and the Budget, concludes that “ the
President has not mounted a broad offensive against regulation. There hasn’t been much
total change since 1981. There has been more balanced administration of regulatory agencies
than we had become used to in the 1970s, but many regulatory rules have been
strengthened.”
In particular, there has been a fervent drive, especially in the past year, to intensify
regulation of Wall Street. A savage and almost hysterical attack was launched late last year
by the Securities and Exchange Commission and by the Department of Justice on the high
crime of “insider trading.” Distinguished investment bankers were literally hauled out of
their offices in manacles, and the most conspicuous inside trader received as a punishment
(1) a fine of one-hundred million dollars; (2) a lifetime ban on any further security trading,
and (3) a jail term of one year, suspended for community service. And this is the light
sentence, in return for allowing himself to be wired and turn informer on his insider trading
colleagues.
All this was part of a drive by the administration to protect inefficient corporate
managers from the dread threat of takeover bids, by which means stockholders are able to
dispose easily of ineffective management and turn to new managers. Can we really say that
this frenzied assault on Wall Street by the Reagan administration had no impact on the stock
market crash?
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And yet the Reagan administration has reacted to the crash not by letting up, but by
intensifying, regulation of the stock market. The head of the SEC strongly considered
closing down the market on Monday, and some markets were temporarily shut down – a
case, once again, of solving problems by shooting the market – the messenger of bad news.
Today the Reagan administration collaborated in announcing early closing of the market for
the next several days. The SEC has already moved, in conjunction with the New York Stock
Exchange, to close down computer program trading on the market, trading related to stock
index futures. But blaming computer program trading for the crash is a Luddite reaction;
trying to solve problems by taking a crowbar and wrecking the machines. There were no
computers, after all, in 1929. Once again, the instinct of the administration, particularly in
relation to Wall Street, is to regulate more and more. Regulate, and inflate, seem to be the
Reaganite answers to our economic ills.
Agricultural policy, for its part, has been a total disaster. Instead of ending farm
price supports and controls and returning to a free market in agriculture, the administration
has greatly increased price supports, controls, and subsidies. Furthermore, it has brought a
calamitous innovation to the farm program; the PIK program (“Payment In Kind”) in which
the government gets the farmers to agree to drastic cuts in crop acreage, in return for which
the government pays back the wheat or cotton surpluses previously held off the market. The
result of all this has been to push farm prices far higher than the world market, depress farm
exports, and throw many farmers into bankruptcy. All the administration can offer,
however, is more of the same disastrous policy.
5. Foreign Economic Policy
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If the Reagan administration has botched the domestic economy, even in terms of
its own goals, how has it done in foreign economic affairs? As we might expect, its foreign
economic policy has been the exact opposite of its proclaimed devotion to free trade and free
markets. In the first place, Adan Smith ties and Bastiat to the contrary notwithstanding, the
Reagan administration has been the most belligerent and nationalistic since Herbert Hoover.
Tariffs and import quotas have been repeatedly raised, and Japan has been treated as a leper
and repeatedly denounced for the crime of selling high quality products at low prices to the
delighted American consumer. In all matters of complex and tangled international
economics, the only way out of the thicket is to keep our eye on one overriding question: Is
it good, or bad, for the American consumer? What the American consumer wants is good
quality products at low prices, and so the Japanese should be welcomed and admired instead
of condemned. As for the alleged crime of “dumping,” if the Japanese are really foolish
enough to waste money and resources by dumping – that is, selling goods to us below costs –
then we should welcome such a policy with open arms; anytime the Japanese are willing to
sell me Sony TV sets for a dollar, I am more than happy to take the sets off their hands.
Not only foreign producers are hurt by protectionism, but even more so are
American consumers. Every time the administration slaps a tariff or quota on motorcycles or
on textiles or semiconductors or clothespins – as it did to bail out one inefficient clothespin
plant in Maine – every time it does that, it injures the American consumer.
It is no wonder, then, that even the Reaganomist Bill Niskanen recently admitted
that “international trade is more regulated than it was 10 years ago.” Or, as Secretary of
Treasury James Baker declared proudly last month: “President Reagan has granted more
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import relief to U. S. industry than any of his predecessors in more than half a century.”
Pretty good for a Bastiat follower.
Another original aim of the Reagan administration, under the influence of the
monetarists, or Friedmanites, was to keep the government’s hand completely off exchange
rates, and to allow these rates to fluctuate freely on the market, without interference by the
Federal Reserve or the Treasury. A leading monetarist, Dr. Beryl W. Sprinkel, was made
Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Policy in 1981 to carry out that policy. But this
non-intervention is long gone, and Secretary Baker, aided by the Fed, has been busily
engaged in trying to persuade other countries to intervene to help coordinate and fix
exchange rates. After being removed from the Treasury, after several years, Sprinkel was
sent to Siberia, and ordered to keep quiet, as head of the Council of Economic Advisors; and
Sprinkel has recently announced that he will leave the government altogether.
Moreover, the policy of foreign aid and foreign lending conducted or encouraged by
the government has proceeded more intensely than even under previous administrations.
Reagan has bailed out the despotic government of Poland with massive loans, so that Poland
could repay its Western creditors. A similar policy has been conducted in relation to many
shaky or bankrupt third world governments. The specter of bank collapse from foreign loans
has been averted by bailouts and promises of bailout from the Federal Reserve, the nation’s
only manufacturer of dollars, which it can produce at will.
Wherever we look, then, on the budget, in the domestic economy, or in foreign
trade or international monetary relations, we see government even more on our backs than
ever. The burden and the scope of government intervention under Reagan have increased,
not decreased. Reagan’s rhetoric has been calling for reductions of government; his actions
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have been precisely the reverse. Yet both sides of the political fence have bought the rhetoric
and claim that it has been put into effect. Reaganites and Reaganomists, for obvious reasons,
are trying desperately to maintain that Reagan has indeed fulfilled his glorious promises;
while his opponents, intent on attacking the bogey of Reaganomics, are also, and for opposite
reasons, anxious to claim that Reagan has really put his free market program into operation.
So we have the curious, and surely not healthy, situation where a mass of politically
interested people are totally misinterpreting and even misrepresenting the Reagan record;
focusing, like Reagan himself, on his rhetoric instead of on the reality.
6. What of the Future?
What of the Future? Is there life after Reaganomics? To assess coming events, we
first have to realize that Reaganomics has never been a monolith. It has had several faces;
Reaganomics has been an uneasy and shifting coalition of several clashing schools of
economic thought. In particular, the leading schools have been the conservative Keynesians,
the Milton Friedman monetarists, and the supply-siders. The monetarists, devoted to a
money rule of a fixed percentage increase of money growth engineered by the Federal
Reserve, have come a cropper. Fervently believing that science is nothing else but
prediction, the monetarists have self-destructed by making a string of self-confident but
disastrous predictions in the last several years. Their fate illustrates the fact that he who lives
by prediction shall die by it. Apart from their views on money, the monetarists generally
believe in free markets, and so their demise has left Reaganomics in the hands of the other
two schools of Reaganomics, neither of whom are particularly interested in free markets or
cutting government.
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The conservative Keynesians – the folks who brought us the economics of the
Nixon and Ford administrations – saw Keynesianism lose its dominance among economists
with the inflationary recession of 1973-74, an event which Keynesians stoutly believed could
never possibly happen. But while Keynesians have lost their old éclat, they remain with two
preoccupations: (1) a devotion to the New Deal, Fair Deal, Great Society, Nixon-Ford-Carter
status quo, and (2) a zeal for tax increases to moderate the current deficit. As for government
spending, never has the thought of actually cutting expenditures crossed their minds. The
supply-siders, who are weak in academia but strong in the press and in exerting enormous
political leverage per capita, have also no interest in cutting government spending. To the
contrary, both conservative Keynesians and supply-siders are prepared to call for an
increasing stream of goodies from Big Daddy government. Both groups have also long been
keen on monetary inflation. The supply-siders have pretty much given up the idea of tax
cuts; their stance is now to accept the deficit and oppose any tax increase. On foreign
monetary matters, the conservative Keynesians and the supply-siders have formed a
coalition; both groups embrace Secretary of Treasury Baker’s Keynesian program of fixed
exchange rates and an internationally coordinated policy of cheap money.
Politically, the Republican presidential candidates can be assessed on their various
preferred visions of Reaganomics. Vice-President Bush is, of course, a conservative
Keynesian and a veteran arch-enemy of supply-side doctrine, which he famously denounced
in 1980 as “voodoo economics.” Secretary of Treasury James Baker is a former Bush
campaign aide. White House Chief of Staff Howard Baker is also in the conservative
Keynesian camp, as was Paul Volker, and is Alan Greenspan. Since former White House
Chief of Staff Donald Regan was a fellow-traveler of the supply-siders, his replacement by
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Howard Baker as a result of the Iran-Contra affair was a triumph of conservative Keynesians
over the supply-siders. This year, in fact, our troika of Economic Rulers, Greenspan and the
two Bakers, has all been squarely in the conservative Keynesian camp.
Senator Robert Dole, the other Republican front-runner for President, is also a
conservative Keynesian. In fact, Bob Dole carried on the fight for higher taxes even when it
was relatively unfashionable inside the administration. So devoted to higher taxes is Bob
Dole, in fact, that he is reputed to be the favorite presidential candidate of the Internal
Revenue Service. So if you like the IRS, you’ll love Bob Dole.
Congressman Jack Kemp, on the other hand, has been the political champion of the
supply-siders ever since supply-side was invented in the late 1970s. Kemp’s call for higher
government spending, and approval of deficits, monetary inflation, and fixed exchange rates,
all attest to his supply-side devotion. Jack Kemp, however, has for some reason not struck
fire among the public, so Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick stands ready in the wings to take up the
cause if Kemp should fail to rally. I confess I have not been able to figure out the economic
views of the Reverend Pat Robertson, although I have a hunch they do not loom very large in
his world outlook.
Although there are a lot of Democratic candidates out there, it is hard at this point to
distinguish one from another, on economic policy or indeed on anything else. As Joe Klein
recently wrote in a perceptive article in the New York magazine, the Republicans are engaged
in an interesting clash of different ideas, while the Democrats are all muddily groping toward
the center. To make the confusion still greater, Klein points out that Republicans are busily
talking about “compassion,” while the Democrats are all stressing “efficiency.” One thing is
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fairly clear; Congressman Gephardt is an all-out protectionist, thoroughly jettisoning the old
Democratic commitment to free trade, and is the most ardent statist in agricultural policy.
On monetary and fiscal policy, the Democrats are the classic party of liberal
Keynesianism, in contrast to the Republican policy of conservative Keynesianism. The
problem is that, in the last decade or two, it has become increasingly difficult to tell the
difference. Apart from supply-sider Kemp, we can expect the President of either party to be
a middle-of-the-road liberal/conservative Keynesian. And so we can expect the next
administration’s economic policies to be roughly the same as they are now. Except that the
rhetoric will be different. So we can, therefore, expect diverse perceptions and responses to
a similar reality by the public and by the market. Thus, if Jack Kemp becomes President, the
public will wrongly consider him a champion of hard money, budget cutting, and the free
market. The public will, therefore, underestimate the wildly inflationist reality of a Kemp
administration. On the other hand, the public probably perceives the Democrats to be wilder
spenders relative to the Republicans than they really are. So should the Democrats win in
1988, we can expect the market to overestimate the inflationary measures of a Democratic
administration.
All of this, along with the universal misperception of Reaganomics, illustrates once
more the wisdom of those incisive political philosophers, Gilbert and Sullivan: “Things are
not always what they seem; skim milk masquerades as cream.”
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As far as I can make out, a “loophole”
is any income that any of us have earned that
hasn’t yet been taxed away by the federal government.
Or, rather, a loophole is money the other guy has earned that you wouldn’t
at all mind him having to fork over to the government. In short,
my money is fairly earned and shouldn’t be taxed away;
the other guy’s money constitutes one vast loophole.
Murray N. Rothbard
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LECTURE 7
DEFICITS AND TAXES: THE ECONOMICS OF THE NEXT FOUR YEARS
Murray N. Rothbard
(Delivered on c. January 11, 1989)

The economics of the next four years depends on the new George H. W. Bush
Administration, and the first question to ask about Mr. Bush is: Did he receive any mandate
from the American voters? It is generally held that he did not because of the negative nature
of his campaign. But it is clear from Bush’s repeated campaign themes that he did receive
three clear mandates from the American people. One is never, never to join the American
Civil Liberties Union. Second, is to make sure that Willie Horton is not released once more
from jail. Mandates indeed, but unfortunately it is not very clear what they have to do with
the functions and powers of the President.
1. Tax Hike Hysteria
But there is one clear Bush campaign theme that does involve the powers of the
Presidency: The famous “read my lips: no new taxes.”
Traditionally, incoming presidents enjoy a “honeymoon” for their first year, or at
least the first one hundred days, in office. But George Bush’s honeymoon might prove to be
the shortest on record. He wasn’t even allowed to savor his victory overnight. Only a few
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minutes after Bush was declared the winner by the networks, the media pundits came on and
announced: “Well, that’s it. George Bush’s honeymoon is now over. He is now in for four
years of exquisite torture.” In particular, the signal for the end of the honeymoon was given
about an hour after the victory by Robert Dole, Republican minority leader in the Senate.
Dole, with the characteristic lack of the conventional courtesies that makes him the delight of
the Washington press corps, bitterly denounced the president-elect. In the course of his
philippic, Dole, of whom it is said that he has never met a tax increase he doesn’t like,
particularly mentioned Bush’s failure to come out for an increase in taxes in order to lower
the deficit.
Starting the next morning, the day after the election, the media, almost as one man,
joined by a concerted chorus of businessmen and, of all things, serried ranks of named and
unnamed economists, jumped with both feet on the president-elect. They sternly lectured
Bush that he must, immediately and without delay, give up the nonsense about no raise in
taxes and commit himself to whopping tax increases. Their only worry was that Bush might
gum up the works by taking his repeated pledge to the voters seriously.
The political arguments about a tax increase are fairly obvious. Liberal Democrats
and moderate Republicans claim that Bush must work in conciliatory fashion with Congress
and go along with tax increases. Conservatives insist that Bush stick by his pledge and stand
firm against Congress and against increasing taxes. The nation’s economists, however, claim
to be above the political fray and to speak in the name of “value-free economic science.”
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan has warned Bush that unless the budget
deficit is reduced immediately, we might face a financial crisis and recession. It turns out
that one of Greenspan’s favorite proposals is a stiff fifteen-cent-a-gallon increase in gasoline
- 159 -

taxes, a proposal that is perhaps understandable coming from a multi-millionaire who is
driven around in a limo paid for by the American taxpayers. It is not surprising that an even
bolder proposal comes from Greenspan’s beloved predecessor as Fed Chairman, Paul
Volcker, who has called for a sixty-cent a gallon increase in the gasoline tax, plus increased
taxes on alcohol and tobacco. I suppose that, if we should ever face Volcker’s huge boost in
gas taxes, we could all take consolation in the great sacrifice Volcker would be making by
paying a higher tax on his famous cigars.
C. Fred Bergsten, head of the Institute of International Economics, has been all over
the media insisting on a tax increase. If there is no increase by Easter, he warns, there is a
“grave risk” of financial crisis and recession. Equally insistent and ubiquitous has been
Lawrence Chimerine, head of the economic forecasting firm, The WEFA Group, who adds
sharply that “anybody who knows how to do arithmetic knows there has to be a tax
increase.” In an open letter to Mr. Bush the day after the election, Mark Memmott, economic
writer for USA Today, claiming to speak for a consensus of business leaders and economists,
demands a big tax increase. Memmott and Company then highlight the advice of Professor
Murray Weidenbaum, former Chairman of The Council of Economic Advisers under
Reagan. Weidenbaum claims that this tax increase could be successfully pushed through,
provided that every group in the country suffer equal pain. As we saw in the so-called Tax
Reform Act of 1986, economists are specialists in the infliction of equal pain, or at least in
plenty of pain period.
The mania for a tax increase among economists came to a head in a comment by the
distinguished Harvard economist Richard Cooper. Noting that last October’s stock market
crash persuaded President Reagan to agree to raise taxes, Cooper suggested that a similar
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crisis might persuade Mr. Bush to break his unfortunate pledge. “In that context,” opined
Professor Cooper, “a crisis might actually be welcome.” Note the interesting shift in
emphasis: Whereas Chimerine, Bergsten, Greenspan, and others demand a tax increase in
order to stave off a financial crisis, Professor Cooper, in his infatuation with higher taxes,
actually welcomes a crisis in order to bring about the increase! Notice too that economic
policy has gotten curiouser and curiouser; in the old days a tax cut was supposed to be the
way to help cure a recession; now a tax increase does the same thing. Which once again
gives point to the old joke that economics professors ask the same exam questions year after
year and they guard against students cheating by continually changing the answers.
Many of the nation’s businessmen also joined the chorus, calling loudly for a tax
increase to lower the deficit. In addition to being persuaded, or bamboozled – depending on
your point of view – by the nation’s economists, some of the pro-tax business leaders seem to
have something else on their minds than altruism. One clue is provided by one of the
nation’s most astute economists, Jerry Jordan, chief economist of First Interstate Bancorp,
and formerly a member of Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers: “The business people
mostly want him [Bush] to raise taxes because they think it won’t be their taxes that will go
up.” Jordan explained that since business taxes got raised a great deal in the so-called tax
reform of 1986 – such as repeal of the investment credit, reduction of depreciation
allowances, and a large increase in capital gains taxes – “that it should go to the consumers
this time.” But there is another obscure but important point: many existing corporate
managers, especially inefficient ones, dislike above all else hostile takeovers outbidding them
for control of their corporation. Thus, Robert E. Mercer, Chairman of Goodyear Tire and
Rubber, so eager for a tax hike that he suggests that Congress be “responsible” enough to
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override a Bush veto, particularly wants a tax that would stop or restrict hostile takeovers and
leveraged buyouts. Echoing this sentiment, Senator Dole has claimed that huge corporate
takeovers do not benefit the economy, and therefore that tax deductions on leveraged buyout
loans should be eliminated, or, in a phrase we will analyze later, that this “loophole” should
be closed. In fact, corporate takeovers benefit the stockholders and the economy by shifting
control of assets from less efficient to more efficient owners.
Foreign dignitaries quickly joined in the seemingly orchestrated bombardment for
higher taxes. In a series of press interviews in the two days following the election, European
and Japanese finance officials joined in the strident call for a tax increase in the United
States. These governments have been helping the U. S. government to stabilize exchange
rates of the dollar at current levels, and they warned that they expect a U. S. tax increase and
deficit reduction as the price for their continued cooperation. The Bank of Japan issued a
report timed to come out on November 9th, calling for higher U. S. taxes, and similar
peremptory demands were made by Pierre Beregovoy, Finance Minister of France, Nigel
Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer in Great Britain, and Onno Runing, Finance Minister
of the Netherlands. Dominique Graber, an economist with the Banque Paribas in France,
warned that “the only solution is to increase taxes and to do it in a substantial way,” although
Onno Runing of the Netherlands was gracious enough to leave the specific path of reducing
the deficits, reducing expenditures or raising taxes, “up to the Americans.” And Timothy
O’Dell, international economist with UBS Phillips and Drew in London, threatened us with
what we might call the “Cooper solution.” He warned that European financial officials may
decide to pull the plug on the dollar, or as he put it, to decide “that the Americans may need,
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if you like, to face a more substantial crisis in the financial markets to come to their senses” –
that is, to agree to increase taxes. [New York Times, November 12, 1988]
But the foreign finance officials see a ray of light on the horizon: their former
counterpart as Secretary of Treasury James Baker. Baker’s appointment as Secretary of State
was hailed immediately by the German and French Finance Ministers.
So frantic are these pundits and establishment experts that they are even managing
to conscript the stock and foreign exchange markets into their campaign. Usually, everyone
acknowledges that the markets hardly speak in a single, clear voice, especially in short-run,
day-to-day movements, which are notoriously murky and difficult to interpret. But the fall in
stock prices in the few days after the election, as well as the fall of the dollar in the exchange
market, are being uniformly interpreted as messages from the market oracle that George
Bush must raise taxes. It certainly seems strange that both sets of markets, which have not
seemed to give much of a darn about the American budget deficit for many months, should
suddenly decide to speak with one voice beginning November 9th.
Let us instead put the movement of the dollar in perspective. It is true that, from
November 8th to November 11th, when the foreign exchange market was supposedly giving
its clarion call for the U. S. to raise taxes, the value of the dollar in terms of Japanese yen fell
by 2.3 percent. But, on the other hand, it is conveniently forgotten that on the five days
before Election Day, November 8th, the dollar rose by 1.1 percent in terms of the yen. So
what are we supposed to conclude? That the market was happy about U. S. deficits just
before the election and suddenly turned gloomy the next day? Come on, assorted pundits,
economists, and financial officials: Give us a break!
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Unfortunately, I haven’t got time to go into the crisis warned against or threatened
by the foreign dignitaries, but it concerns a threat to stop cooperating in keeping up the value
of the dollar in exchange markets by buying dollars with their currencies. I can only say here
that the entire aura of crisis around the value of the dollar is an artificial creation of attempts
by governments and central banks, ever since James Baker became Secretary of the Treasury
in 1985, to fix the exchange rate of the dollar at some level or other – usually any existing
rate – which these politicians and experts think to be superior to rates set by the supply and
demand forces of the market. Here is a continuing and losing struggle of governments
against the market, and the governments are doomed to lose, bringing repeated currency
crises in their wake. As usual, the main cause of any economic problem turns out to be
government intervention.
I would like to pause for a moment and note a refreshing contrast to the tax hike
mania of all these distinguished economists and statesmen: the resounding vote on Election
Day by which 82 percent of our fellow Nevadans endorsed a constitutional amendment to
prohibit, ever, any income tax in the State of Nevada.
2. “Wiggle Room”
Unfortunately, as they well realize, there is hope for our massed phalanx of high tax
hysterics. That hope lies in what we might call “advanced semantics.” When his aides and
handlers found Ronald Reagan stubbornly resistant to the idea of a tax increase, they were
repeatedly able to convince him to back such increases by the simple but effective device of
calling it by a different name. “No Mr. President,” they would say, “this is not a tax increase,
no indeed. It is [and here take your pick] ‘a rise in Social Security premiums’; ‘an increase
in user fees’; ‘a tax reform’; ‘fairness, or equity, in taxes’; ‘tightening IRS enforcement’; and
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(my two favorites) ‘closing the loopholes’ and ‘revenue enhancement.’ We’re not raising
taxes, Mr. President, we’re just enhancing revenue.” “Oh, ok, then.”
Governor Dukakis’s favorite form of not-raising taxes – I guess every politician has
his favorite – was, you may remember, to double the number of IRS agents. This pledge
was, I am sure, one of the reasons that Dukakis did not exactly endear himself to the
American people. In denouncing his suggestion, in fact, George Bush eloquently declared
that “we need fewer IRS agents, not more.” This sentiment met with thunderous applause,
including my own, but I am afraid that I would not bet my life on reductions in the IRS staff
during the next four years.
Advanced semantics led Ronald Reagan to raise taxes, in the name of not-raising
taxes, in every year of his administration, very often in the name of “closing loopholes.” We
may ask: what are these “loopholes” that we are supposed to close? As far as I can make
out, a “loophole” is any income that any of us have earned that hasn’t yet been taxed away by
the federal government. Or, rather, a loophole is money the other guy has earned that you
wouldn’t at all mind him having to fork over to the government. In short, my money is fairly
earned and shouldn’t be taxed away; the other guy’s money constitutes one vast loophole.
To return to George Bush, in his press conference the day after Election Day, he
reiterated his adamant dedication to not raising taxes. However, he gladdened the hearts of
the tax hike hysterics by allowing himself what the Los Angeles Times enthusiastically called
“wiggle room.” The wiggle method: our old friend advanced semantics. Thus, Bush went
out of his way to endorse a tax increase taking effect next January 1st. This is an income tax
surtax of fifteen percent on all Medicare recipients with incomes over $10,000 to help pay for
Reagan’s new program of catastrophic health insurance. “I don’t consider that taxes,”
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George Bush commented, “some charge that that was a tax increase. I don’t think it was.”
Well, that’s interesting. If that’s not taxes, what in the world is it? We haven’t been told yet,
but I am sure that President Bush will come up with a linguistically entertaining, if not
exactly convincing, answer.
As might be expected, C. Fred Bergsten led the cheering section at Bush’s
statement on the Medicare tax. “What Bush said,” Bergsten exulted, “looks like a very
skillful way to start opening the door to various revenue increases. By volunteering when he
didn’t have to that the Medicare approach is ok, he appears to be signaling that certain tax
increases might be acceptable.” Indeed.
Not only that: at this same news conference, George Bush was pressed on whether
he would resist all kinds of “revenue enhancements,” which, as the Los Angeles Times neatly
explained, is “a code word on Capitol Hill for various types of subtle rather than explicit tax
increases.” [November 10, 1988] Bush answered, “You’d have to define for me what you
mean by revenue enhancement.” But surely, Mr. Bush has been around Washington long
enough to know all too well what “revenue enhancements” are – tax increases by a sweeter
name – and his answer signals that he is prepared to go the enhancement route. What price
lip-reading now?
3. Analyzing the Deficit
Having discussed the sudden post-election hysteria designed to pressure George
Bush into raising taxes, let us analyze the deficit itself. The federal government has been
blithely sailing along on an annual deficit of approximately $200 billion since 1983.
But what about the much-ballyhooed Gramm-Rudman Law? Doesn’t that law
insure a phased reduction of the deficit until a balanced budget is achieved in a few years?
- 166 -

The answer is no. What Congress giveth, Congress can take away. No law by a past
Congress can bind a current one. There has been a law on the books since the 1970s
prohibiting Congress from incurring any deficit. Why haven’t we heard of this law?
Because it is a dead letter, since who is going to enforce it? Short of the courts sending
federal marshals to lock up every Congressman, I don’t see how such a law can be
enforceable. Similarly, there is a law on the books putting a rigid ceiling on the total
accumulated national debt. Congress deals with that rigid cap by simply raising that cap
every year or two. The same can be done to the Gramm-Rudman targets; they can simply be
changed every year and the balanced budget postponed indefinitely into the rosy but
increasingly hazy future.
Avoiding such defective crutches as Gramm-Rudman, then, let us look at Mr.
Chimerine’s stern arithmetic. If we want to reduce the deficit, or even eliminate it altogether,
do we have to raise taxes?
We should, in the first place, look at the supply-side doctrine. The supply-side
economists claim that orthodox economists, by which they mean everyone except
themselves, overlook the crucial distinction between tax rates and tax revenues. A lowering
of tax rates could so stimulate saving or income or whatever is being taxed, that the
government would wind up with more revenue, and everyone would be happy. The most
famous and extreme version of this doctrine was the notorious “Laffer Curve,” in which a cut
in income tax rates, particularly marginal tax rates in the upper income brackets, would so
stimulate savings and income that federal revenues would increase and balance the budget.
But scarcely more convincing is the common Reaganomic view that we don’t have
to worry about the deficit because we will eventually “grow out of it” – that is, keep tax rates
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the same and wait for revenue to grow over the years. For even this milder variant of the
supply-side doctrine is subject to the devastating and unanswerable question: How long are
we supposed to wait for this pie in the sky?
Actually, supply-side theory makes far more sense when it is applied to taxes that
are more specific, and less sweeping, than the income tax. Thus, a few years ago, the
government of the District of Columbia, searching, as governments are wont to do, for higher
revenue, seized on the idea of an enormous increase in the gasoline tax in the District. Since
it is duck soup for drivers in the District to nip across the border to Maryland or Virginia to
fill their gas tanks, the District government rapidly found that the amount of gas sold fell
drastically, and so did their gasoline revenues. Shamefacedly, they had to back down and
repeal the tax increase.
George Bush’s proposal for a cut in the capital gains tax falls somewhere in the
murky zone between the D. C. gas tax and the income tax. In the tax reform act of 1986, the
capital gains tax suddenly rose from a top of 20 percent to a top of 33 percent. George Bush
has proposed lowering the capital gains tax back to 15 percent.
Would this cut raise or lower tax revenues, and so would it help or hurt the deficit
problem? Which will outweigh the other, the lower tax rate on capital gains, or the greater
volume of investments and capital transactions? Well, who knows? As usual in such
matters, expert economic forecasters differ drastically. Harvard economist Lawrence
Lindsey, using Treasury Department models, forecasts an increased revenue from a Bush
capital gains tax cut of between $6 and $10 billion per year – itself a hefty range. On the
other hand, the Congressional Budget Office estimates, from the same tax cut, a decreased
revenue of from $4 to $8 billion per year.
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Perhaps the best way to tackle this problem is to forget about the deficit in this case
and do what is best on the capital gains question itself, which would mean, in my view, to
adopt the tax cut with enthusiasm. But this would also imply, of course, that there are other
questions in economic life than the deficit, and that some of these problems might even be
more important.
Forgetting about the supply-siders, then, let us return to Mr. Chimerine’s lesson in
arithmetic. If we want to reduce or eliminate a $200 billion or $150 billion deficit, do we
have to increase taxes? Sorry, but that’s not the answer my own arithmetic comes up with.
If you spend more than you take in, you have two choices: either keep the deficit and finance
it, or eliminate the deficit. If you decide to finance it, you again have two choices: you can
either borrow the money from someone, or you can sell your assets to pay for the deficit.
(Or, of course, some combination of the two.) If you are an individual, or organization, or a
state or local government, these are the only ways you can finance a deficit. If you are the
federal government, however, there is another cherished arrow in your quiver. You can also
finance your deficit by printing money. The central government of any country has the
monopoly power to print as much money as it desires. In older and simpler days, the
Treasury Departments of each country would simply print the currency outright and spend it;
in these more sophisticated times, the same deed can be accomplished less directly by
financing the deficit through the banking system, guided by the central bank, which in our
case is the Federal Reserve.
If you have ever wondered, then, why it is that even governments of wealthy states
and localities habitually turn to the federal government for aid and comfort, there is your
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answer. State and local governments can tax their citizens, but they can’t legally print money
to finance their cherished expenditures.
Let us linger a moment on a neglected way to finance a deficit: selling your assets.
An individual who did that would be rightly considered financially unsound. But since the
federal government can always bail itself out of potential bankruptcy either by taxing more or
by printing money, ordinary financial considerations do not apply. In fact, those of us who
believe that government has grown far too large and owns far too many assets compared to
the private sector, would welcome the sale of federal assets – now known as “privatization” –
for its own sake. Useful assets would be transferred from government to the productive
private sector. And at the same time, the deficit would be financed without having to raise
taxes. Critics of selling government assets to finance a deficit object that this is a one-shot
solution, and that next year more such assets will have to be sold to the private sector. As far
as I am concerned, that’s ok. I am willing to continue the process for as long as it takes to
finance the deficit.
This brings us to our main question: What’s so terrible about the deficit anyway? I
have long objected to deficits, and I have been particularly critical of free-market economists
who had attacked deficits all their lives, and then, after a few months in the Reagan
Administration, found all sorts of ingenious reasons why deficits are harmless after all. I
haven’t changed my views on any of this. But I think it is important not to succumb to antideficit hysteria, and to ponder the question: Are deficits the worst thing in life? Or, is there
anything worse than deficits? Surely, before jumping out of the deficit frying-pan, we should
take care we don’t jump into some more dangerous fire.
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So what’s so terrible about deficits? First, it means sustaining a high level of
government spending, which means in turn that huge amounts of resources are being
siphoned out of the productive private sector to be largely wasted in governmental
boondoggles. But this brings us back to the final vital bit of deficit arithmetic. If we set
aside the sale of government assets, there are two ways to cut or eliminate a deficit: either
raise taxes or cut government spending. If the government is spending $200 billion more
than it is taking in, it can either raise taxes by $200 billion or it can cut its own spending by
$200 billion. There is the crucial arithmetic that Mr. Chimerine and his colleagues have
apparently forgotten. And that means a real cut, a cut-cut, and not a cut in the rate of
increase, or a cut in the percentage of spending to GNP, or a cut in projected future estimates,
or all the other ways in which the federal government has managed to redefine the word
“cut” in the public arena. Another example of creative semantics! A cut of $200 billion in
government spending would yield two glorious benefits at the same time: (1) it would stop
wasting $200 billion of resources in the government sector, and (2) it would get rid of the
deficit.
Where can federal spending be cut? The standard analysis is that almost nothing
can be cut, everything is locked in some entitlement or other. But as I have already pointed
out, nothing can lock Congress in: whatever it has locked, it can unlock. My favorite
proposal is simply to go back to the last year of the much maligned wild-spending Carter
Administration. If Congress simply passed an overriding law decreeing that no government
agency can spend more than it did in fiscal year 1980, that would mean an over 40 percent
cut in federal spending. We could then enjoy a hefty tax cut and even some reduction of the
national debt. There is my plan: an immediate spending cut, a tax cut, a balanced budget
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and even a little reduction of the debt. Of course, I would prefer going back to some
previous fiscal year, maybe Thomas Jefferson, but heaven forbid that I be considered
unrealistic in my policy proposals.
George Bush also has a proposal on government spending, but I’m afraid it is not
nearly as satisfactory. He proposes a “flexible freeze” of federal expenditures. To me
“flexible freeze” sounds like what Bill Buckley would call an “oxymoron,” a contradiction in
terms. Apparently he means a freeze of total spending adjusted by the rate of inflation, with
each item going up and down within it. Frankly, I will believe it when I see it. In the
meanwhile, I’ll take my own inflexible retroactive freeze.
Reluctantly setting aside the sale of government assets or a drastic cut in
government spending, we finally complete the question: what’s so terrible about a deficit?
Given a level of government spending, one bad thing about a deficit is that it will be
inflationary if financed by the banking system. If it is financed by the public it will not be
inflationary, but it will increase the tax load on future generations, and it would, as would
monetary inflation, crowd out private investment. That is, it would take private savings,
which are low anyway compared to other developed countries, and funnel them into
government boondoggles. But does raising taxes improve the situation? No, because raising
taxes doesn’t just crowd out private savings; it taxes them away altogether. Even inflation,
as destructive as it is, is not quite as bad as an equivalent tax. For inflation means that you
might have to pay $100 for a loaf of bread; but the equivalent in taxation would mean that
you wouldn’t have money to buy bread at all. I submit that raising taxes to eliminate a
deficit is the equivalent of a doctor curing a patient of bronchitis by shooting him to death;
the cure is worse than the disease.
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In short, deficits are bad and the budget should be balanced: but only if the balance
comes by cutting government spending or the deficit is financed by selling government
assets. Otherwise, raising taxes is worse than continuing the deficit.
4. George Bush and the Dread “L” Word
Finally, the more we contemplate the likely policies of the Bush Administration, the
more it seems that his proposed spending will be more “flexible” than “freeze.” On health
care, for example, we have already seen that Bush supports the new Reagan program of
catastrophic health insurance. He also advocates expansion of the existing health care
program for mothers with infants, spending an estimated $180 million in the first year – and
the first year, for all federal spending programs, is but the foot in the door. Mr. Bush wants
to expand Medicare programs, and proposes to allow families with incomes above those now
eligible for Medicaid to “buy in” to this subsidized program: once again, the annual estimate
of $120 million is only for the first year. Indeed, Princeton Professor Uwe Reinhardt
estimates that if George Bush is serious about this Medicaid buy-in program it would incur
“at least $30 billion” in additional federal expenditures per year. [New York Times,
November 1, 1988]
And this is just the beginning. The nation’s savings and loan industry is now not
only philosophically bankrupt, it is rapidly going down the tubes. Once again, good old papa
government, Democrat or Republican, stands ready to bail out the entire industry. FSLIC,
the federal “insurance” agency for savings and loans, has supposedly “insured” all their
deposits, but “insurance” in this field is only a grisly joke, and the FSLIC itself is now
admittedly bankrupt. The next savior is supposed to be the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, which already has its hands full “insuring” all the deposits in the nation’s
- 173 -

commercial banks. But FDIC “insurance” is just as pathetic; it has no money either. The
government estimates that soon the FDIC will have to pour out somewhere between 50 and
100 billion dollars to save the savings and loan banks – and government always
underestimates its future costs. Where will the FDIC get the money from? Not to worry, for
as everyone knows, behind the FDIC stands the might of the U. S. Treasury and the Federal
Reserve, and they can always get the money – either by taxing us more or by printing the
money and handing it to the banks or depositors.
Mr. Bush has also pledged to pour far more federal resources into the war against
drugs. Since the drug problem seems to have escalated in direct proportion to the amount of
money government has spent to combat it, the money and manpower that the Bush
Administration might pour into this war can prove to be endless. Mr. Bush has also
advocated spending more money on housing; also, since he has pledged to go down in
history as the “education president,” presumably that means pouring a lot more federal
money into some form of education. He has also promised to be an environmentalist
president, dedicated to cleaning up Boston Harbor, setting aside a great deal more land for
national parks, and pledging to prohibit oil drilling off the California coast.
George Bush spent a great deal of his presidential campaign pinning Dukakis with
the dread “L” word, liberalism. Since acknowledging or fleeing from the “L” word has now
become a vital part of American politics, it might be well to figure out what liberalism is. I
have always believed that a liberal is a person who believes in expanding government, and
especially the federal government, intervention and power over every aspect of economic and
social life. In that case considering his likely programs if Mr. Bush is searching out liberals,
he might well be advised to look in the mirror. Conservative Republican Congressman
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Connie Mack has just eked out a victory in the Florida Senate race over his moderate
Democratic opponent, Representative Buddy Mackay, by using the blunt but effective
slogan, “Hey Buddy, you’re a liberal!” But in view of the shaky nature of his resistance to
higher taxes, and considering Mr. Bush’s likely programs for the years ahead, from expanded
health care to fixing exchange rates, we might well conclude, “Hey George! You’re a
liberal!”

FINIS
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